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Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation presents three studies of an economic analysis of federally-funded housing 
assistance programs on the quality of a recipient’s locational decisions, psychological well-being, 
and labor market outcomes. It features a restricted-use of the administrative data (household-level) 
and self-reported social survey, conducted by the Moving to Work (MTW) Project Research Lab 
at the University of Illinois between 2012 and 2014, providing the opportunity to evaluate current 
policy initiatives under the MTW demonstration in Champaign County, Illinois. 
The first chapter explores the role of costs of moving in Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) 
households’ locational choices, and identifies mobility-disadvantaged groups, in the sense of 
having a high-level of costs of moving, by comparing different levels of disutility based on 
recipients’ characteristics. I choose households that receive housing vouchers from 2008 to 2010 
in the twin cities of Champaign-Urbana in Illinois, and track their residential locations using 
restricted-use administrative data. I also adopt the Mixed Logit (ML) model to model residential 
location choices, incorporating recipients’ heterogeneous preferences over costs of moving factors, 
as well as other various dimensions of dwelling and neighborhood attributes. Our main findings 
suggest that the HCV households are responsive to costs of moving factors indicating that there is 
a strong disincentive for the internal relocation costs, such as costs of reluctance to leave the 
familiar surroundings (social ties), and search costs for housing and daily-use facilities in potential 
destination neighborhoods. Also, the results from the ML model reveal a high-level of statistical 
significance of heterogeneity in preferences among the HCV households, providing empirical 
evidence to support that recipients would face different levels of costs of moving based on their 
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characteristics. Moreover, the comparison of the distribution of individual-level random 
coefficients for costs of moving factors among defined mobility-disadvantaged groups is analyzed.  
In the second and third chapters, I present an interim evaluation of the MTW self-
sufficiency program on participants’ psychological well-being and labor market outcomes. As of 
2010, the HACC has joined the MTW demonstration, and the MTW self-sufficiency program has 
taken effect in Champaign County, Illinois, from January 2013. Specifically, under the self-
sufficiency statutory objective, the HACC requires all working-age (18-54), able-bodied (non-
disabled) family members to work a certain number of hours or attend job training, educational 
institutions, or programs that assist recipients to obtain employment and achieve economic 
independence within the certain years. Moreover, MTW PHAs enforce participation in Local Self-
Sufficiency (LSS) programs that assists in advising on career planning and assessing barriers to 
employment of non-compliant households. Also, if a participating household maintains a 
continuous state of non-compliance until the next re-certification, then a penalty or sanction will 
be imposed to the household to compel compliance or to limit its welfare benefits, often resulting 
in loss of subsidy.  
Since the program could work through multiple channels to influence heads’ psychological 
well-being and labor market outcomes, I calculate the average program effects estimated by the 
Difference-in-Differences models. My study makes use of the self-reported survey, referred to as 
“Housing and Self-Sufficiency Social Survey,” which includes questionnaire items which assess 
respondents’ psychological well-being, as well as household-level socioeconomic characteristics 
for the treatment and control group households. For this analysis, I followed head of households 
that completed the surveys in 2012 and 2014. In the body of the dissertation, I present a detailed 
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discussion of the analysis on attrition and balancing tests, as well as the applied econometric 
models to understand the findings.  
In the second chapter, I find that, in the short-run, the MTW self-sufficiency program leads 
to an increase of case heads’ depression (CES-D) and a decrease of hopefulness (ATH); however, 
there is no significant short-run impact on anxiety (GAD). These results can be explained by the 
fact that, overall, the adverse effects, derived from challenges and hardships to fulfill self-
sufficiency requirements, dominate other effects in the short-run. We also hypothesize that non-
white and low-educated head of households may suffer more from psychological stress. We indeed 
observe a larger negative impact in hopefulness (ATH) and depression (CES-D), lending support 
to our hypothesis that heads of low-socioeconomic status may face greater levels of psychological 
stress. 
The findings in the third chapter suggest that, in the short-run, the MTW self-sufficiency 
program leads to a significant increase in participants’ probability of working in the labor force 
(7.8-10.3 percentage-points) and number of weekly hours worked (3.0-3.7 hours). We also 
hypothesize that the MTW self-sufficiency program may have larger effect sizes in head of 
households with relatively less barriers to employment (such as heads with no criminal history, 
and having at least a high-school diploma or GED). On the other hand, we expect that the program 
may have relatively lower effect sizes in single mother households since they are often thought to 
be the most disadvantaged group which may experience further barriers to economic self-
sufficiency. Our results lend support to the first hypothesis that the program has a larger impact on 
labor market outcomes of the participants with less barriers to employment; however, we do not 
find the statistical short-run impact for single mother households. 
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CHAPTER 1 
DECONCENTRATING THE POOR VIA PUBLIC 
HOUSING POLICY: WHAT REALLY MATTERS? 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Low-income minorities’ spatial concentration constitutes a highly visible phenomenon in the 
United States, and, many scholars, politicians, and public administrators have examined its causes 
and consequences over the past several decades. Kain (1968) asserts that the suburbanization of 
low-skilled jobs, combined with involuntary racial and ethnic segregation of the poor in the inner-
city, could create excessive supply of low-skilled workers relative to available jobs in the inner-
city, thereby worsening their labor market outcomes. Cutler and Glaeser (1997) show that Blacks 
in highly segregated metropolitan areas have substantially worse economic (idleness and earnings) 
and social (schooling and single parenthood) outcomes than those who lived in integrated areas. 
Case and Katz (1991) find that residence in dilapidated neighborhoods in which peers are involved 
in risky behaviors would increase youth’s likelihood of the analogous behaviors.  
 In an effort to alleviate these negative consequences, the U.S. government has implemented 
various public housing policies and programs aimed at deconcentrating the poor, in addition to its 
traditional objectives which assist low-income households to secure safe, decent, and affordable 
housing. Especially, the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program has received national 
attention on achieving deconcentration of poverty due to its unique feature – allowing recipients 
the opportunity to rent privately owned housing in any neighborhood within the jurisdiction of the 
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local Public Housing Authority (PHA) – which gives far more flexibility about where to live than 
other types of public housing programs do. However, previous studies present mixed results for 
its locational outcomes. Specifically, evidence suggests that the HCV program is effective to move 
a large share of recipients out of the most distressed neighborhoods compared to public housing 
residents and low-income households without housing vouchers (i.e. Devine, Gray, Rubin, & 
Taghavi, 2003; Hartung & Henig, 1997; Katz, Kling, & Liebman, 2001; Newman & Schnare, 
1997). However, the HCV households tend to make short-distance moves and re-cluster in 
economically declining neighborhoods (Goering, Stebbings, & Siewert, 1995; Khadduri, 2001; 
Pendall, 2000; Popkin & Cunningham, 2000). Some studies also assert that the HCV program, by 
itself, does not ensure an access to low-poverty neighborhoods (Lens, Ellen, & O’Regan, 2011; 
McClure, 2010; Turner, 1998).  
A series of descriptive studies, with regard to these ambiguous results, address the burden 
of relocation costs as a main barrier preventing a recipient’s geographic mobility – difficulties in 
searching for a housing unit of adequate quality at the right price and a landlord who is willing to 
participate in the program (Devine et al., 2003; Finkel & Buron, 2001; Kennedy & Finkel 1994); 
and disutility from unwilling disruption of social ties built in the origin neighborhood (Briggs, 
1988; Briggs & Turner, 2006; Clampet-Lundquist, 2004). Additionally, Popkin and Cunningham 
(2000) show that recipients would experience different levels of relocation costs based on their 
personal problems (disability, illness, lack of communication skills, substance abuse, criminal 
backgrounds), as well as financial constraints (transportation, security deposits) and potential 
discrimination against race, income, and household composition (large family size, families with 
children).  
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 In this study, we explore the role of costs of moving in HCV households’ locational 
choices, and identify mobility-disadvantaged groups, in the sense of having a high-level of costs 
of moving, by comparing different levels of disutility based on recipients’ characteristics. We 
choose households that receive housing vouchers from 2008 to 2010 in the twin cities of 
Champaign-Urbana in Illinois, and track their residential locations using restricted-use 
administrative data (HUD-50058 Family Report records) received from the Housing Authority of 
Champaign County (HACC). We adopt the Mixed Logit (ML) model (McFadden & Train, 2000; 
Train 1998) to model recipients’ location choices, incorporating recipients’ heterogeneous 
preferences over costs of moving factors, as well as other various dimensions of dwelling and 
neighborhood attributes. 
Our main findings suggest that the HCV households are responsive to costs of moving 
factors indicating that there is a strong disincentive for the internal relocation costs, such as costs 
of reluctance to leave the familiar surroundings (social ties), and search costs for housing and 
daily-use facilities in potential destination neighborhoods. Also, the results from the ML model 
reveal a high-level of statistical significance of heterogeneity in preferences among the HCV 
households, providing empirical evidence to support that recipients would face different levels of 
costs of moving based on their characteristics. Specifically, we find that younger head of 
households, disabled head of households, and households that stayed in the same neighborhood 
between 2006 and 2008 show relatively higher-level of disutility for leaving the neighborhood. 
Also, large-family households, single-parent households, disabled head of households, and 
minimum TTP households have a higher-level of disutility for an additional distance from the 
origin neighborhood (information cost or search cost), compared to the disutility of all analyzed 
households. Moreover, regression results show that recipients’ locational choices are determined 
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by relative differences of exogenous neighborhood attributes between the origin and destination 
neighborhoods.1 These results support the previous descriptive findings that recipients’ locational 
choices would be determined not only by relative difference of exogenous neighborhood attributes 
(a rational decision to choose a neighborhood which provides a higher-level of satisfaction), but 
also by the internal relocation costs of moving based on recipients’ characteristics. Similarly, 
Shroder (2002) defines that voucher holders’ lease-up processes are determined by weighing likely 
trade-offs among the net benefits of relocation and cost indicators. 
The remainder of the study proceeds as follow: Section 1.2 discusses general background 
information about the HCV program including eligibility, family obligations, and previous 
locational outcomes. Section 1.3 details locational factors and empirical model, and Section 1.4 
describes data and sampling design. Section 1.5 discusses model selection and regression results. 
Section 1.6 discusses limitations of the study, and Section 1.7 closes with concluding comments. 
 
1.2. Program Eligibility and Family Obligations 
As of the mid-1970s, the HCV program, which is operated by the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) in conjunction with over 3,000 local PHAs, has grown to 
represent the nation’s largest housing subsidy program serving more than 2.2 million low-income 
households. Eligibility for the HCV program is determined by applicants’ annual gross income 
which must not exceed 50 percent of the local (area) median income.2 Also, the PHAs must provide 
                                                          
1 We include several neighborhood attributes such as crime rates, rental vacancy rates (housing market tightness), 
proportion of white population, and spatial accessibility measures to job opportunities and persons below the poverty 
threshold. These variables would not be exogenous in the longitudinal framework since the relocation of a recipient 
(low-income household) would change the value of the corresponding variables; however, in this study, we assume 
that such variables are pre-determined in the cross-sectional location choice model.  
2 Program eligibility and family obligations are identical across all PHAs.  
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75 percent of its housing vouchers to applicants whose income does not exceed 30 percent of the 
local median income. Since the number of housing vouchers issued is limited, the PHAs often 
faces excess demand from eligible households. In most instances, housing vouchers are distributed 
based on a queuing mechanism, where the applicants on the waiting list the longest receive priority 
when a housing voucher is available. Upon voucher approval to the HCV program, a prospective 
tenant searches for potential housing in any neighborhood, as long as the unit meets the program 
requirements. First, the HCV households are generally obliged to pay Total Tenant Payment 
(TTP), which is 30 percent of their monthly income, towards housing, but the PHAs also allow 
recipients to spend up to an additional 10 percent of their income in situations where the gross rent 
exceeds the locally designated payment standard representing the maximum allowable rent. 
Second, the PHAs provide a range of appropriate unit size, based on household size and 
composition, and the basic housing quality standards that the unit must meet for consideration. 
Third, a landlord is willing to participate in the program. If a housing unit satisfies the program 
requirements, the PHAs execute a Housing Assistance Payment contract directly paid to the 
landlord. Also, a recipient can be terminated from the assistance for fraudulent or criminal behavior 
or after eviction by a landlord for a serious lease violation. 
 
1.3. Empirical Model 
Locational choices are made based on a recipient’s unique set of priority and preference over 
dwelling and neighborhood attributes. Relative differences in location factors among the choice 
alternatives motivate the recipient to choose a location that maximizes utility (satisfaction) in a 
given time. The traditional multinomial logit (MNL) has, for a long time, provided the foundation 
for discrete choice analysis due to its advantages in terms of closed-form solution and simplicity 
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of interpretation and use (McFadden, 1973); however, the MNL model assumes independence 
from irrelevant alternatives (IIA). This assumption may be realistic in some situations, but can be 
a strong assumption if the number of choice alternatives get large because it assumes that all 
alternatives are independent.  
As an alternative model to relax the IIA assumption, the nested multinomial logit (NL) 
model has often been utilized particularly in locational choice literature (i.e. Anas & Chu, 1984; 
Chattopadhyay, 2000; Nechyba & Strauss, 1998; Quigley 1985). The NL captures a recipient’s 
heterogeneous preference over various dimensions of location factors by interacting location 
factors with the recipient’s demographic or economic characteristics. However, in applied studies, 
it is common to have limited information of those characteristics, and the MNL and NL models 
result in capturing relatively lower levels of heterogeneous preferences on location factors (Morey 
& Rossman, 2003; Hole, 2008).  
The mixed logit (ML) model, also known as a random coefficient model, has been applied 
in a number of fields because it provides a flexible and computationally practical econometric 
method for any discrete-choice model deriving random utility maximization (McFadden, 1978; 
McFadden & Train, 2000). The ML model defines that the utility of each household is a function 
of the alternative-specific variables with coefficients that include the fixed and random effects 
reflecting the household’s heterogeneous preferences. This feature, indeed, motivates the use of 
the ML model in this study since it is less realistic to assume that all recipients have the same 
preference for costs of moving factors, as well as other location factors (i.e. Popkin & Cunningham, 
2000; Shroder, 2002).3 Additionally, the ML model relaxes the IIA property (Greene & Hensher, 
                                                          
3 Shroder (2002) finds that having many friends and close distance to church in the origin neighborhood would 
reduce recipients’ lease-up rates in low-poverty neighborhoods; however, dissatisfaction with the origin neighborhood 
would increase lease-up rates. Also uncertainty about finding an apartment in a new neighborhood and distance from 
the origin neighborhood would reduce lease-up rates in low-poverty neighborhoods. 
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2003; McFadden & Train, 2000; Train, 1998). The utility of a recipient i who chooses a location j 
after residing in location k is described by: 
(1)     𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑘 = (𝛼1𝑖
′ 𝐹𝑘𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑖
′ 𝑉𝑘𝑗) + 𝛼3𝑖
′ 𝑋1𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑘
′
𝑋2𝑗
𝑋2𝑘
+ 𝛾′𝑀 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘, 
where X is a vector of choice-specific dwelling and neighborhood attributes, and M is a vector of 
mobility status variables. Dwelling attributes, 𝑋1, include Bedroom, Single-family home (binary), 
and three binary variables for age of structure – Built before 1960, Built in 1960s, and Built in 
1970s. Neighborhood attributes,  𝑋2, contain Percent white, Crime rate, and Rental vacancy rate. 
Additionally, we include two spatial accessibility measures to low-skilled jobs (Access to work) 
and to persons below the poverty threshold (Proximity to the poor).4, 5 The description of the 
variables is given in Table 1.1. We use relative measures of neighborhood attributes taking the 
form of destination-to-origin ratios because recipients’ locational choices are based on the 
comparison of designation neighborhood attributes with those of the current neighborhood of 
residence. The larger the value of the ratio from one, the greater the relative difference between 
                                                          
4 We collect all available job opportunities in the study area, but some of these jobs require higher level skills or 
education, and recipients are less likely to apply for these jobs because they are less-skilled and educated. To account 
for recipients’ ability, we calculate the accessibility measure based on low-skills required jobs. Defined low-skilled 
jobs include manufacturing (31), wholesale trade (42), retail trade (44), transportation and warehousing (48), health 
care and social assistance (62), and accommodation and food services (72). The numbers in parenthesis indicate North 
American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) codes. 
5 Raphael (1998) and Gurmu, Ihlanfeldt, and Smith (2008) use similar accessibility measures – access to jobs and 
the supply of laborers competing for the jobs – to explain the effect of spatial variation in the demand for labor and 
labor supply on economic activities. In our study, these variables are utilized in slightly different form and context. 
Specifically, the Access to work variable is included as a pulling factor capturing recipients’ preference on accessing 
job opportunities (having more chance to have jobs). On the other hand, the Proximity to the poor variable works as a 
pushing factor capturing the level of disutility for close distance to the poor, often associated with a low level of 
services and resources. It may also capture part of disutility derived from concentration of low-skilled laborers 
competing for available jobs, as discussed in Raphael (1998) and Gurmu, Ihlanfeldt, and Smith (2008).  
The accessibility measure is a gravitational measure of access that places less weight on relatively distant subjects. 
To account explicitly for distance in accessibility measure, more distant subjects are discounted using a distance decay 
function defined as: 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑙 = ∑ 𝑁𝑙 ∗ 𝑒𝑥 𝑝(−𝛿𝑑𝑗𝑙) .
𝐿
𝑙=1   𝑁𝑙 represents the number of low-skilled jobs for the Access 
to work variable and number of persons below the poverty threshold for the Proximity to the poor variable in Census 
Tract l; 𝑑𝑗𝑙  is the distance in kilometer between the centroids of Census Tract j and l; and 𝛿 is a discounting multiplier, 
ranged from 0.1 to 1. These accessibility measures include all Census Tracts in Champaign County, IL.  
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the destination and origin neighborhoods, thereby resulting in greater influence in their locational 
choice probabilities.  
We define that costs of moving are incurred when a recipient decides to make an inter-
neighborhood move (Census Tract level). Specifically, we use a binary variable for move (or 
stay), 𝐹𝑘𝑗, to capture fixed costs of moving reflecting psychic costs – reluctance to leave familiar 
surroundings (social ties) –, and distance in kilometer between centroids of the origin and 
destination neighborhood, 𝑉𝑘𝑗, to capture variable costs of moving – information costs (or search 
costs) for housing, transportation, schools, and other closely related daily-use facilities in a 
destination neighborhood. Specifically,  𝐹𝑘𝑗  is equal to one if a move is required to locate in 
neighborhood j, and equal to zero if the recipient decides to stay in the same neighborhood k 
between 2008 and 2010.6 The underlying intuition is that information costs would be low if a 
recipient has already lived in the same neighborhood, and it tends to increase as distance from the 
origin neighborhood increases. Also, mobility status variables (fixed effects) are included to 
capture unobservable economic and non-economic characteristics, generated in the mobility flow 
from each poverty region to another, compared to the reference category of staying in the same 
poverty region.7  
𝛼𝑖 is a vector of household-specific coefficients, accounting for recipient i’s preferences, 
and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘 is an error term which is independent and identically distributed (IID). The most distinct 
                                                          
6 O’Keefe (2004) uses the conditional logit model to analyze migration patterns of Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) recipients in California, and uses the similar variables – binary move (or stay) variable and distance 
between centroids of the origin and destination, capturing potential costs of moving (psychic and search costs). 
Similarly, Davies, Greenwood, and Li (2001) investigate interstate migration behaviors and include a binary ‘non-
migration’ variable and distance and its quadratic term to capture costs of moving.  
7 We classify the study area into three regions by poverty rates (aggregate neighborhoods) – low-poverty region 
(under 10 percent population below poverty threshold), mid-poverty region (between 10 percent and 30 percent 
poverty rates), and high-poverty region (over 30 percent poverty rates). 
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feature of the model is to capture the fixed effects and non-observable random effects in the vector 
of coefficient 𝛼𝑖 which can be specified as: 
(2)     𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝑖, 𝜇𝑖~(0, 𝑊), 
where 𝛼 indicate the fixed effects, and 𝜇𝑖 is a random effect that is distributed with mean zero and 
variance-covariance matrix W. Specifically, the coefficients vary among the households with 
density 𝑓(𝛼𝑖|𝛼, 𝑊). The probability to choose alternative j is the integral over all possible values 
of 𝛼𝑛: 
(3)      𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘 = ∫ (
𝑒
(𝛼1𝑖
′ 𝐹𝑘𝑗+𝛼2𝑖
′ 𝑉𝑘𝑗)+𝛼3𝑖
′ 𝑋1𝑗+𝛽𝑗𝑘
′ 𝑋2𝑗
𝑋2𝑘
+𝛾′𝑀
∑ 𝑒
(𝛼1𝑖
′ 𝐹𝑘𝑙+𝛼2𝑖
′ 𝑉𝑘𝑙)+𝛼3𝑖
′ 𝑋1𝑙+𝛽𝑗𝑘
′ 𝑋2𝑙
𝑋2𝑘
+𝛾′𝑀
𝑙
)  𝑓( 𝛼𝑖)𝑑 𝛼𝑖  
 The unconditional probability is a weighted average of a product of standard logit formulas, 
evaluated at different values of 𝛼𝑖, with the weights given by the density 𝑓(𝛼𝑖). Since likelihood 
function, defined as, 𝐿𝐿(𝜃) = ∑ ln𝑃𝑟𝑖(𝜃)
𝑁
𝑖=1 , cannot be solved analytically in the ML model 
(Brownstone & Train, 1998; Train, 2003), it is therefore approximated using simulation methods. 
The simulated log-likelihood is given by, 
(4)      𝑆𝐿𝐿(𝜃) = ∑ ∑ 𝑑𝑛𝑗  ln 𝑃𝑖𝑗?̌?
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
 ,     
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒   𝑃𝑖𝑗?̌? =
1
𝑅
∑ 𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑘(𝛼
𝑟)
𝑅
𝑟=1
, 
where R is the number of replications and is the r th draw from 𝑓(𝛼|𝜃), and 𝑑𝑛𝑗 = 1 if i choose j 
after residing in location k, and zero otherwise. The maximum simulated likelihood estimator is 
the value of 𝜃 that maximizes SLL.8 
                                                          
8 The MIXL model is estimated using Stata’s “mixlogit” command by Hole (2007). 
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1.4. Data 
For this research, the HACC provided the HUD-50058 Family Report records – the restricted-use 
administrative data which contain HCV households’ demographic, economic, dwelling, and 
location information. Our sample contains 736 low-income households that received housing 
vouchers from 2008 to 2010. We also use Census-Tract level neighborhood attributes, collected 
from the five-year (2006-2010) American Community Survey (ACS) of the U.S. Census Bureau. 
Additional source of information for type and number of available jobs were achieved from Zip 
Code Business Patterns (ZBP). Also, we received three-year (2008-2010) crime data from policy 
department of each city of Urban and Champaign. 
  
1.4.1. Housing Choice Voucher Households 
Table 1.2 details the comparison of descriptive statistics for all HCV households that received 
housing vouchers from 2008 to 2010, and households that made inter-neighborhood moves and 
households that stayed in the same neighborhood between 2008 and 2010. Specifically, we observe 
that 217 (about 29 percent) households moved to another neighborhood. This trend in mobility 
could be attributed to a number of factors. Particularly, households that made inter-neighborhood 
moves tended to have more Black- and female-headed households. Also, on average, households 
that made inter-neighborhood moves had greater household size than households that stayed in the 
same neighborhoods, but there was no noticeable change in gross income between the two groups. 
Additionally, about half of the households that made inter-neighborhood moves (46 percent) chose 
to stay in the same poverty region, while 31 percent of the households moved to lower-poverty 
regions, and 23 percent of the households moved to higher-poverty regions.  
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1.4.2. Sampling of Alternatives 
We construct a location choice set by collecting information of rental housing units occupied by 
all HCV households between 2006 and 2010. This provides a reasonable and feasible set of 
location alternatives since a certain type of housing that has not been rented by the HCV 
households over time may be less likely to be available to other voucher holders due to various 
reasons like unaffordable rent, inadequate quality of housing, or potential income and racial 
discrimination. Additionally, we could increase the number and variety of housing options by 
including occupied (observed) rental housing units between 2006 and 2010, compared to those 
only observed in 2010, because the latter may provide a less feasible set of location alternatives in 
cases where the HCV households were disproportionately distributed to certain neighborhoods 
duringthat year. Since not all housing units were observed in each year, we estimate the fitted value 
of gross rent obtained with the (pooled) OLS regression of observed gross rent on a set of dwelling 
characteristics, as well as year fixed effect, neighborhood fixed effect (Census Tract level), and 
landlord fixed effect (Table 1.3). 
We characterize the HCV households’ locational choice alternatives of 1613 discrete 
housing types. Each housing type is a collection of housing units that are located within the same 
neighborhood and share the identical characteristics (Bedroom, Single-family home, Built before 
1960, Built in 1960s, and Built in 1970s). Then, we take the average of the rental prices of all rental 
housing units with same housing type.9 By constructed design of location choice alternatives, we 
need to have 3024 (= 7 * 2 * 8 * 27) location alternatives – the number of bedrooms which range 
                                                          
9 Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Tra (2010) use the similar approach to characterize the choice set.  
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from 0 to 6 (7 types), dwelling type which is a binary variable for single-family home or not (2 
types), and three binary variables for age of structure (8 types), and 27 neighborhoods.  
However, the actual number of combinations (1613 housing types) that exist in the study 
area is much smaller since, for example, a certain neighborhood contains no zero or six bedroom 
units or single-family home type, while some neighborhoods have all types of housing. Therefore, 
instead of sampling location alternatives from each neighborhood, we classify the study area into 
three regions by poverty rates (aggregate neighborhoods) – low-poverty region (under 10 percent 
population below poverty threshold), mid-poverty region (between 10 percent and 30 percent 
poverty rates), and high-poverty region (over 30 percent poverty rates) – and randomly draw 
location alternatives from each region. Table 1.4 presents descriptive statistics for distribution of 
housing types in defined three regions.  
Additionally, in order to establish a more relevant choice set, a recipient’s choice set is 
conditioned on two program requirements which are affordable rent and eligible unit size (Table 
1.5). Location alternatives that fail to meet these requirements were excluded from the recipient’s 
choice set. Also, since using an all choice set would render the estimation computationally 
infeasible when the number of housing alternatives grows large, we employ a uniform sampling 
scheme. A recipient’s choice set includes a chosen location alternative and a random sample of 29 
location alternatives from the remaining non-chosen (or rejected) alternatives. Also, each HCV 
household has a different choice set because random draw of housing alternatives is repeated per 
household basis.  
Table 1.6 presents descriptive statistics for dwelling and neighborhood attributes of chosen 
and non-chosen location alternatives. We observe that, on average, chosen location alternatives 
required less inter-neighborhood moves, shorter-distance move between centroids of the origin 
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and destination neighborhoods, a greater number of bedrooms, more single-family home, and 
younger age of structure. Also, the HCV households tended to choose a neighborhood with less 
proportion of white population, more access to low-skilled jobs, lower access to people below 
poverty threshold, less crime rate and rental vacancy rate relative to those in the origin 
neighborhood.   
 
1.5. Results 
The modeling results using the MNL model are reported in Table 1.7. Model 1 reports estimates 
of the parameters of the location factors without specifying the interaction terms with recipients’ 
characteristics. The results suggest that HCV households prefer a unit that allows a higher level of 
consumption for non-housing goods indicating that, ceteris paribus, they would prefer more 
income and lower family share of rent. The coefficient on costs of moving variables are negative 
and highly significant, suggesting that there exists a strong disutility to make an inter-
neighborhood move (psychic costs) and additional distance from the origin neighborhood 
(information costs). Also, recipients have a higher demand for a greater number of bedrooms, 
while they have a lower demand for older housing. The results show that recipients prefer higher 
percentage of vacant rental housing, lower crime rates, and lower proportion of white population 
relative to origin neighborhood characteristics. Also, the coefficients on spatial accessibility 
variables suggest that, on average, recipients prefer more access to job opportunities, but prefer 
not to close to the poor relative to origin neighborhood characteristics. Moreover, the coefficients 
of mobility status variables show that movers prefer to move to mid-poverty regions, while they 
prefer not to move out from mid-poverty regions. 
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Model 2 reports the coefficients of a similar model specification but with the quadratic 
term of the Bedroom variable and location factors interacted with head’s age, and household size 
and income variables. The results show that a larger-family household tends to choose a greater 
number of bedrooms and single-family home unit. Also, on average, high income households have 
a higher demand for a greater number of bedroom, but have a lower demand for single-family 
home. Black head of households prefer less proportion of white population in the neighborhood 
(the Percent white variable becomes insignificant after adding the interaction term). Moreover, 
statistical significance of the quadratic term of the Bedroom variable indicates a non-linear relation 
between number of bedrooms and decision preferences. In the same table, we also report the 
likelihood ratio index and the goodness-of-fit measurement of the models using the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).10 All results support that 
the Model 2 is preferred specification.  
In Table 1.8 we report estimates of the parameters obtained from the NL model using the 
specification of Model 2 in Table 1.7. We consider two-tier nested structures of residential location 
choices. Specifically, in Model 3, recipients make a binary choice for housing type at the top level 
and make a multinomial choice for housing unit at the bottom level. In Model 4, recipients make 
a multinomial choice among low-poverty, mid-poverty, and high-poverty regions at the top level, 
and make a multinomial choice for housing unit at the bottom level. The results show that the 
estimated coefficients have the same sign with those in Model 2 specification. Also, the goodness-
of-fit measurements indicate that using NL (Model 3) slightly improves the fit.  
                                                          
10 The likelihood ratio index is a measure of goodness-of-fit, defined as 1-[SSL(θ)/SLL(0)], where SLL(θ) is the 
value of the simulated log-likelihood function at the estimated parameters, and SLL(0) is the value with all parameters 
equal to zero.  The index ranges from zero to 1, and the higher value indicates better fit.  
15 
 
The modelling results using the ML model are reported in Table 1.9. The random 
coefficients in the ML model are specified to be normally distributed and estimated by maximum 
simulated likelihood using 300 Halton draws. We allow random coefficients for costs of moving 
factors (Move and Distance), Bedroom, Single-family home, and binary variables for the age of 
structure (Built before 1960, Built in 1960s, and Built in 1970s). We fix the coefficient for the Non-
housing consumption variable since a normally distributed Non-housing consumption coefficient 
implies that some recipients may prefer a housing that lowers consumption on non-housing goods 
which is counter-intuitive. Similarly, we fix coefficients for neighborhood characteristics since it 
is not convincing that recipients may prefer a neighborhood with higher crime rates, lower vacant 
rental housing (less housing options),  less access to jobs (less chance to have jobs), and closer 
proximity to the poor (often associated with lower level of services and resources) relative to the 
origin neighborhood. Also, interaction term between Percent white and Black head of household 
captures most of the variations in the Percent white variable, and allowing random coefficient for 
Percent white does not actually improve the fit.  
Also, the mean coefficients estimated by the ML model tend to be greater than those with 
fixed coefficients models. For example, the variance in error term in the MNL model is greater 
than the variance in the extreme value error term in the ML model, so the normalization makes the 
parameter estimates in the MNL model smaller in magnitude than those in the ML model (Revelt 
& Train, 1998). This result indicates that disutility of the inter-neighborhood move and distance 
from the origin neighborhood get larger after accounting for recipients’ unobserved heterogeneous 
preferences.  
For further analysis on the goodness-of-fit among different model strategies, we include 
additional interaction terms into the MNL and NL models and compare the AIC and BIC as model 
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selection criteria. Figure 1.1 shows that, according to the AIC criteria, the MNL and NL models 
have a better fit over the ML model if the degree of freedom is less than mid-30s, while the BIC 
shows that the ML model overwhelms other models in all cases. Additionally, for a better 
understanding of how the model explains HCV households’ residential location choices, we 
compare the predicted and actual residential distribution, aggregated over neighborhood, of the 
HCV households using estimates from the ML model (Table 1.10). The results show that the 
predicted residential distribution of recipients across neighborhoods is close to the actual 
residential distribution (only 0.38 percentage point difference). 
Figure 1.2 presents kernel density plots of the distribution of the household-level estimates 
for random coefficient variables in the ML model. Specifically, the results from the ML model 
reveal a high-level of statistical significance of heterogeneity in preferences among the HCV 
households, providing empirical evidence to support that recipients would face different levels of 
costs of moving based on their characteristics. On the basis of previous studies, we define several 
mobility-disadvantaged groups – large-family (≥5) households (insufficient supply of rental 
housing; discrimination against household composition), Black-headed households (racial 
discrimination), households that stayed in the same neighborhood between 2006 and 2008 (strong 
social ties), disabled head of households (personal illness), single-parent households (financial 
difficulties), and minimum TTP (the lowest income group) households (financial difficulties).11 
Also, we define additional subgroups by head’s age, female-headed households, and households 
with high gross income (75th percentile).  
Table 1.11 and 1.12 summarize descriptive statistics for costs of moving random 
coefficient variables (household-level) across the defined subgroups comparing levels of disutility 
                                                          
11 See Briggs (1988), Briggs and Turner (2006), Clampet-Lundquist (2004), Devine et al. (2003), Finkel and 
Buron (2001), Kennedy and Finkel (1994), and Popkin and Cunningham (2000).  
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for an inter-neighborhood move and distance from the origin neighborhood, respectively.12 The 
results show that younger (age ≤ 33) head of households, disabled head of households, and 
households that stayed in the same neighborhood between 2006 and 2008 show relatively higher-
level of disutility for an inter-neighborhood move, while large-family households tend to have a 
lower-level of disutility for the move, compared to one of all analyzed households. Also, large-
family households, single-parent households, disabled head of households, and minimum TTP 
households have relatively higher-level of disutility for an additional distance from the origin 
neighborhood, while younger head of households and households with high gross income show a 
lower-level of disutility for the distance than one of all analyzed households. However, we cannot 
observe a noticeable difference in distribution of the coefficients for some types of households (i.e. 
female-headed households and Black-headed households) since those households occupy the 
majority of the samples. Additionally, we present kernel density plots of the distribution of each 
costs of moving random coefficient across the subgroups in Figure 1.3 and 1.4.  
 
1.6. Limitations 
We acknowledge that costs of moving factors may over- or under-estimate relocation costs if the 
study area is small. Previous studies use a binary move (or stay) variable to capture potential 
psychic costs in case of a long-distance move (i.e. inter-County, States, or international migration) 
reflecting non-monetary costs incurred if movers cannot maintain the relationships with friends, 
families, and familiar surroundings. If the study area is small, it may be difficult to hold the same 
assumption since movers may feel little loss of social ties if the actual distance is quite small. 
                                                          
12 We report both mean and median values, as well as other descriptive statistics. But, we tend to use median 
values for the comparison (interpretation) since mean values may be less robust when skewness gets large.  
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Similarly, we calculate distance between centroids of the origin and destination neighborhoods. 
However, this measure of distance fits exactly in cases where a recipient is located in both 
centroids of the neighborhoods. For example, if a recipient makes an inter-neighborhood move, 
but, if the actual distance is small, then distance between centroids of the neighborhoods 
overestimates the costs. On the other hand, if a recipient makes an inter-neighborhood move, but, 
if the actual distance is larger than the distance between centroids of the neighborhoods, then the 
distance variable underestimates the costs. Additionally, our study has an external validity issue – 
main findings would be limited to regions (and PHAs) that share similar characteristics with 
Champaign-Urbana cities (and HACC) since heterogeneity inherent in different regional 
characteristics would affect unobserved household characteristics, resulting in different residential 
behaviors.  
 
1.7. Conclusion 
In this study, we explore the role of costs of moving in HCV households’ locational choices, and 
identify a different level of disutility of relocation costs based on recipients’ economic and 
demographic characteristics. Our main findings suggest that the HCV households are responsive 
to costs of moving factors indicating that there is a strong disincentive for the internal relocation 
costs, such as costs of reluctance to leave the familiar surroundings (social ties), and search costs 
for housing and daily-use facilities in potential destination neighborhoods. Also, our findings 
indicate that a particular group of households bearing a high-level of disutility for costs of moving 
tends to have limited abilities or resources to make a geographic move and relocated in a targeted 
(often low-poverty) neighborhood.  
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These findings may provide insight into the effectiveness of the program recently 
implemented in HACC. Specifically, as of 2015, the HACC has recognized insufficient affordable 
rental units, derived from the difference between the Fair Market Rents (FMRs) and market-rate 
rents, as a barrier limiting locational choices of HCV households. In order to closely reflect local 
housing market conditions, HACC has introduced policies to re-define FMRs and the payment 
standard in smaller geographic areas. The underlying assumption is that spatially-adjusted rental 
subsidies expand housing options in high-cost neighborhoods, and implicitly assumes that the 
recipients will exercise their mobility option to find housing in high-opportunity neighborhoods. 
However, this may be a reasonable assumption if a decrease in family share of rents is enough to 
compensate costs over the expected net benefits of mobility, given the identical housing market 
conditions.  
Our findings suggest that the program may exert larger relocation effect when the HACC 
provides additional assistance which reduces costs of moving to recipients with higher costs of 
moving (i.e. housing search resources – mobility counselling services, web-based search including 
housing-options that accept the vouchers, legal advisor, social networks and support). This is 
consistent with findings from Shroder (2002) and Galiani, Murphy and Pantano (2012) that more 
intense counselling service for housing search raises the lease-up rate in low-poverty 
neighborhoods. 
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1.8. Tables 
 
 
Table 1.1: Description of Location Factor Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Non-housing consumption = Monthly consumption of non-housing goods 
   (monthly gross income – monthly family share of rent) 
Cost of Moving* 
  Move = 1 if inter-neighborhood move is required, 0 otherwise 
  Distance = Distance in kilometer between centroids of the origin and  
  destination neighborhood 
  
Dwelling Characteristics 
  Bedroom = Number of bedrooms 
  Single  family home = 1 if single-family home, 0 otherwise 
  Built before 1960  = 1 if built before 1960 
  Built in 1960s = 1 if built in 60s  
  Built in 1970s = 1 if built in 70s 
  
Neighborhood Characteristics (Census Tract) 
  Percent white = Percentage of white persons in neighborhood 
  Access to work = Proximity to demand for labor of a low-skilled jobs 
  Proximity to the poor = Proximity to persons below the poverty threshold 
  Crime rate = 3-year average of number of crimes per 1,000 persons in 
  neighborhood 
  Rental vacancy rate = Percentage of vacant rental housing in neighborhood 
  
Mobility Status* 
  LM = 1 if a recipient moved from low-poverty region to mid-poverty  
  region between 2008 and 2010, 0 otherwise 
  LH = 1 if a recipient moved from low-poverty region to high-poverty  
  region between 2008 and 2010, 0 otherwise 
  ML = 1 if a recipient moved from mid-poverty region to low-poverty  
  region between 2008 and 2010, 0 otherwise 
  MH = 1 if a recipient moved from mid-poverty region to high-poverty  
  region between 2008 and 2010, 0 otherwise 
  HL = 1 if a recipient moved from high-poverty region to low-poverty  
  region between 2008 and 2010, 0 otherwise 
  HM = 1 if a recipient moved from high-poverty region to mid-poverty  
  region between 2008 and 2010, 0 otherwise 
  NN = 1 if a recipient stayed in the same region between 2008 and 2010,  
  0 otherwise (reference category) 
Notes: * Low-poverty region is defined by the neighborhoods with less than 10 percent of population below poverty 
threshold. Mid-poverty neighborhood has between 10 and 30 percent of population below poverty threshold, and high-
poverty neighborhood has more than 30 percent of population below poverty threshold.    
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 All 
Sampled  
Households 
Movers Stayers 
Socioeconomic Characteristics    
  Head, Age 42.46 
(12.42) 
37.89 
(9.45) 
44.37 
(13.01) 
  Head, Female 0.90 
(0.29) 
0.95 
(0.21) 
0.88 
(0.32) 
  Head, Black 0.84 
(0.37) 
0.87 
(0.34) 
0.83 
(0.38) 
  Household, Size 3.06 
(1.65) 
3.50 
(1.61) 
2.88 
(1.63) 
Household, Young child  
  (<6) 
0.42 
(0.49) 
0.55 
(0.50) 
0.37 
(0.48) 
  Household, Gross income 15,766.47 
(9,451.12) 
15,746.88 
(8,816.02) 
15,774.67 
(9,712.54) 
    
Mobility Status*    
  LM 0.02 
(0.15) 
0.08 
(0.28) 
– 
(–) 
  LH 2.72 x e-3 
(0.052) 
9.22 x e-3 
(0.36) 
– 
(–) 
  ML 0.05 
(0.21) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
– 
(–) 
  MH 0.04 
(0.20) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
– 
(–) 
  HL 0.01 
(0.11) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
– 
(–) 
  HM 0.03 
(0.17) 
0.11 
(0.31) 
– 
(–) 
  NN 0.84 
(0.37) 
0.46 
(0.50) 
– 
(–) 
    
Obs. 736 217 519 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. All statistics are based on HCV 
households’ 2010 information. Income-related variables are expressed in 2010 
dollars. * Low-poverty region is defined by the neighborhoods with less than 10 
percent of population below poverty threshold. Mid-poverty neighborhood has 
between 10 and 30 percent of population below poverty threshold, and high-
poverty neighborhood has more than 30 percent of population below poverty 
threshold.    
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Table 1.3: Regression Used for Estimating Monthly Gross Rent, 2006-2010 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Bedroom 193.538*** 
(2.218) 
174.979*** 
(2.530) 
174.979*** 
(7.581) 
Single family home 79.872*** 
(3.894) 
53.206*** 
(5.726) 
53.206*** 
(15.804) 
Built before 1960 -11.638*** 
(3.833) 
-22.206*** 
(6.689) 
-22.206** 
(10.331) 
Built in 1960s 0.757*** 
(3.755) 
-24.667*** 
(6.465) 
-24.667** 
(11.000) 
Built in 1970s 19.934 
(4.052) 
-22.683*** 
(8.394) 
-22.683* 
(12.204) 
Cons. 315.612*** 
(6.497) 
387.879*** 
(21.843) 
387.879*** 
(33.700) 
    
Year fixed effect Y Y Y 
Neighborhood fixed effect N Y Y 
Landlord fixed effect N Y Y 
Clustered Standard Error N N Y 
    
R2 0.81 0.900 0.90 
Obs. 6,050 6050 6,050 
Notes: Robust-standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Monthly gross rent 
(dependent variable) is expressed in 2010 dollars. There exists 27 
neighborhoods (Census Tracts). Roust-standard errors in Column (3) are 
clustered in landlord-level (569 clusters). Different levels of clustered robust-
standard errors were performed and did not make noticeable change in the level 
of statistical significance.  
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Table 1.4: Distribution of Location Choice Alternatives 
 
 Gross 
Rent  
One 
bedroom 
units 
Two 
bedroom 
units 
Three 
bedroom 
units 
Four or  
more bedroom 
units 
Single-family 
home 
Built 
before 
1960 
Built in 
1960s 
Built in 
1970s 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Low-poverty regions 903.98 
(225.03) 
26 
(18.98) 
68 
(14.81) 
107 
(15.71) 
37 
(11.01) 
108 
(10.08) 
76 
(10.98) 
68 
(16.27) 
49 
(16.28) 
Mid-poverty regions 938.66 
(226.19) 
96 
(70.07) 
317 
(69.06) 
408 
(59.91) 
217 
(64.58) 
674 
(62.93) 
441 
(63.73) 
255 
(61.00) 
214 
(71.10) 
High-poverty regions 966.23 
(196.61) 
15 
(10.95) 
74 
(16.12) 
166 
(24.38) 
82 
(24.40) 
289 
(26.98) 
175 
(25.29) 
95 
(22.73) 
38 
(12.62) 
Obs. 1613 137 459 681 336 1071 692 418 301 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parenthesis in column (1), and percentages (frequencies) are reported in parenthesis from column (2) to column (9). Monthly 
gross rent is expressed in 2010 dollars. Low-poverty neighborhood is defined by the area with less than 10 percent of population below the poverty line. Mid-
poverty neighborhood has between 10 and 30 percent of population below poverty, and high-poverty neighborhood has more than 30 percent of population below 
poverty line.    
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Table 1.5: Typical Public Housing Authority Voucher Size Based on  
Number of Persons in Household 
 
 Minimum number of  
persons in household 
Maximum number of  
persons in household 
0 bedroom 1 1 
1 bedroom 1 2 
2 bedrooms 2 4 
3 bedrooms 3 6 
4 bedrooms 4 8 
5 bedrooms 5 10 
                                        Source: HUD Housing Choice Voucher Program Guidebook 
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Table 1.6: Summary Statistics of Chosen and Rejected Location Alternatives 
 
 Chosen Location  
Alternatives  
Rejected Location  
Alternatives 
Non-housing consumptiona 823.96 739.87 
   
Cost of Moving   
   Move 0.30 
(0.46) 
0.93 
(0.26) 
   Distanceb 1.36 
(2.54) 
5.05 
(3.11) 
   
Dwelling Characteristics   
   Bedroom 2.73 
(0.95) 
2.30 
(0.99) 
   Single-family home 0.60 
(0.49) 
0.51 
(0.50) 
   Built before 1960  0.36 
(0.48) 
0.41 
(0.49) 
   Built in 1960s 0.25 
(0.43) 
0.27 
(0.44) 
   Built in 1970s 0.16 
(0.37) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
   
Neighborhood Characteristics   
   Percent whitec 1.17 
(1.38) 
1.89 
(3.34) 
   Access to workc 40.97 
(40.14) 
33.98 
(35.54) 
   Proximity to the poorc 1.08 
(0.55) 
1.89 
(2.17) 
   Crime ratec 1.09 
(0.59) 
1.63 
(5.55) 
   Rental vacancy ratec 1.00 
(0.92) 
1.19 
(1.58) 
   
Obs. 736 21344 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. a Non-housing consumption variable 
is expressed in 2010(/1000) dollars. b Distance is expressed in kilometers. c 
Destination-to-origin ratio.  
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Table 1.7: Estimated Coefficients from MNL Model 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Non-housing consumptiona 0.305 2.57 0.491 3.84 
Move -2.161 -10.16 -2.105 -9.60 
Distanceb -0.181 -6.12 -0.176 -5.48 
Bedroom 1.424 15.26 1.514 2.16 
Bedroom x Age   0.865 6.04 
Bedroom x Size   0.263 2.04 
Bedroom x Income   0.027 2.52 
Bedroom2   -0.802 -6.41 
Single-family home 0.121 0.82 -0.579 -0.70 
Single-family home x Age   0.013 0.91 
Single-family home x Size   0.209 1.62 
Single-family home x Income   -0.037 -2.33 
Built before 1960  -0.899 -6.37 -0.808 -5.49 
Built in 1960s -0.724 -5.08 -0.665 -4.44 
Built in 1970s -0.913 -5.77 -0.815 -4.94 
Percent whitec -0.108 -2.81 0.019 0.30 
Percent whitec x Black   -0.166 -2.23 
Access to workc 0.047 4.36 0.045 3.98 
Proximity to the poorc -0.416 -4.32 -0.394 -4.02 
Crime ratec -0.281 -3.39 -0.277 -3.08 
Rental vacancy ratec 0.127 2.22 0.127 2.07 
LM 1.023 2.92 0.976 2.66 
LH -1.141 -1.47 -1.13 -1.45 
ML -1.686 -6.89 -1.65 -5.72 
MH -1.591 -6.61 -1.62 -6.62 
HL 0.225 0.53 0.33 0.65 
HM 0.999 3.16 1.05 3.22 
     
Number of Recipients 736  736  
Number of Alternatives 21344  21344  
Likelihood ratio index 0.473  0.505  
AIC 2688.74  2540.25  
BIC 2864.82  2780.36  
Notes: a Non-housing consumption variable is expressed in 2010(/1000) dollars. b 
Distance is expressed in kilometers. c Destination-to-origin ratio. After 
experimentation with a rage of values of 𝛿, we choose 0.1 for spatial accessibility 
variables because it provides the greatest explanatory power, however, the sign of the 
coefficients do not depend on the choice of 𝛿. 
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Table 1.8: Estimated Coefficients from NL Model 
 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Non-housing consumptiona 0.675 3.92 0.520 3.53 
Move -2.558 -7.80 -2.489 -6.46 
Distanceb -0.196 -4.78 -0.190 -4.93 
Bedroom 1.457 1.73 1.630 2.06 
Bedroom x Age 0.105 5.19 0.095 5.19 
Bedroom x Size 0.322 1.94 0.287 2.00 
Bedroom x Income 0.031 2.31 0.028 2.33 
Bedroom2 -0.912 -5.24 -0.873 -5.30 
Single-family home -0.950 1.05 -0.592 -0.66 
Single-family home x Age 0.016 1.04 0.013 0.86 
Single-family home x Size 0.143 0.99 0.213 1.53 
Single-family home x Income -0.043 -2.48 -0.036 -2.10 
Built before 1960  -0.971 -5.08 -0.857 -4.66 
Built in 1960s -0.826 -4.34 -0.683 -3.82 
Built in 1970s -0.967 -4.60 -0.841 -4.28 
Percent whitec 0.011 0.14 0.134 0.21 
Percent whitec x Black -0.192 -2.02 -0.167 -2.20 
Access to workc 0.054 3.86 0.044 3.60 
Proximity to the poorc -0.449 -3.71 -0.379 -3.58 
Crime ratec -0.302 -2.82 -0.294 -2.91 
Rental vacancy ratec 0.143 1.95 0.131 1.99 
LM 1.289 2.92 1.015 2.42 
LH -1.296 -1.38 -0.791 -0.91 
ML -1.911 -5.03 -1.006 -2.09 
MH -2.044 -5.79 -1.201 -2.79 
HL 0.363 0.58 1.015 1.37 
HM 1.231 3.05 1.189 2.61 
     
Number of Recipients 736  736  
Number of Alternatives 21344  21344  
Likelihood ratio index 0.506  0.503  
AIC 2523.90  2542.81  
BIC 2780.24  2806.93  
Notes: In Model 3, recipients make a binary choice for housing type at the top 
level and make a multinomial choice for housing unit at the bottom level. In 
Model 4, recipients make a multinomial choice among low-poverty, mid-poverty, 
and high-poverty regions at the top level, and make a multinomial choice for 
housing unit at the bottom level.  
a Non-housing consumption variable is expressed in 2010(/1000) dollars. b 
Distance is expressed in kilometers. c Destination-to-origin ratio. After 
experimentation with a rage of values of 𝛿, we choose 0.1 for spatial accessibility 
variables because it provides the greatest explanatory power, however, the sign 
of the coefficients do not depend on the choice of 𝛿. 
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Table 1.9: Estimated Coefficients from ML Model 
 
 Mean Coefficient S.D. Coefficient 
 Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Non-housing consumptiona 0.618 3.94   
Move -3.082 -7.23 3.071 3.34 
Distanceb -0.185 -3.81 0.158 2.89 
Bedroom 6.592 3.00 3.498 4.65 
Bedroom x Age 0.173 4.55   
Bedroom x Size 1.324 2.99   
Bedroom x Income 0.056 2.11   
Bedroom2 -2.755 -4.35   
Single-family home -1.031 -0.84 0.824 2.24 
Single-family home x Age 0.019 0.93   
Single-family home x Size 0.347 1.72   
Single-family home x Income -0.053 -2.29   
Built before 1960  -1.151 -3.90 1.260 2.25 
Built in 1960s -1.326 -3.91 2.492 3.80 
Built in 1970s -1.298 -3.67 1.936 2.91 
Percent whitec 0.052 0.50   
Percent whitec x Black -0.263 -2.11   
Access to workc 0.048 3.22   
Proximity to the poorc -0.451 -3.75   
Crime ratec -0.310 -2.54   
Rental vacancy ratec 0.118 1.54   
LM 1.372 3.09   
LH -0.834 -0.95   
ML -1.976 -6.58   
MH -1.748 -5.83   
HL 0.425 0.56   
HM 1.417 2.47   
     
Number of Recipients 736    
Number of Alternatives 21344    
Likelihood ratio index 0.517    
AIC 2536.00    
BIC 2671.98    
Notes: a Non-housing consumption variable is expressed in 2010(/1000) dollars. b Distance is 
expressed in kilometers. c Destination-to-origin ratio. After experimentation with a rage of 
values of 𝛿, we choose 0.1 for spatial accessibility variables because it provides the greatest 
explanatory power, however, the sign of the coefficients do not depend on the choice of 𝛿. 
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Table 1.10: Comparison of Predicted and Actual Locational Distribution 
 
Census Tract Actual Locational  
Distribution [%] 
Estimated Locational  
Distribution [%] 
Difference 
200 8.41 8.22 0.19 
302 0.14 0.09 0.05 
500 1.49 1.26 0.23 
700 6.38 7.12 0.61 
800 8.41 6.97 1.41 
901 14.93 14.75 0.18 
902 1.09 0.49 0.60 
1000 3.26 2.59 0.67 
1100 1.09 0.60 0.49 
1201 10.99 12.73 1.68 
1203 2.31 1.95 0.36 
1204 0.27 0.21 0.06 
1205 0.14 0.10 0.04 
1206 0.14 0.24 0.13 
1301 0.68 0.87 0.27 
1400 0.00 0.15 0.12 
5300 3.26 3.40 0.24 
5401 2.31 1.37 0.94 
5402 0.27 0.25 0.02 
5500 7.73 7.72 0.05 
5600 10.58 11.45 0.95 
5701 4.75 5.04 0.21 
5702 2.31 2.34 0.09 
5800 3.39 4.21 0.40 
6000 0.27 0.21 0.06 
11000 5.29 5.42 0.11 
11100 0.14 0.25 0.20 
    
Mean difference   0.38 
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Table 1.11: Descriptive Statistics for Household-Level Estimates of  
the Move (Random Coefficient) Variable  
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Median Skewness Obs. 
All households -3.073 1.246 -3.208 0.895 736 
Head’s age ≤ 33 -3.016 1.430 -3.478 0.867 209 
33 < Head’s age ≤ 50 -2.992 1.128 -3.137 0.775 344 
Head’s age > 50 -3.291 0.874 -3.147 0.548 183 
Large family households -2.722 1.480 -2.953 0.626 148 
Black-headed households -3.022 1.262 -3.151 0.877 617 
Single-parent households -3.059 1.234 -3.178 1.085 456 
Households that stayed in  
  the same neighborhood 
-3.387 1.279 -3.427 0.769 491 
Female-headed households -3.028 1.261 -3.178 0.893 665 
Disabled head of households -3.200 0.880 -3.806 0.517 162 
Households with high gross income 
  (75th percentile) 
-3.175 1.264 -3.433 0.726 184 
Minimum TTP Households -2.972 1.464 -3.297 1.234 124 
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Table 1.12: Descriptive Statistics for Household-Level Estimates of  
the Distance (Random Coefficient) Variable and Willingness to Accept Measurement 
 
 Random Coefficient  Willingness to Accept  
Measurement 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Median Skewness  Mean Median Obs. 
All households -0.185 0.071 -0.182 -0.603  0.299 0.294 736 
Head’s age ≤ 33 -0.186 0.078 -0.174 -0.847  0.301 0.282 209 
33 < Head’s age ≤ 50 -0.191 0.075 -0.187 -0.461  0.309 0.303 344 
Head’s age > 50 -0.174 0.052 -0.181 0.363  0.282 0.293 183 
Large family households -0.206 0.086 -0.204 -0.655  0.333 0.330 148 
Black-headed households -0.188 0.072 -0.184 -0.582  0.304 0.298 617 
Single-parent households -0.200 0.073 -0.195 -0.847  0.324 0.316 456 
Households that stayed in  
  the same neighborhood 
-0.181 0.067 -0.181 -0.356  0.293 0.293 491 
Female-headed households -0.188 0.072 -0.183 -0.669  0.304 0.296 665 
Disabled head of households -0.195 0.056 -0.201 0.514  0.316 0.325 162 
Households with high gross  
  income (75th percentile) 
-0.180 0.077 -0.175 -0.335  0.291 0.283 184 
Minimum TTP Households -0.193 0.085 -0.182 -1.131  0.312 0.294 124 
                                Notes: Willingness to Accept values are expressed in 2010(/1000) dollars. 
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1.9. Figures 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Model Selection 
 
 
Notes: MNL, NL, and ML represent the multinomial logit, nested logit, and mixed logit model.  
AIC and BIC represent the Akaike Information Criterion and Bayesian Information Criterion. 
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of the Individual Estimates of Random Coefficient Variables 
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of the Individual Estimates of the Move (Random Coefficient) Variable Across the Subgroups 
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Figure 1.3 (continued) 
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Figure 1.3 (continued) 
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Figure 1.3 (continued) 
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Figure 1.4: Distribution of the Individual Estimates of the Distance (Random Coefficient) Variable Across the Subgroups 
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Figure 1.4 (continued) 
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Figure 1.4 (continued) 
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Figure 1.4 (continued) 
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CHAPTER 2 
The MOVING TO WORK DEMONSTRATION:  
EARLY RESULTS OF THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY 
PROGRAM ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The Moving to Work (MTW) demonstration was legislated by Section 204 of the Omnibus 
Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act (OCRAA) of 1996 to assess innovative, locally 
designed policies and activities which mainly focus on achieving three statutory objectives – 
enhancing cost-effectiveness in federal expenditures, expanding affordable housing options, and 
encouraging participating households to achieve economic self-sufficiency. MTW public housing 
authorities (PHAs), which are unlike other conventional public housing programs (i.e. public 
housing and housing voucher programs), impose work requirements and time-limits on the receipt 
of subsidy under the self-sufficiency statutory objective. Moreover, MTW PHAs enforce 
participation in mandatory Local Self-Sufficiency (LSS) programs that assist in advising on career 
planning and assessing barriers to employment of non-compliant households. Also, if a 
participating household maintains a continuous state of non-compliance until the next re-
certification, then a penalty or sanction will be imposed to the household to compel compliance or 
to limit its welfare benefits, often resulting in loss of subsidy.1 
                                                          
1 Each MTW PHA develops its unique activities and policies at the same time depending on the local housing 
authority and community circumstances. For example, not all MTW PHAs necessarily impose a sanction or implement 
reward (i.e. escrow account) systems.    
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In this study, we examine the early impact of the MTW Self-Sufficiency program on case 
heads’ psychological well-being.2  As of 2010, the Housing Authority of Champaign County 
(HACC) has joined the MTW demonstration, and the MTW Self-Sufficiency program has taken 
effect in Champaign County, Illinois, from January 2013. We conducted our own surveys from 
2012 – each head of household completed a baseline survey prior to the MTW Self-Sufficiency 
program in order to provide a benchmark for the evaluation. Baseline survey took place throughout 
the year of 2012, and a head who completed the baseline survey was asked to complete a follow-
up survey 12 months from the baseline survey. For our analysis, we followed head of households 
that completed the surveys in 2012 and 2014. 
Since the program could work through multiple channels to influence heads’ psychological 
well-being, as well as not all of the heads in the treatment group make the same choices from the 
given options, we calculate the average program effects estimated by the Differences-in-
Differences models. For example, as a consequence of compliance with the self-sufficiency 
requirements, a head would achieve satisfaction linked to an improvement in psychological well-
being; however, psychological distress of non-compliant head of households may be worse due to 
undesired labor market outcomes and academic achievement, as well as fear of sanctions as a 
response to failure of compliance (i.e. Currie & Stabile, 2006, Ettners, 1996; Ettners, Frank, & 
Kessler, 1997; Hamilton, Merrigan, & Dufresne, 1997; Heckman Stixrud, & Urzua, 2006; McKee-
Ryan, Song, Wanberg, & Kinicki, 2005; Murphy & Athanasou, 1999). Also, various types of 
disutility may come from following coercive rules and activities conditioned on the receipt of 
subsidy. However, since, by its design, the MTW demonstration may not be an ideal random 
                                                          
2 We define that the MTW self-sufficiency program incorporates any activities and policies initiated under the 
self-sufficiency statutory goal. Work requirements, time-limits, sanctions, and mandatory LSS are some examples of 
them. 
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assignment experiment, potential source of bias can be derived from correlation between agency 
selection processes and particular recipients’ characteristics, or PHA’s or regional specifics. We 
report program effect estimates using the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) approach to test 
whether the difference in characteristics bias our estimates. 
This study uses multi-item scales to attain a more accurate and global measurement of 
psychological well-being including the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression (CES-D), 
Adult Trait Hope (ATH), and Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD). Previous studies have used 
subjective measurements of psychological well-being varying from single-item to multi-item 
scales, which has led to a debate over the reliability and validity of the measurements versus 
administrative cost and operational efficiency (i.e. Drolet & Morrison 2001; Fayers & Machin, 
2000; Netemeyer, Bearden, & Sharma, 2003; Wanous, Reichers, & Hudy, 1997). Specifically, a 
multi-item scale provides a higher reliability and validity of the measurement which allows a more 
accurate assessment of psychological symptoms; however, it could also burden respondents to 
answer a set of questionnaires over time, leading to high attrition rates and administrative costs. 
We also calculate the internal consistency of each scale using Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951), 
and the alpha estimates are significantly high for the psychological well-being index which 
supports the use of the multi-item scales. 
Our findings indicate that, in the short-run, the MTW self-sufficiency program leads to an 
increase of case heads’ depression (CES-D) and a decrease of hopefulness (ATH); however, there 
is no significant short-run impact on anxiety (GAD). These results can be explained by the fact 
that, overall, the adverse effects, derived from challenges and hardships to fulfill self-sufficiency 
requirements, dominate other effects in the short-run. We also hypothesize that non-white and low-
educated head of households may suffer more from psychological stress. We indeed observe a 
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larger negative impact in hopefulness (ATH) and depression (CES-D), lending support to our 
hypothesis that heads of low-socioeconomic status may face greater levels of psychological stress. 
This study contributes to the literature in psychological well-being and its measurement 
and public policy. First, this study contributes to the growing empirical literature on psychological 
well-being of welfare recipients in public housing programs. To-date, most previous studies that 
examine recipients’ psychological aspects of well-being are limited to the Moving to Opportunity 
for Fair Housing (MTO) experiment and Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE) 
VI program. Specifically, the MTO studies use Kessler 6 (K6), 6-item questionnaire to determine 
general psychological distress (i.e. Gennetian et al., 2012; Kling, Liebman, and Katz, 2007; 
Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn, 2003; Sanbomatsu et al., 2013). Also, Popkin et al. (2002), in their 
baseline report for the HOPE VI Panel Study, use 7-item Pearlin Mastery scale for self-efficacy, 
5-item Mental Health Inventory (MHI) for overall mental health status, and 12-item Composite 
International Diagnostic Interview Instrument (CIDI) for major depressive symptoms. In this 
study, we extend a previous assessment of psychological well-being instruments – using the CES-
D scale designed to measure the level of depressive symptoms based on a 20-item questionnaire; 
the ATH scale designed to measure level of hopefulness based on a 12-item questionnaire; and a 
7-item GAD scale for anxiety symptoms. Specifically, unlike previous studies measuring the 
overall mental health status or using a single-item or reduced-form of the scales, we have a more 
accurate (more questionnaire items) measurement of each psychological well-being index of 
depression, hopefulness, and anxiety. 
Second, in public policy, we are aware of no empirical study that examines psychological 
aspects of the MTW Self-Sufficiency program. Previous reports point out that the evaluation has 
been limited due to (i) unstandardized data collection – each PHA develops unique policies at the 
46 
 
same time - and (ii) absence of adequate control groups (non-MTW PHAs) which may lead to 
biased program effect estimates (Abravanel et al., 2004). These limitations make a nationwide 
evaluation extremely difficult to compare outcomes of interests across PHAs and establish external 
validity of findings. We attempt to reduce the potential bias in the estimation by establishing a 
control group (non-MTW PHA) based on several criteria with location and neighborhood 
characteristics; however, our findings may be limited to PHAs that share similar activities and 
characteristics with the HACC. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follow: Section 2.2 discusses background 
information about the MTW demonstration, and Section 2.3 reviews previous literature and 
discusses measures of psychological well-being. Section 2.4 outlines the empirical strategy and 
data that includes survey design, attrition, and balance tests. Section 2.5 describes regression 
results, and Section 2.6 discusses limitations of the study and closes with concluding comments. 
 
2.2. Background 
The MTW demonstration was legislated by Section 204 of the Omnibus Consolidated Recessions 
and Appropriations Act of 1996 to assess innovative, locally designed initiatives. The MTW 
demonstration is designed to allow flexibilities and waivers to participating PHAs to avoid 
excessive regulatory burden that may impede the effectiveness of policies and programs in 
provisions of the 1937 Housing Act (Abravanel et al., 2004). MTW PHAs are also permitted to 
combine various operating subsidies into a single, flexible fund, referred to as a Block Grant, and 
use these funds interchangeably to better fit the needs of its community.  
The MTW demonstration is set to run until the end of 2018, and all participating PHAs 
have to return to the traditional administration of public housing and the HCV programs. The 39 
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current MTW PHAs manage over nearly 12% of the nation’s public housing units and 14% of 
housing vouchers (Table 2.1). In general, the MTW demonstration has three statutory objectives: 
enhancing cost-effectiveness in federal expenditures, expanding affordable housing options, and 
encouraging participating households to achieve economic self-sufficiency. Because of its 
regulatory flexibility, MTW PHAs are allowed to have their own activities and support services, 
as well as different definitions of program eligibility and fulfillment of the self-sufficiency criteria; 
however, this flexibility makes it difficult to conduct a nationwide MTW evaluation, comparing 
outcomes of interest across the PHAs. 
As of 2010, the HACC joined the MTW demonstration. The HACC serves the County of 
Champaign, Illinois, which is a largely rural county with twin cities of Champaign and Urbana. 
This study focuses on the impact of policies and activities initiated under the MTW self-sufficiency 
statutory objective on case heads’ psychological well-being. Figure 2.1 summarizes the timeline 
of the MTW self-sufficiency program. In early 2011, the HACC determined program eligibility, 
work requirements and time-limits, and developed administrative procedures for sanctions and 
connections to community support programs; however, the actual program became effective in 
January 2013. 
The HACC requires all working-age (18-54), able-bodied (non-disabled) family members 
to work a certain number of hours or attend job training, educational institutions, or programs that 
assist recipients to obtain employment and achieve economic independence within the certain 
years. Specifically, under the self-sufficiency statutory objective, head of households are required 
to develop a self-sufficiency plan that identifies goals and objectives for each household member 
in the first certification. Re-certification is repeated annually. Households with no income were 
first invited to set up the plan because they are one of the main targets of the program for a 
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transition to work (Figure 2.1). The HACC also requires that at least one adult member in the 
MTW household is expected to work a minimum of 20 hours per week or be enrolled in an 
educational institution that provides a certificate or degree by the next re-certification. In the fourth 
re-certification, one adult member must be employed a minimum of 20 hours per week; and all 
other adult members must be employed a minimum of 20 hours per week, or attend an institutional 
program. In the sixth re-certification, all adult members have to be self-sufficient. Also, family 
members, aged 5 through 18, are required to be enrolled and attend school.  
Moreover, along with the work requirement, the HACC enforces participation in its 
mandatory Local Self-Sufficiency (LSS) program. Each MTW household is assigned a case 
manager who assists in advising on their career planning and assessing employment barriers. The 
case managers also provide referrals to services offered by local social service partners including: 
the public health district, child care resource centers; education and job training services; financial 
budgeting; and transportation services. Compliant households –all adult members, aged 18 through 
54, have been employed 20 hours per week for a minimum of 12 months and members, aged 5 
through 18, are enrolled in school – are exempt from the mandatory LSS program; however, they 
must participate in the program if they fail to satisfy the self-sufficiency requirements. 
Non-compliant households face a loss of housing assistance which may give a strong 
motivation to offset work disincentives. Specifically, the HACC terminates housing assistance if 
a recipient does not meet self-sufficiency requirements. Specifically, if a recipient is not compliant, 
the HACC sends a letter to the recipient for an appointment with a case manager to help meet the 
requirements. If the recipient does not respond a second time, the HACC and case manager review 
the recipient’s current status. After the review, a termination of housing assistance letter would be 
mailed to the recipient. There are, however, hardship exemptions for households with extenuating 
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circumstances such as illness or loss of employment through no fault of the family member. The 
households in such circumstances have 16 days from the date of the letter to respond in writing to 
request an exemption. 
 
2.3. Psychological Well-Being 
2.3.1. Literature Review 
Mental illness is among the most prevalent and disabling illnesses. According to the National 
Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) report in 2012, approximately 43.7 million adults, aged 
18 or older, suffer from some form of mental illness, representing 18.6% of all adults in the United 
States (Abuse, 2012). A growing body of literature suggests that mental illness is negatively 
associated with socioeconomic status, particularly in educational achievement and labor market 
outcomes. Ettners (1996) using an instrumental variable approach to examine the effect of income 
on depression finds that increasing monthly income makes a substantial improvement in 
depressive symptom-days. Theodossiou (1998) applies a discrete choice model approach to 
measure unemployment effects on six different mental illnesses using the cross-sectional data set. 
The paper finds that unemployed individuals significantly suffer from experiencing a marked rise 
in anxiety, depression, and loss of confidence, and a reduction in self-esteem and the level of 
general happiness. Murphy and Athanasou (1999) and McKee-Ryan et al. (2005) publish meta-
analyses collecting cross-sectional and longitudinal studies to examine the effects of 
unemployment on mental illness. They conclude that job loss causes a significant increase in 
symptoms of mental distress, while gaining a job is associated with a strong impact on the 
improvement in psychological well-being. Also, an increasing number of studies contribute to 
evidence of reverse causality. Kessler et al. (1999) using the National Comorbidity Survey show 
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that laborers with major depression tend to have more short-term work-loss or work-cutback days. 
Additionally, the presence of mental disorders decreases earnings, hours of work, and work 
productivity (Bartel & Taubman, 1979, 1986; Berndt et al., 1998; Ettner, Frank, & Kessler, 1997; 
Frank & Gertler, 1991; Hamilton, Merrigan, & Dufresne, 1997).  
Education has been found to be positively associated with various health outcomes (Currie 
& Moretti, 2003; Cutler & Lleras-Muney, 2006; Grossman 2000, 2006; Kenkel, Lillard, & Mathios, 
2006; Lleras-Muney, 2005). Like other health outcomes, education may be directly and indirectly 
related to psychological well-being. For example, low-educated minorities may be less likely to 
adopt preventive health behaviors seeking diagnosis and receiving medical treatment. Also, 
education increases earnings and employment (Card, 2001; Heckman & Carneiro, 2003; Harmon 
& Walker 1995; Ashenfelter & Krueger, 1992), and as we discussed, improving socioeconomic 
status could reduce risk factors for mental illness. Moreover, the causality between education and 
mental health can be reversed (Currie & Stabile, 2006; Heckman et al., 2006). These findings 
suggest that understanding change in participants’ psychological well-being in response to the 
MTW Self-Sufficiency program will provide meaningful information of how and where to invest 
federal expenditures to achieve the self-sufficiency statutory objective in a more efficient manner. 
Specifically, given the high correlation between mental health and labor market outcomes, if the 
MTW self-sufficiency program impairs participants’ mental health, one method to increase 
likelihood of achieving the self-sufficiency statutory objective would be to increase the housing 
authority’s outlays on providing mental health care services.  
Figure 2.2 presents several factors that may affect case heads’ psychological well-being.3 
Specifically, heads are required to choose to make an investment in education or work a minimum 
                                                          
3 With MTW flexibility, some PHAs implement financial reward systems such as an escrow account or direct 
payment to residents to encourage participants to achieve economic independency. These reward systems may directly 
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of 20 hours per week during the first year of program participation. As a consequence of 
compliance with self-sufficiency requirements such as having a job or acquiring an educational 
degree, heads would achieve satisfaction linked to an improvement in psychological well-being; 
however, psychological distress of non-compliant head of households may be worse due to 
undesired labor market outcomes and academic achievement, as well as fear of sanctions as a 
response to failure of compliance. Furthermore, non-compliant heads who choose the employment 
path may experience some form of stress during the job search, while non-compliant heads who 
choose the educational path would also be under stress worrying about financial hardship, derived 
from tuition payment and a reduction in working hours due to time conflict between attending 
classes and working time. Also, lack of childcare, costs of transportation, and academic stress are 
some examples of additional factors worsening their mental health condition. Also, currently 
compliant households may not be free from some form of stress since they must make identical 
commitments if they lose their jobs or work less than 20 hours in a week. 
 
2.3.2. Measuring Psychological Well-Being 
Since psychological well-being is difficult to assess and quantify, establishing a reliable and valid 
measurement of depression, anxiety, and hopefulness has become a major concern in psychiatric 
diagnosis and in health service research. Specifically, psychological well-being measurements 
differ in length, ranging from a single-item scale to several constructs containing the reduced-form 
and full-length multiple-item scales. The use of a single item versus multiple-item scale has been 
intensively researched in terms of their strength and weakness in social science research. Many 
                                                          
affect MTW households’ psychological well-being by an increase of income, but they can also indirectly affect mental 
health through encouraging households to be complaint. The HACC has not yet implemented the activities.  
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researchers prefer to use the multiple-item scale since it provides higher reliability and validity 
than a single-item scale (Fayers & Machin, 2000; Netemeyer, Bearden, & Sharma, 2003; Spector, 
1992). Specifically, depression, anxiety, and hopefulness are broad in scope and simply cannot be 
assessed with a single item. A multi-item scale has several questions targeting the same social 
issue, and the final composite score is based on all questions. That is, although a respondent makes 
an error on one item, the impact on the overall score is quite minimal; however, the use of multiple-
item scales increases a burden for the respondents to answer a set of questions over time, resulting 
in high attrition rates, as well as risk of asking irrelevant questions.   
On the other hand, the single-item scale has practical advantages of simplicity and ease of 
administration (Drolet & Morrison 2001; Wanous, Reichers, & Hudy, 1997). These lead to a 
higher rate of completed responses, and enhance operational efficiency such as data entry and data 
analysis (Rogelberg & Stanton 2007). However, respondents are less likely to give consistent 
answers over time. Their responses can be different depending on mood for the day. Also, 
respondents could give an unintended answer or interpret the question differently over time. Some 
recent studies find that, only under very specific conditions, a single-item scale performs equally 
well as a multi-item scale (Bergkvist & Rossiter, 2007; Diamantopoulos, Sarstedt, Fuchs, 
Wilczynski, & Kaiser 2012). In this study, we use multi-item scales to attain a more accurate and 
global measurement for psychological well-being; however, noted as a disadvantage of the use of 
multi-item scales, we lose 28 observations (about 6.28 percent of all sampled head of households 
at baseline) due to missing items for scales over time. 
We use a multi-item scale, known as Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression (CES-
D), designed to measure the level of depressive symptomatology (Radloff, 1977). The measure of 
the CES-D scale is based on response to 20 items including four components - depressive affect 
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(blues, depressed, lonely, cry, sad), positive affect (good, hopeful, happy, enjoy), somatic and 
retarded activity (bothered, appetite, effort, sleep, get going), and interpersonal (unfriendly, 
dislike). A list of 20 items of the CES-D scale is presented in Table 2.2. Respondents indicate how 
often within the last week they experienced symptoms of depression on a 4-point scale: “Rarely 
or none of the time (less than 1 day)” (0); “Some or a little of the time (1-2 days)” (1); 
“Occasionally or a moderate amount of time (3-4 days)” (2); and “Most or all of the time (5-7 
days)” (3). Starred items are coded in reverse, so that, for example, 3 for “Rarely or none of the 
time (less than 1 day)” to 0 for “Most or all of the time (5-7 days)”. In general, the 20 items are 
summed to create an overall CES-D scale score ranging from 0 to 60, with a higher score indicating 
more depressive symptoms. Also, the entire CES-D scale was considered missing if more than 4 
items are missing. However, this method could deliver wrong information if a respondent answers 
different numbers of items over time.4 In order to have precise measurement, we average these 20 
items to construct the CES-D scale score, allowing up to 4 missing items. 
We also use the Adult Trait Hope (ATH) scale which is designed to measure level of 
hopefulness based on a combination of believing there is a way to achieve personal goals (agency) 
and being motivated to take action to pursue those goals (pathways) (Snyder et al., 1991). Table 
2.3 list items for the ATH scale. The scale is comprised of 12 items using a 4-point scale: 
“Definitely false” (1); “Mostly false” (2); “Mostly true” (3); and “Definitely true” (4). The two 
subscales – agency and pathways – use 4 items each. The agency subscale score is derived by 
summing items 2, 9, 10, and 12; the pathway subscale score is derived by adding items 1, 4, 6, and 
8. Moreover, four additional items are used as distracters (item 3, 5, 7, and 11). These two 
subscales are summed to create an overall hope score. Higher overall hope scores indicate 
                                                          
4 In our data, about 28 percent head of households answered different number of CES-D items over time. 
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individuals are more hopeful, more motivated to achieve their goals, and more capable of 
designing means to achieve their goals. Similar to the CES-D scale, we average the 8 single-item 
scales (agency and pathway) allowing up to 1 missing item. 
Lastly, we use the Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) scale which is a prevalent mental 
disorder measure that involves chronic worrying, nervousness, and tension. We utilize a reduced 
form of the GAD scale comprised of a 7 item questionnaire which has the highest correlation with 
the total 13-item scale (Spitzer et al., 2006). Table 2.4 lists questions for the GAD scale. 
Respondent’s answers to these questions are coded on a 4-point scale: “Not at all” (0); “Several 
days” (1); “Over half the days” (2); and “Nearly every day” (3). The GAD scale is measured by 
an average of the 7 items, allowing up to 1 missing item, and higher score indicating more anxiety 
symptoms.5 
 
2.4. Design and Methods 
2.4.1. Conceptual Model 
A goal of this study is to provide the early impact of the MTW self-sufficiency program on case 
heads’ psychological well-being. Our data consist of the two time-period household-level 
observations in 2012 (baseline) and 2014 (follow-up). We calculate the effects using the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression in which an outcome variable is regressed on treatment dummy, 
time dummy, and the interaction of treatment and time dummy. Our model specification to 
estimate the impact of the MTW self-sufficiency program is: 
(1) 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑀𝑇𝑊𝑗 𝛽1 + 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 𝛽2 + 𝑀𝑇𝑊𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  𝛽3 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡, 
                                                          
5 In our data, about 16 percent and 4 percent of households answered different number of the ATH and GAD items 
over time, respectively. 
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where i, j, and t index head of household, PHA, and time respectively. 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 are psychological well-
being index: the labor force participation (1 if the head is employed; 0 if unemployed) and the 
labor supply (number of hours worked per week). 𝑀𝑇𝑊𝑗 is a treatment dummy (1 for MTW PHA; 
0 for non-MTW PHA). 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a time dummy (1 for follow-up year; 0 for baseline year). 𝛽0 is 
designed to capture unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  is an idiosyncratic error 
term.  𝛽3 identifies the program effect, estimated by, 
(2) 𝐷𝐷 = 𝐸(𝑦1
𝑇 − 𝑦0
𝑇|𝑇1 = 1) −  𝐸(𝑦1
𝐶 − 𝑦0
𝐶|𝑇1 = 0) = 𝛽3 
Since not all of the heads of participating households make the same choices, the DD 
estimate represents the average program effects for all working-age, able-bodied head of 
households regardless of whether the treatment was actually received. Also, inclusion of the 
control variables (i.e. age, gender, race, etc.) would increase the precision of the causal effect 
estimates of interest. 
 
2.4.2. Agency Selection 
In a program evaluation context, if the MTW self-sufficiency program was randomly assigned, 
one can estimate the program effect by comparing the outcomes between the treatment and control 
group. By its design, the selection of MTW PHAs is not an ideal random assignment experiment. 
Specifically, it is a PHA’s own decision to apply for the demonstration, and Congress may 
authorize specific PHAs to become part of MTW, and in others, it may authorize HUD to select 
the PHAs through its own criteria. However, Cadik and Nogic (2010) argue that “the scoring and 
selection process was not straightforward” (p.13). They report that several highest scored PHAs 
failed to join the MTW demonstration due to limited program scope, and inadequate or lack of 
innovative activity proposals. On the other hand, some PHAs which did not belong to the highest 
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scoring group were recommended for participation in the demonstration. Additionally, some 
selected PHAs withdrew from the demonstration since the originally requested deregulation was 
not secured in negotiated agreements. These factors would raise endogeneity concerns: the 
particular unobserved characteristics (recipients’ characteristics, and PHA’s or regional specifics), 
correlated with agency selection processes, can bias the program effect estimates. 
On the other hand, implementation timing of self-sufficiency programs is plausibly 
uncorrelated with case heads’ unobserved characteristics. Actually, effective date of the program 
depends on local housing authority’s circumstances. Specifically, as shown in Figure 2.1, the 
HACC’s implementation plan of the MTW self-sufficiency program was approved in early 2011; 
however, the actual effective date of the program was postponed to January 2013. For example, 
the effective date may vary by the size of local housing authority, cost burden (or financial 
capability) of program implementation, time for program preparation, or priority changes among 
activities and programs. Also, since the self-sufficiency program is mandatory for all program 
eligible households, endogeneity issues in the participation decision at the household-level would 
not bias the program effect estimates.  
In order to reduce potential source of bias from correlation between agency selection 
processes and recipients’ characteristics – in case that recipients’ particular characteristics may 
increase the likelihood of being selected as an MTW agency –, we capture various dimensions of 
recipients’ lives by collecting criminal history, educational attainment, marriage status, presence 
of driver’s license, computer skills, residential mobility, English-speaking skills, and household 
composition information, in addition to conventional utilized variables such as head age, race, 
gender, household size, and income. The rich set of variables allow us to create a more convincing 
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statistical sample of control group households using the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
approach. 
Moreover, in order to reduce bias from correlation between agency selection processes and 
PHA’s and regional specifics, we considerably choose a control group PHA based on following 
criteria: (1) a PHA has not been a member of the MTW demonstration; (2) a PHA is located in the 
same state since recipients may be influenced by different state rules and policies which were 
likely to affect unobserved household and neighborhood characteristics; (3) a PHA does not serve 
a large city or its suburban areas due to heterogeneity inherent in different regional characteristics; 
and (4) a PHA is in the close distance and shares similar observed neighborhood characteristics. 
According to the criteria, we chose a PHA which serves a small metropolitan statistical area (MSA) 
and its suburban areas, located southwest of Champaign County. Under the consent of the non-
MTW PHA, we surveyed control group households that satisfied eligibility in the MTW self-
sufficiency program. Table 2.5 compares descriptive statistics for the selected economic, 
demographic, and housing characteristics of each Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) including 
the treatment PHA (HACC) and control PHA. It shows that total population and households in 
MSA with treatment PHA were about twice as large than the control PHA, while population 
density was similar. MSA with control PHA had a higher proportion of white and Black (alone) 
head of households. Also, the average unemployment rates in 2012 were high in MSA with control 
PHA (2.6%), but the change in unemployment rates between 2012 and 2014 was quite close. 
Similarly, annual median income was close between MSAs for all households and for Black head 
of households. MSA with treatment PHA had about twice many housing units, while household-
unit ratio was similar. Lastly, household-level poverty rates in MSA with treatment PHA was 
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reported to be higher, but the family-level poverty rates, and families below severe poverty level 
were close.   
 
2.4.3. Survey Design and Response Rate 
We conducted our own survey, which we refer to as the “Housing and Self-Sufficiency Social 
Survey.” The survey includes a set of questionnaire items which assess respondents’ psychological 
well-being, as well as household-level socioeconomic characteristics, for the treatment and control 
group households. An additional source of information for the treatment group came from HUD-
50058 Family Report records.  
The timeline of the study is summarized in Figure 2.3. Each head of household completed 
a baseline survey prior to the MTW self-sufficiency program in order to provide a benchmark for 
the evaluation. Baseline survey took place throughout the year of 2012, and a head of household 
that completed the baseline survey was asked to complete a follow-up survey 12-months from the 
baseline survey. Heads were randomly selected from the all MTW eligible households once every 
quarter year, and we sent invitation letters to them to complete the survey. The heads who did not 
wish to complete the survey were excluded from the study, but we re-sent invitation letters or made 
calls to heads that did not respond to the survey invite. The heads who completed the survey 
received $25 Wal-Mart gift cards as a remuneration of participation. For our analysis, we followed 
head of households that completed the survey in both 2012 (baseline) and 2014 (follow-up).  
Table 2.6 presents survey design and response rates at baseline and follow-up year. The 
main sampling frame for the data used in this study consisted of working-age (18-54), able-bodied 
(non-disabled) head of households. In 2012, 1,224 heads in the treatment group and 761 heads in 
the control group met eligibility for program participation, and about 94.2 percent and 82.1 percent 
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of those heads in the treatment and control groups were invited, respectively.6 By the end of 
baseline year, in the treatment group, 301 heads (approximately 27 percent) completed the social 
survey and 162 heads (approximately 26 percent) in the control group.7 Specifically, we excluded 
17 observations due to missing psychological well-being index at baseline. This led to the total 
observation from 463 to 446. 
 
2.4.4. Attrition and Baseline Balance Test 
We find levels of attrition due to various reasons – portability out, dropouts, no response, or 
refusals to complete a subsequent survey. The main reason for attrition is ‘no response’. Also, for 
some cases, we could not reach households if their address changed, but was not updated in 
administrative data. In these cases, invitation letters were returned and we considered them as ‘no 
response’. With other reasons of portability out, dropouts, and refusals to complete the survey, it 
leads to small level of sample attrition.8 
In 2014, a total of 227 (50.9 percent) head of households completed the survey, including 
148 heads in the treatment group, and 79 heads in the control group. Attrition rates were similar in 
both groups (approximately 48.6 percent and 50.0 percent for the treatment and control group, 
respectively).9 We compare statistical difference in psychological well-being index and other 
covariates at baseline between the attrition and non-attrition group for all sampled head of 
                                                          
6 We could not send our invitation letters to the rest of households (71 households or 6%) because of temporarily 
unavailable address.  
7 At the time of survey in 2012, 7 households in HACC that completed the surveys were in a process of portability-
out (living outside of HACC), and we decided to exclude them. 
8 Households that port out to another public housing authority or refused to complete the survey were small less 
than 5 percent of all attrition. 
9 11 observations that had missing psychological well-being index in the follow-up survey were considered in the 
attrition group. 
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households and two subgroups – non-white and low-educated head of households.10 Low-educated 
head of households include heads with GED, high school diploma, or no formal education degree. 
The description of variables (covariates) are listed in Table 2.7. The results, presented in Table 
2.8, show that the attrition group of all sampled head of households tended to have younger head 
of households; the attrition group of non-white head of households tended to have younger and 
fewer employed heads; and the attrition group of low-educated head of households tended to have 
younger head of households.   
In order to test whether attrition was random in our data set, we conducted two tests: the 
attrition probit test (Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, & Moffitt, 1998) and BGLW test (Becketti, Gould, 
Lillard, & Welch, 1988). Attrition probit regressions consist of the estimates obtained with the 
probit model of attrition dummy on baseline pre-treatment variables. Table 2.9 presents regression 
results for all sampled head of households and two subgroups (non-white and low-educated head 
of households). The results show that overall the attrition status is not affected by our psychological 
well-being index; however, we find that head’s age, criminal history, and English speaking skill 
are significant predictors of attrition at least 10 percent level across different groups. Then, we 
perform Wald test which indicates whether the included variables are jointly equal to zero, and all 
test statistics lead us to accept the null hypothesis.11 
The BGLW test consists of estimates obtained with the OLS regression of each outcome 
variable at the baseline on the attrition dummy, pre-treatment variables, and interaction terms 
between the attrition dummy and pre-treatment variables. Then, we calculate F-test statistics for 
the joint significance of the interaction terms. All regression results and BGLW tests for 20-item 
CES-D, 12-item ATH, and 7-item GAD scales are reported in Table 2.10, 2.11, and 2.12, 
                                                          
10 See ‘notes’ to Table 2.7 for the detailed estimation process.   
11 We use Stata ‘test’ command after running attrition probit regression. 
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respectively. We find that all test statistics fail to reject the null hypothesis, concluding that attrition 
in the sample was random and less likely to bias program effect estimates for the sample of 
remaining head of households across all different groups. 
Lastly, Table 2.13 details the results for a baseline balancing test which compares the 
difference in our psychological well-being index and pre-treatment variables between the 
treatment and control group. If the control group is well established, we would expect that none of 
the coefficients would differ from zero. The results show that the treatment group tended to have 
more non-white heads and fewer heads with criminal history and high school or GED degree for 
all sampled head of households; fewer heads with criminal history and high school or GED degree, 
and more households with adult members and recently moved households for non-white head of 
households; and fewer heads with criminal history for low-educated head of households. 
 
2.4.5. Internal Consistency and Descriptive Statistics 
Internal consistency refers to the reliability of a multiple-item scale based on the degree of item 
inter-correlation (or inter-relatedness) within the scale. Failure to inter-correlate indicates that the 
within-scale items do not represent a common underlying construct. A useful coefficient for 
assessing internal consistency is Cronbach’s Alpha (Cronbach, 1951). The value for alpha ranges 
between 0 and 1, and the higher alpha coefficient indicates higher reliability. A series of studies 
have reported different acceptable values of alpha from 0.70 to 0.90 (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994; 
Streiner, 2003). Table 2.14 reports the alpha estimates for the 20-item CES-D, 12-item ATH, and 
7-item GAD scales for all non-attrition group, and it shows that the estimates are significantly high 
ranging from 0.846-0.925. We also report the alpha estimates, presented in Table 2.15 and Table 
62 
 
2.16, for non-attriting non-white and low-educated head of households. All results support the use 
of multi-item scales.    
Based on the internal consistency results, Table 2.17 presents descriptive statistics for our 
psychological well-being index at baseline and follow-up year. Overall, the CES-D scale score in 
the treatment group increased, while the scale score decreased in the control group for all sampled 
head of households and non-white head subgroup over time. On the other hand, the CES-D scale 
score increased both in the treatment and control group for low-educated head of households. Also, 
we observed that the ATH scale score in the treatment group decreased, while the scale score 
increased in the control group across all sampled head of households and the subgroups. Lastly, 
we observed the overall decrease in the GAD scale score both in the treatment and control group, 
but, the control group showed relatively larger reduction. Figure 2.4 present kernel density 
estimates for the change in distribution of the CES-D, ATH, and GAD scale scores of the treatment 
and control group at baseline and follow-up year. 
 
2.5. Results 
2.5.1. Difference-in-Differences Estimates 
A central goal of this study is to examine the early impact of the MTW Self-Sufficiency program 
on case heads’ psychological well-being. We use multi-item scales to attain a more accurate and 
global measurement of depression (20-item CES-D), hopefulness (12-item ATH), and anxiety (7-
item GAD) symptoms. Since the program works through multiple channels to influence 
psychological well-being, we calculate the average program effects, estimated by the Difference-
in-Differences models. Table 2.18 shows the results for the program effects on psychological well-
being index. Separated regressions are estimated for all sampled head of households, as well as 
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the two sub-sample groups that include non-white and low-educated head of households. Robust 
standard errors, clustering at household-level, are reported in parentheses.  
Our findings indicate that, in the short-run, the MTW self-sufficiency program leads to an 
increase of case heads’ depression (CES-D) and a decrease of hopefulness (ATH); however, there 
is no statistical effect on anxiety (GAD). Specifically, the results show that the program decreases 
the ATH scale scores by approximately 4.65-4.88 percentage points, and increases the CES-D 
scale scores by 3.83-4.67 percentage points. We also hypothesize that non-white and low-educated 
head of households may suffer more psychological stress. Overall, the program indeed leads to a 
larger and significant reduction in ATH scale scores for low-educated head of households by 
approximately 6.08-6.13 percentage points, at the 5 percent level. We also find that the program 
decreases the ATH scale scores of non-white head of households by 4.75-5.05 percentage points, 
and increases the CES-D scale score by 5.23-6.03 percentage points, significant at the 5 percent 
level or higher. 
These results can be explained by the fact that, overall, the adverse effects, derived from 
challenges and hardships to fulfill requirements in MTW self-sufficiency program, dominates the 
other effects in the short-run. Also, according to our results, we mostly observe larger negative 
impacts in hopefulness and depression scale scores, lending support to our hypothesis that the 
heads of low socioeconomic status (low-educated heads and minorities) may face greater levels of 
psychological stress since these subgroups are often thought to be disadvantaged groups which 
may experience further barriers to self-sufficiency; however, we cannot find any statistical 
program effects on anxiety, measured by the GAD scale. However, since previous health literature 
suggests that psychological well-being is negatively associated with socioeconomic status, such 
64 
 
difference in level of education, race, and criminal history may induce a downward bias in the 
program effects which lead to smaller magnitude of the estimates than the actual.  
 
2.5.2. Difference-in-Differences Estimates with Matching Analysis 
In order to test whether the group differences bias our estimates, we adopt the Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM) to create a statistical sample of control group households that share 
approximately similar likelihoods of being assigned to the treatment condition based on pre-
treatment characteristics. We use Nearest Neighbor (NN) matching approach allowing the 
replacement due to small sample size. Specifically, more than one NN (oversampling) is applied 
to reduce variance in prediction, resulting from using more information to construct the 
counterfactual for each sample household. Also, we impose different levels of tolerance on the 
maximum propensity score distance, referred to as caliper, since the NN approach may result in 
poor matches if the closest neighbor is far away. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) generally suggests 
a caliper of 0.25 standard deviation of the propensity score. In this study, we chose 6-NN and two 
calipers – one for 0.25 of the standard deviation of the propensity scores and the other which 
provides the lowest standardized bias-test statistics.12 Lastly, since it is possible that no match can 
be found for a particular head of household in the treatment group based on the common support, 
we exclude those whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum 
of the control group households (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997).  
                                                          
12 The standardized bias is defined as the difference of the mean values of each variable for the treatment group 
and the control group, divided by the square root of the average sample variance in both groups. Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1985) recommend that a standardized difference of greater than 20 percent should be considered too large and 
an indicator that the matching process is failed. We chose the number of NN and caliper that provide the lowest mean 
and median bias of all pre-treatment variables. 
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Table 2.19 presents difference-in-difference estimates with the adjustment to group 
differences using the PSM approach for all sampled head of households.13 The first two columns 
report the estimates with a caliper of 0.25 standard deviation of the calculated propensity scores, 
and the latter two columns use a caliper that provides the lowest bias-test statistics.14 We also 
report several test-statistics to compare the level of bias before and after the match. Specifically, 
the pseudo R-squared is very low, indicating that the estimated model only explains about 1-2 
percent variation of the treatment condition, and the likelihood ratio (LR) test leads us to accept 
the hypothesis of joint significance of the pre-treatment variables after the match. Additionally, 
the mean and median standardized bias decrease significantly after the match. Generally, the 
matching results are consistent across the subgroups. Lastly, Figure 2.5 shows the density 
distribution of the calculated propensity scores for the treatment and control groups before and 
after the match. The more the two distributions are similar (overlap), the larger common supports 
they have. We observe that the distributions tend to have a larger common support after the match, 
indicating that the matching procedure is successful in balancing the treatment and control group 
based on the pre-treatment variables. 
The results show that, on average, the MTW Self-Sufficiency program decreases the ATH 
scale score by approximately 5.90-6.55 percentage points, and increases the CES-D scale score by 
4.77-5.90 percentage points across different matching specifications. Table 2.20 shows that overall 
the program decreases the ATH scale score by about 6.88-7.40 percentage points, and increases 
the CES-D scale core by 5.73-6.37 percentage-points for non-white head of households. Also, we 
cannot find the program effect in depression for low-educated head of households prior to the 
                                                          
13 Propensity score estimation and matching was performed using Stata’s “psmatch2” and “pstest” commands. 
14 We find no statistical difference in all pre-treatment variables after the match. The results for balance test are 
available from authors by requests. 
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match; however, we find that the program increases the CES-D scale score by approximately 5.47-
6.87 percentage-points, and decreases the ATH scale score by 7.40-9.35 percentage-points across 
different matching specifications (Table 2.21). However, we still find no statistical effect on 
anxiety (GAD) across the subgroups. According to the results, we indeed find a larger program 
effect after the match. This indicates the fact that the differences in some socioeconomic variables 
between the treatment and control group induce a downward bias in the program effect estimates, 
leading to smaller impact size. Also, overall, the results show that low-educated head of 
households suffer the most hopelessness and depressive symptoms after the match. 
 
2.6. Limitations and Concluding Remarks 
We examine the early impact of MTW self-sufficiency program on case heads’ psychological well-
being. We use a psychological well-being index which captures case heads’ depression, 
hopefulness, and anxiety. Our findings indicate that, in the short-run, the MTW self-sufficiency 
program leads to an increase of case heads’ depression and a decrease of hopefulness. We also 
find that heads of low socioeconomic status (low-educated heads and minorities) suffer more from 
psychological stress; however, there is no significant short-run impact on anxiety. 
Our study has some limitations. First, we cannot identify the effect of each factor (i.e. 
employment, education, job searches, financial hardship, sanction, etc.) in the MTW self-
sufficiency program (Figure 2.2), and how those effects might change over time. For example, if 
a household becomes compliant, the adverse effects occurred in transition (i.e. job search, financial 
hardship, and sanctions) may diminish over time in the long-run, and the positive effects from 
employment or educational achievement dominate. However, if unemployment status lasts for a 
long period of time, the participants would suffer more from mental illness. 
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Second, in a program evaluation context, particularly in analysis of randomized control 
trials (RCT), previous studies have recommended to estimate robust standard errors, clustering at 
the randomization level (Moulton, 1990; Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004). Specifically, the 
usual assumption for errors is independently and identically distributed, but this is often not 
realistic in many cases since households within the group or region can be correlated in some 
unknown ways. Also, serial correlation in errors may cause another source of bias with longer time 
spans. Cameron and Miller (2011) state that failure to control for clustering in OLS regression 
underestimates standard errors and overstates t-statistics. However, the cure can be worse with a 
small number of clusters or unbalanced cluster sizes, leading to more incorrect inferences than the 
regression without clustering the standard errors. For example, Rogers (1993) finds that 20 clusters 
that contain no more than 5 percent of the data in each cluster would provide accurate inferences. 
Kezdi (2004) shows that 50 clusters is often close enough to infinity for accurate inference, and 
less than 10 clusters would cause 7-16 percent bias. Similarly, Peterson (2009) uses simulations 
and concludes that the bias is approximately 1 percent for 100 clusters, 3 percent for 40 clusters, 
and 27 percent for 5 clusters.  
In our study, since the program is implemented at the PHA level, we would estimate 
standard errors clustered at the PHA level; however, since we only have two groups – one for 
MTW (treatment) and the other for non-MTW (control),  we cannot calculate inference due to 
insufficient degree of freedom. Also, as we discussed, less than 10 clusters creates more bias than 
the regression without clustering standard errors. The next largest regional boundary we consider 
is zip-code level; however, since assisted households are free to move across the regions within 
the local PHA jurisdiction, the underlying assumption that each zip-code region is independent is 
not realistic. Additionally, we have total of 12 zip-code regions which are a smaller number of 
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clusters recommended by Kezdi (2004) or Peterson (2009). Therefore, we estimate robust standard 
errors, clustered at household level. This allows for correlation within household over time (or 
time correlation), but assumes independence over household (or no spatial correlation). Also, 
estimating standard errors, clustered at household level, leads to another assumption – 
equicorrelation within the cluster (household level), indicating equal correlation for a given 
individual over time. Equicorrelation is often a less reasonable assumption with longer time spans. 
This would not be substantial in our study since we analyze the short-run MTW impacts following 
only two-subsequent years. Lastly, clustering at household level (229 households) meets restriction 
in number of clusters for accurate inferences (more than 50 clusters). 15  
This data limitation leads to another limitation of our study. Specifically, we cannot control 
for some plausibly influential variables that would be compounded with our program effect 
estimates that may cause an upward bias. Especially, Champaign and Urbana cities have had an 
unusual number of serious crimes such as shootings in the past couple years (Schenk, 2012, 2015). 
Residents in these cities may experience greater exposure to fear of crimes which make residents’ 
psychological health more unstable. These regional effects can be canceled out with the regional 
fixed effects (often in randomization level), but it is less likely adopted in our study due to a small 
number of aggregated treatment and control groups.  
Lastly, our findings may be limited to PHAs that share similar activities and characteristics 
with the HACC. Since each MTW PHA develops its unique activities and policies at the same time 
based on PHA and community circumstances, it is difficult to establish external validity of the 
findings. If we suppose that sanctions explain most of the adverse program effects and an MTW 
PHA decides not to impose sanctions on participating households, then we may not observe 
                                                          
15 Robust-standard errors with no clustering option do not make noticeable change in statistical significance of 
the estimates. 
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program effects on mental health. Also, particularly, the HACC does not implement escrow 
account activity, and if having an escrow account helps to improve case head’s psychological well-
being, then the adverse effects of the HACC MTW self-sufficiency program tend to be greater 
than other PHAs that share similar activities and characteristics, but have additional escrow 
account activity.  All of these study limitations suggest a further study is needed to make a 
comprehensive evaluation of MTW self-sufficiency program on psychological health. 
Although our study has several limitations, as a pioneer study of evaluating the MTW 
demonstration, our study contributes to a growing empirical literature in public policy and 
psychological well-being and its measurement. Our findings would provide economically valuable 
information of how and where to invest federal expenditure to achieve self-sufficiency in a more 
efficient manner. Specifically, given the high correlation between mental health and labor market 
outcomes, if the MTW self-sufficiency program impairs participating households’ mental health, 
one method to achieve the self-sufficiency statutory objective would be to increase the housing 
authority’s outlays on providing mental health care services. Also, unlike previous studies 
measuring the overall mental health status or use the reduced form of mental health scales, we 
have a more accurate measurement of each psychological well-being index based on a full set or 
extended number of questionnaires, linked to better understanding of program effects on 
psychological well-being. The magnitude of these effects are meaningful in policy perspective 
since it could provide a framework and motivation for targeting people that are at greater risk of 
depression and hopelessness, which might affect their ability to adhere to educational and work 
requirements being implemented in the MTW demonstration. 
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2.7. Tables 
 
 
Table 2.1: Moving to Work (MTW) Participating Sites 
 
Site Public Housing  
Units 
Housing Choice  
Vouchers 
Alaska Housing Finance Corporation 1,300 4,300 
Atlanta Housing Authority 8,200 18,800 
Housing Authority of Baltimore City 12,600 17,500 
Boulder Housing Partners 337 857 
Cambridge Housing Authority 3,125 2,500 
Housing Authority of Champaign County 447 1,706 
Charlotte Housing Authority 4,900 4,500 
Chicago Housing Authority 26,300 49,800 
Housing Authority of Columbus, GA 2,300 2,333 
Delaware State Housing Authority 500 600 
District of Columbia Housing Authority 8,700 12,900 
Fairfax County Redevelopment and Housing   
  Authority 
1,100 3,910 
Holyoke Housing Authority 921 1,380 
Keene Housing 200 600 
King County Housing Authority 3,499 7,773 
Lawrence-Douglas County Housing Authority 400 600 
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Housing  
  Authority 
1,303 2,512 
Lincoln Housing Authority 300 2,900 
Louisville Metropolitan Housing Authority 5,300 9,500 
Massachusetts Dept. of Housing and Community  
  and Development 
0 20,000 
Minneapolis Public Housing Authority 7,000 5,000 
Housing Authority of the City of New Haven 2,800 4,400 
Oakland Housing Authority 3,700 12,900 
Orlando Housing Authority 1,600 2,900 
Philadelphia Housing Authority 18,600 16,800 
Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh 5,846 6,237 
Portage Metropolitan Housing Authority 300 1,800 
Housing Authority of Portland 3,100 7,900 
Housing Authority of the City of Reno 764 2,728 
San Antonio Housing Authority 7,000 12,400 
Housing Authority of the County of San Bernardino 1,700 8,400 
San Diego Housing Commission 35 13,900 
Housing Authority of the County of San Mateo 200 4,200 
Housing Authority of the County of Santa Clara 
  / Housing Authority of the City of San Jose 
350 16,700 
Seattle Housing Authority 6,000 8,400 
Tacoma Housing Authority 900 3,500 
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Table 2.1 (continued) 
 
 
Site Public Housing 
Units 
Housing Choice  
Vouchers 
Tulare County Housing Authority 700 2,800 
Vancouver Housing Authority 550 2,100 
   
U.S. Total 1,150,867 2,112,817 
MTW Total 142,877 298,036 
% MTW Total 12.41% 14.11% 
Source: Authors’ calculation using U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) data. 
 
Notes: Public housing, managed by the State, are added to public housing stocks in Cambridge Housing Authority. 
Total number of public housing units and issued housing vouchers are collected from the 2013 Picture of Subsidized 
Households data set from the HUD.   
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Table 2.2: 20-item Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression (CES-D) Scale 
 
Item Range 
1. I was bothered by things that usually don’t bother me 0-3 
2. I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor 0-3 
3. I felt that I could not shake off the blues, even with help from my family or friends 0-3 
4. I felt I was just as good as other people* 0-3 
5. I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing 0-3 
6. I felt depressed 0-3 
7. I felt that everything I did was an effort 0-3 
8. I felt hopeful about the future* 0-3 
9. I thought my life had been a failure 0-3 
10. I felt fearful 0-3 
11. My sleep was restless 0-3 
12. I was happy* 0-3 
13. I talked less than usual 0-3 
14. I felt lonely 0-3 
15. People were unfriendly 0-3 
16. I enjoyed life* 0-3 
17. I had crying spells 0-3 
18. I felt sad 0-3 
19. I felt that people disliked me 
20. I could not get “going” 
0-3 
0-3 
Notes: Survey respondents indicate how often within the last week they experienced symptoms of depression on a 4-
point scale: “Rarely or none of the time (less than 1 day)” (0); “Some or a little of the time (1-2 days)” (1); 
“Occasionally or a moderate amount of time (3-4 days)” (2); and “Most or all of the time (5-7 days)” (3). Starred items 
are coded in reverse. For example, 3 for “Rarely (less than 1 day)” to 0 for “Most (5-7 days)”. We measure the CES-
D scale by taking an average of the 20 items, allowing up to 4 missing items. A higher scale score indicates more 
depressive symptoms. 
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Table 2.3: 12-item Adult Trait Hope (ATH) Scale 
 
Item Range 
1. I can think of many ways to get out of a jam. * 1-4 
2. I energetically pursue my goals. ** 1-4 
3. I feel tired most of the time. 1-4 
4. There are lots of ways around my problem. * 1-4 
5. I am easily downed in an argument. 1-4 
6. I can think of mays ways to get the things in life that are most  
  important to me. * 
1-4 
7. I worry about my health. 1-4 
8. Even when others get discouraged, I know I can find a way to  
  solve the problem.* 
1-4 
9. My past experiences have prepared me well for my future. ** 1-4 
10. I’ve been pretty successful in life. ** 1-4 
11. I usually find myself worrying about something. 1-4 
12. I meet the goals that I set for myself. ** 1-4 
Notes: The ATH scale consists of 12 items using a 4-point scale: “Definitely false” (1); “Mostly false” (2); “Mostly 
true” (3); and “Definitely true” (4). The two subscales – agency and pathway – use four items each. The agency 
subscale score is calculated by summing item 2, 9, 10, and 12; and the pathway subscale score is derived by adding 
item 1, 4, 6, and 8. Four items (3, 5, 7, and 11) are used as distracters. We measure the ATH scale by taking an average 
of these two subscales (agency and pathway), allowing up to 1 missing item. A higher hope scale score indicates that 
a respondent is more hopeful, more motivated to achieve his/her goals, and more capable of designing means to 
achieve their goals.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4: 7-item Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) Scale 
 
Item Range 
1. Feeling nervous, anxious, or on edge 0-3 
2. Not being able to stop or control worrying 0-3 
3. Worrying too much about different things 0-3 
4. Trouble relaxing 0-3 
5. Being so restless that it’s hard to sit still 0-3 
6. Become easily annoyed or irritable 0-3 
7. Feeling afraid as if something awful might happen 0-3 
Notes: The GAD scale consists of 7 items using a 4-point scale: “Not at all” (0); “Several days” (1); “Over half the 
days” (2); and “Nearly every day” (3). We measure the GAD scale by taking an average of the 7 items, allowing up 
to 1 missing item. A higher score indicates more anxiety symptoms. 
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Table 2.5: Comparison of Descriptive Statistics of Selected Economic, Demographic, and Housing 
Characteristics between Metropolitan Statistical Areas of the Treatment and Control PHAs 
 
 MSA 
(MTW-HACC) 
MSA 
(Non-MTW) 
Demographic Characteristics   
  Population 231655 110558 
  Population Density 201.8 190.8 
  Household 91327 45074 
Race   
  White alone household 80.86% 83.55% 
  Black alone household 10.27% 14.36% 
Economic status   
  Median Household income $46,830 $46,165 
  Median household income (black only) $26,194 $25,321 
  Unemployed rate in 2012 7.40% 10.00% 
  Unemployed rate 2012-2014 -1.40% -1.30% 
  Business establishment 2012 4808 2445 
Housing   
  Median rent $777 $656 
  Housing unit 101010 50505 
  Household-unit ratio 1.106 1.120 
Poverty rate   
  Household level 18.91% 13.89% 
  Family level 9.67% 10.94% 
  Family level-severe poverty (<.5) 4.29% 4.89% 
Source: Five-year (2008-2012) American Community Survey data from United States 
Census Bureau   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
Table 2.6: Sample Design, Response Rates, and Attrition 
 
 All Eligible 
Households 
Treatment  
Group (MTW) 
Control Group  
(Non-MTW) 
Baseline (2012):    
  Number of MTW eligible households 1,985 1,224 761 
Number invited 
  (Percent invited, %) 
1,778 
(89.6) 
1,153 
(94.2) 
625 
(82.1) 
Number responded 
  (Response rate, %) 
463 
(26.4) 
301 
(26.7) 
162 
(25.9) 
Missing psychological well-being  
  index at baseline 
17 13 4 
  Sub-total 446 288 158 
    
Follow-up (2014):    
Number of portability out, dropouts,  
  no response or refusals 
208 132 76 
Missing psychological well-being  
  index at follow-up 
11 8 3 
  Percent decreased (%) 49.1 48.6 50.0 
Final sample size 227 148 79 
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Table 2.7: Description of Variables 
 
 Description 
Dependent variables  
  CES-D = 20-item Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression  
  scale score 
  ATH = 12-item Adult Trait Hope scale score 
  GAD = 7-item Generalized Anxiety Disorder scale score 
  
Program variable  
  MTW = 1 for MTW PHA; 0 for other 
  Post = 1 for follow-up year; 0 for baseline year 
  
Control variables  
  Head, Age = Age 
  Head, White = 1 for white; 0 for other 
  Head, Female = 1 for female; 0 for other 
  Head, Divorced = 1 for head was divorced; 0 for other 
  Head, Single = 1 for single; 0 for other 
  Head, Criminal history = 1 for ever serving time in jail; 0 for other 
Head, Less than high school  
  diploma 
= 1 for less than high school diploma;  0 for other 
Head, High school diploma or  
  GED 
= 1 for high school diploma or GED; 0 for other 
  Head, English speaking skill = 1 for speaking good or excellent; 0 for speaking fair or  
  poor 
  Head, Second language = 1 for speaking second language; 0 for other 
  Head, Computer skill = 1 for ever using computer; 0 for other 
  Head, Driver’s license = 1 for having a driver’s license; 0 for other 
  Head, Employment status = 1 for having at least a job; 0 for other 
  Household, Size = Household size 
  Household, Child = 1 for having at least a child; 0 for other 
  Household, Adult member = 1 for living with an adult member over the age of 18; 0  
  for other 
Household, Other sources of  
  income 
= 1 for receiving income from other adult members  
  (excluding head) over the age of 18; 0 for other  
  Household, Recently moved = 1 for a household that moved in less than three months 
Notes: Head, English speaking skill was originally asked in a four-point scale: “Poor” (1); “Fair” (2); “Good” (3); 
and “Excellent” (4). We re-code the variable – 1 if a respondent chose ‘excellent’ or ‘good’, and 0 if a respondent 
chose ‘fair’ or ‘poor’.  
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Table 2.8: Comparison of Psychological Well-Being and Other Covariates between Attrition and Non-Attrition Group 
 
 All Sampled Head of 
Households 
 Non-White Head of  
Households 
 Low-Educated  
Head of Households 
 Non-Attriting  
Households  
(1) 
Attrition 
Dummy  
(2) 
 Non-Attriting  
Households  
(3) 
Attrition 
Dummy  
(4) 
 Non-Attriting  
Households  
(5) 
Attrition 
Dummy  
(6) 
20-item CES-D 
 
0.759 
(0.520) 
0.045 
(0.052) 
 0.744 
(0.517) 
0.055 
(0.056) 
 0.791 
(0.533) 
0.007 
(0.069) 
12-item ATH 
 
2.927 
(0.551) 
-0.027 
(0.051) 
 2.956 
(0.549) 
-0.068 
(0.056) 
 2.803 
(0.555) 
0.078 
(0.070) 
7-item GAD 
 
0.810 
(0.815) 
0.002 
(0.079) 
 0.770 
(0.801) 
-0.004 
(0.084) 
 0.783 
(0.809) 
-0.020 
(0.103) 
Head, Age 37.451 
(9.062) 
-2.694*** 
(0.861) 
 37.569 
(9.112) 
-2.775*** 
(0.943) 
 37.854 
(9.536) 
-2.773** 
(1.239) 
Head, White 0.121 
(0.326) 
0.046 
(0.032) 
 – 
( – ) 
– 
( – ) 
 0.114 
(0.319) 
0.067 
(0.044) 
Head, Female 0.964 
(0.186) 
-0.018 
(0.020) 
 0.970 
(0.172) 
-0.025 
(0.021) 
 0.959 
(0.198) 
-0.002 
(0.026) 
Head, Divorced 0.098 
(0.298) 
-0.013 
(0.027) 
 0.091 
(0.289) 
-0.043* 
(0.026) 
 0.081 
(0.274) 
0.003 
(0.035) 
Head, Single 0.813 
(0.391) 
0.030 
(0.036) 
 0.822 
(0.383) 
0.050 
(0.037) 
 0.837 
(0.371) 
0.013 
(0.047) 
Head, Criminal history 0.161 
(0.369) 
-0.059* 
(0.032) 
 0.163 
(0.371) 
-0.055 
(0.035) 
 0.148 
(0.356) 
-0.076* 
(0.039) 
Head, Less than  
  high school degree 
0.197 
(0.399) 
0.011 
(0.038) 
 0.209 
(0.408) 
-0.018 
(0.041) 
 0.358 
(0.481) 
0.025 
(0.062) 
Head, High school  
  or GED degree 
0.354 
(0.479) 
-0.020 
(0.045) 
 0.347 
(0.477) 
0.005 
(0.049) 
 – 
( – ) 
– 
( – ) 
Head, English  
  speaking skill 
0.856 
(0.352) 
-0.046 
(0.036) 
 0.846 
(0.362) 
-0.048 
(0.039) 
 0.844 
(0.364) 
-0.079 
(0.051) 
Head, Second  
  language 
0.031 
(0.175) 
0.009 
(0.018) 
 0.031 
(0.173) 
0.007 
(0.019) 
 0.016 
(0.128) 
0.001 
(0.017) 
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Table 2.8 (continued) 
 
 
 All Sampled Head of 
Households 
 Non-White Head of  
Households 
 Low-Educated  
Head of Households 
 Non-Attriting  
Households (1) 
Attrition 
Dummy  
(2) 
 Non-Attriting  
Households (3) 
Attrition 
Dummy  
(4) 
 Non-Attriting  
Households (5) 
Attrition 
Dummy  
(6) 
Head, Computer skill 0.826 
(0.380) 
-0.020 
(0.037) 
 0.817 
(0.387) 
-0.008 
(0.040) 
 0.724 
(0.449) 
-0.023 
(0.058) 
Head, Driver’s license 0.692 
(0.463) 
-0.048 
(0.045) 
 0.665 
(0.473) 
-0.034 
(0.049) 
 0.585 
(0.495) 
-0.066 
(0.064) 
Head, Employment  
  status 
0.545 
(0.499) 
-0.076 
(0.047) 
 0.553 
(0.498) 
-0.109** 
(0.051) 
 0.472 
(0.501) 
-0.042 
(0.063) 
Household, Size 3.107 
(1.552) 
-0.053 
(0.146) 
 3.117 
(1.601) 
-0.042 
(0.161) 
 3.073 
(1.631) 
0.072 
(0.205) 
Household, Child 0.768 
(0.423) 
0.034 
(0.039) 
 0.756 
(0.430) 
0.039 
(0.043) 
 0.740 
(0.441) 
0.070 
(0.054) 
Household, Adult  
  member 
0.223 
(0.417) 
-0.034 
(0.038) 
 0.228 
(0.421) 
-0.055 
(0.041) 
 0.195 
(0.398) 
-0.022 
(0.050) 
Household, Other  
  sources of income 
0.081 
(0.274) 
-0.004 
(0.026) 
 0.082 
(0.276) 
-0.013 
(0.027) 
 0.083 
(0.276) 
-0.007 
(0.035) 
Household, Recently  
  moved 
0.049 
(0.217) 
-0.004 
(0.020) 
 0.051 
(0.220) 
-0.009 
(0.022) 
 0.033 
(0.178) 
0.009 
(0.025) 
Obs. 227 446  197 382  123 243 
Notes: Difference in psychological well-being and other covariates (pre-treatment variables) between attrition and non-attrition group for all sampled head of 
households, and non-white and low-educated heads at baseline. Low-educated head of households include heads with GED, high school diploma, and no formal 
education degree. Heads with high school or GED degree are categorized as a reference group. Column (1), (3), and (5) present baseline mean of psychological 
well-being index and other covariates (listed on the left) of non-attrition group. Standard deviations are reported in the parenthesis. Column (2), (4), and (6) report 
the estimates obtained with the OLS regression of each variable on attrition dummy (1 for attrition group; 0 for other) with public housing authority (PHA) fixed 
effect (here, we have two PHAs – one for MTW PHA (or the treatment group) coded as 1, and non-MTW PHA (or the control group) coded as 0). Robust errors 
are reported in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent, and *** at 1 percent level.      
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Table 2.9: Attrition Probit Regression  
(Dependent Variable: Attrition Dummy) 
 
 All Sampled Head of 
Households 
 Non-White Head of  
Households 
 Low-Educated  
Head of Households 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
20-item CES-D 
 
0.227 
(0.181) 
0.189 
(0.195) 
 0.260 
(0.200) 
0.183 
(0.216) 
 0.158 
(0.248) 
-0.027 
(0.281) 
12-item ATH 
 
-0.020 
(0.122) 
-0.073 
(0.132) 
 -0.113 
(0.133) 
-0.201 
(0.147) 
 0.195 
(0.163) 
0.185 
(0.178) 
7-item GAD 
 
-0.119 
(0.114) 
-0.097 
(0.125) 
 -0.166 
(0.127) 
-0.114 
(0.139) 
 -0.063 
(0.163) 
0.046 
(0.184) 
Head, Age  -0.029*** 
(0.009) 
  -0.027 
(0.010) 
  -0.028** 
(0.012) 
Head, White  0.261 
(0.190) 
  – 
( – ) 
  0.386 
(0.268) 
Head, Female  -0.418 
(0.344) 
  -0.678* 
(0.405) 
  -0.632 
(0.485) 
Head, Divorced  -0.042 
(0.310) 
  -0.535 
(0.369) 
  0.051 
(0.458) 
Head, Single  -0.001 
(0.236) 
  -0.096 
(0.254) 
  -0.035 
(0.336) 
Head, Criminal history  -0.357* 
(0.193) 
  -0.359* 
(0.212) 
  -0.551* 
(0.312) 
Head, Less than high school degree  -0.017 
(0.184) 
  -0.165 
(0.203) 
  0.211 
(0.190) 
Head, High school or GED degree  -0.131 
(0.151) 
  -0.108 
(0.164) 
  – 
( – ) 
Head, English speaking skill  0.370** 
(0.183) 
  -0.339* 
(0.194) 
  -0.670*** 
(0.243) 
Head, Second  language  0.162 
(0.337) 
  0.111 
(0.381) 
  -0.045 
(0.703) 
Head, Computer skill  -0.132 
(0.185) 
  -0.043 
(0.201) 
  -0.093 
(0.209) 
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Table 2.9 (continued) 
 All Sampled Head of 
Households 
 Non-White Head of  
Households 
 Low-Educated  
Head of Households 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Head, Driver’s license  -0.086 
(0.151) 
  -0.012 
(0.162) 
  -0.190 
(0.199) 
Head, Employment status  -0.114 
(0.132) 
  -0.206 
(0.145) 
  -0.029 
(0.194) 
Household, Size  -0.023 
(0.052) 
  -0.014 
(0.055) 
  0.034 
(0.068) 
Household, Child  0.080 
(0.219) 
  0.077 
(0.235) 
  0.187 
(0.299) 
Household, Adult  member  0.072 
(0.199) 
  0.001 
(0.218) 
  0.164 
(0.295) 
Household, Other  sources of income  0.119 
(0.277) 
  0.104 
(0.308) 
  -0.037 
(0.396) 
Household, Recently  moved  -0.149 
(0.301) 
  -0.275 
(0.335) 
  0.065 
(0.455) 
PHA Fixed Effect  0.092 
(0.141) 
 0.129 
(0.140) 
0.192 
(0.155) 
 0.077 
(0.165) 
0.082 
(0.196) 
Cons.  2.101*** 
(0.799) 
 0.129 
(0.457) 
2.618*** 
(0.918) 
 -0.691 
(0.522) 
1.399 
(1.080) 
         
Obs. 446 446  382 382  243 243 
Log-likelihood -308.198 -282.467  -262.627 -238.162  -167.442 -149.538 
Pseudo R-squared 0.003 0.003  0.007 0.055  0.001 0.074 
         
Wald (Joint significance test for attrition)         
Chi-squared test statistics without  
  constant (p-value) 
1.87 
(0.600) 
25.79 
(0.261) 
 3.43 
(0.330) 
26.13 
(0.202) 
 1.70 
(0.637) 
21.73 
(0.415) 
Chi-squared test statistics with  
  constant (p-value) 
1.87 
(0.760) 
25.8 
(0.309) 
 4.28 
(0.370) 
26.57 
(0.228) 
 1.95 
(0.746) 
21.76 
(0.474) 
Notes: Attrition probit regressions consist of the estimates, obtained with a probit model of attrition dummy on psychological well-being and other covariates (pre-
treatment variables)  with public housing authority (PHA) fixed effect (here, we have two PHAs – one for MTW PHA (or the treatment group) coded as 1, and 
non-MTW PHA (or the control group) coded as 0). Low-educated head of households include heads with GED, high school diploma, and no formal education 
degree. Heads with high school or GED degree are categorized as a reference group. A Wald test is performed to test whether the included variables are jointly 
equal to zero. Robust errors are reported in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent, and *** at 1 percent level. 
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Table 2.10: BGLW Test for 20-item CES-D Scale 
 
 All Sampled  
Head of Households 
Non-White Head 
of Households 
Low-Educated  
Head of Households 
Head, Age 0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
Head, White 0.149 
(0.115) 
– 
( – ) 
-0.073 
(0.169) 
Head, Female 0.172 
(0.152) 
0.275 
(0.188) 
-0.020 
(0.299) 
Head, Divorced 0.151 
(0.188) 
0.106 
(0.215) 
0.184 
(0.275) 
Head, Single -0.041 
(0.137) 
-0.112 
(0.159) 
-0.190 
(0.190) 
Head, Criminal history 0.075 
(0.117) 
0.158 
(0.125) 
-0.103 
(0.156) 
Head, Less than high  
  school degree 
0.057 
(0.119) 
0.160 
(0.130) 
0.067 
(0.116) 
Head, High school or  
  GED degree 
0.022 
(0.081) 
0.083 
(0.090) 
– 
( – ) 
Head, English speaking  
  skill 
-0.074 
(0.126) 
-0.116 
(0.135) 
-0.093 
(0.161) 
Head, Second language -0.097 
(0.146) 
0.059 
(0.135) 
-0.135 
(0.430) 
Head, Computer skill 0.029 
(0.136) 
-0.021 
(0.147) 
0.006 
(0.128) 
Head, Driver’s license -0.077 
(0.101) 
-0.033 
(0.109) 
-0.120 
(0.120) 
Head, Employment  
  status 
-0.141* 
(0.078) 
-0.130* 
(0.085) 
-0.094 
(0.112) 
Household, Size 0.025 
(0.031) 
0.022 
(0.031) 
0.040 
(0.041) 
Household, Child -0.049 
(0.110) 
-0.034 
(0.121) 
-0.059 
(0.172) 
Household, Adult  
  member 
0.024 
(0.103) 
0.027 
(0.115) 
0.260 
(0.167) 
Household, Other  
  sources of income 
-0.055 
(0.139) 
-0.084 
(0.159) 
-0.270 
(0.237) 
Household, Recently  
  moved 
-0.223** 
(0.104) 
-0.197* 
(0.118) 
-0.431 
(0.290) 
PHA Fixed effect 0.025 
(0.081) 
0.015 
(0.086) 
0.042 
(0.109) 
Cons. 0.569 
(0.366) 
0.687 
(0.419) 
1.202** 
(0.530) 
Attrition dummy 0.444 
(0.527) 
-0.338 
(0.624) 
-1.184 
(0.750) 
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Table 2.10 (continued) 
 
 
 All Sampled  
Head of Households 
Non-White Head 
of Households 
Low-Educated  
Head of Households 
Interaction with  Attrition  
  dummy 
   
Head, Age 0.009 
(0.008) 
0.009 
(0.009) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
Head, White -0.174 
(0.159) 
– 
( – ) 
0.170 
(0.231) 
Head, Female 0.065 
(0.348) 
-0.179 
(0.419) 
0.636 
(0.442) 
Head, Divorced 0.151 
(0.264) 
0.065 
(0.340) 
0.100 
(0.411) 
Head, Single 0.278 
(0.182) 
0.352* 
(0.206) 
0.413 
(0.299) 
Head, Criminal history -0.103 
(0.183) 
-0.187 
(0.205) 
0.377 
(0.276) 
Head, Less than high  
  school degree 
-0.107 
(0.164) 
-0.182 
(0.183) 
-0.035 
(0.161) 
Head, High school or  
  GED degree 
-0.110 
(0.129) 
-0.167 
(0.140) 
– 
( – ) 
Head, English speaking  
  skill 
0.183 
(0.158) 
0.200 
(0.175) 
0.151 
(0.203) 
Head, Second language 0.019 
(0.276) 
-0.224 
(0.272) 
0.764 
(0.607) 
Head, Computer skill 0.126 
(0.168) 
0.198 
(0.182) 
0.081 
(0.178) 
Head, Driver’s license -0.177 
(0.141) 
-0.146 
(0.154) 
-0.236 
(0.171) 
Head, Employment  
  status 
0.084 
(0.115) 
0.050 
(0.128) 
0.044 
(0.162) 
Household, Size -0.026 
(0.045) 
-0.029 
(0.048) 
-0.019 
(0.058) 
Household, Child -0.028 
(0.189) 
-0.024 
(0.210) 
-0.252 
(0.249) 
Household, Adult  
  member 
-0.003 
(0.190) 
0.085 
(0.219) 
-0.197 
(0.254) 
Household, Other  
  sources of income 
0.103 
(0.221) 
0.093 
(0.252) 
0.360 
(0.362) 
Household, Recently  
  moved 
0.310 
(0.213) 
0.364 
(0.270) 
0.218 
(0.395) 
PHA Fixed Effect -0.186 
(0.124) 
-0.195 
(0.137) 
-0.037 
(0.162) 
    
Obs. 446 382 243 
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Table 2.10 (continued) 
 
 
 All Sampled  
Head of Households 
Non-White Head of 
Households 
Low-Educated  
Head of Households 
R-squared 0.098 0.095 0.187 
    
BGLW (Joint significance test 
for attrition) 
   
  F-test statistics without  
    constant (p-value) 
0.65 
(0.871) 
0.70 
(0.815) 
0.81 
(0.691) 
  F-test statistics with  
    constant (p-value) 
0.64 
(0.886) 
0.69 
(0.829) 
0.77 
(0.744) 
Notes: BGLW test consists of estimates obtained with the OLS regression of 20-item CES-D scale score at baseline 
on attrition dummy, baseline pre-treatment variables, and interaction terms between attrition dummy and the pre-
treatment variables with public housing authority (PHA) fixed effect (here, we have two PHAs – one for MTW PHA 
(or the treatment group) coded as 1, and non-MTW PHA (or the control group) coded as 0). Low-educated head of 
households include heads with GED, high school diploma, and no formal education degree. Heads with high school 
or GED degree are categorized as a reference group. The BGLW test is performed to test whether the included 
variables are jointly equal to zero. Robust errors are reported in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 
pct., and *** at 1 pct. level. 
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Table 2.11: BGLW Test for 12-item ATH Scale 
 
 All Sampled  
Head of Households 
Non-White Head 
of Households 
Low-Educated  
Head of Households 
Head, Age -0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
Head, White -0.250** 
(0.123) 
– 
( – ) 
-0.090 
(0.166) 
Head, Female 0020 
(0.190) 
-0.126 
(0.251) 
0.114 
(0.294) 
Head, Divorced 0.065 
(0.196) 
-0.056 
(0.225) 
0.144 
(0.270) 
Head, Single 0.089 
(0.155) 
0.049 
(0.165) 
0.280 
(0.187) 
Head, Criminal history -0.010 
(0.092) 
-0.047 
(0.100) 
0.107 
(0.153) 
Head, Less than high  
  school degree 
-0.340*** 
(0.121) 
-0.400*** 
(0.132) 
-0.182 
(0.114) 
Head, High school or  
  GED degree 
-0.172** 
(0.081) 
-0.186** 
(0.088) 
– 
( – ) 
Head, English speaking  
  skill 
-0.202* 
(0.118) 
-0.172 
(0.127) 
-0.385** 
(0.158) 
Head, Second language 0.171 
(0.192) 
0.081 
(0.191) 
0.827* 
(0.423) 
Head, Computer skill 0.057 
(0.124) 
0.105 
(0.135) 
0.036 
(0.126) 
Head, Driver’s license 0.003 
(0.097) 
-0.032 
(0.102) 
-0.040 
(0.118) 
Head, Employment  
  status 
-0.172** 
(0.079) 
0.183** 
(0.085) 
0.183* 
(0.110) 
Household, Size 0.005 
(0.034) 
0.017 
(0.034) 
0.027 
(0.040) 
Household, Child -0.009 
(0.120) 
-0.036 
(0.131) 
0.059 
(0.169) 
Household, Adult  
  member 
0.012 
(0.142) 
-0.029 
(0.155) 
-0.001 
(0.164) 
Household, Other  
  sources of income 
0.088 
(0.151) 
0.146 
(0.168) 
0.200 
(0.233) 
Household, Recently  
  moved 
-0.145 
(0.216) 
-0.152** 
(0.230) 
-0.335 
(0.285) 
PHA Fixed effect 0.032 
(0.085) 
0.054 
(0.093) 
0.118 
(0.107) 
Cons. 3.193*** 
(0.356) 
3.229*** 
(0.409) 
2.883*** 
(0.521) 
Attrition dummy 0.443 
(0.476) 
0.546 
(0.541) 
0.641 
(0.737) 
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Table 2.11 (continued) 
 
 
 All Sampled  
Head of Households 
Non-White Head 
of Households 
Low-Educated  
Head of Households 
Interaction with  Attrition  
  dummy 
   
Head, Age -0.012 
(0.007) 
-0.018** 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.010) 
Head, White 0.302* 
(0.171) 
– 
( – ) 
0.100 
(0.227) 
Head, Female -0.147 
(0.313) 
-0.010 
(0.384) 
-0.363 
(0.435) 
Head, Divorced -0.225 
(0.240) 
0.064 
(0.273) 
-0.081 
(0.404) 
Head, Single -0.368** 
(0.181) 
-0.347* 
(0.190) 
-0.437 
(0.294) 
Head, Criminal history -0.128 
(0.145) 
-0.042 
(0.163) 
-0.109 
(0.272) 
Head, Less than high  
  school degree 
0.370** 
(0.152) 
0.421** 
(0.166) 
0.122 
(0.158) 
Head, High school or  
  GED degree 
0.244** 
(0.121) 
0.299** 
(0.130) 
– 
( – ) 
Head, English speaking  
  skill 
0.309** 
(0.149) 
0.260 
(0.163) 
0.480** 
(0.200) 
Head, Second language 0.089 
(0.317) 
0.263 
(0.328) 
-1.469** 
(0.597) 
Head, Computer skill 0.008 
(0.160) 
-0.049 
(0.170) 
-0.059 
(0.175) 
Head, Driver’s license -0.007 
(0.132) 
0.062 
(0.141) 
-0.029 
(0.168) 
Head, Employment  
  status 
0.071 
(0.110) 
-0.088** 
(0.120) 
0.034 
(0.159) 
Household, Size -0.025 
(0.046) 
0.011 
(0.048) 
0.018 
(0.057) 
Household, Child -0.158 
(0.178) 
-0.164 
(0.195) 
-0.110 
(0.245) 
Household, Adult  
  member 
-0.076 
(0.201) 
0.034 
(0.226) 
-0.259 
(0.249) 
Household, Other  
  sources of income 
-0.085 
(0.212) 
-0.239 
(0.236) 
-0.064 
(0.356) 
Household, Recently  
  moved 
0.064 
(0.270) 
-0.014 
(0.308) 
0.647* 
(0.388) 
PHA Fixed Effect 0.080 
(0.123) 
0.057 
(0.137) 
-0.023 
(0.159) 
    
Obs. 446 382 243 
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Table 2.11 (continued) 
 
 
 All Sampled  
Head of Households 
Non-White Head 
of Households 
Low-Educated  
Head of Households 
R-squared 0.153 0.180 0.208 
    
BGLW (Joint significance test 
for attrition) 
   
  F-test statistics without  
    constant (p-value) 
1.45 
(0.101) 
1.30 
(0.185) 
1.15 
(0.311) 
  F-test statistics with  
    constant (p-value) 
1.40 
(0.117) 
1.35 
(0.151) 
1.14 
(0.318) 
Notes: BGLW test consists of estimates obtained with the OLS regression of 12-item ATH scale score at baseline on 
attrition dummy, baseline pre-treatment variables, and interaction terms between attrition dummy and the pre-
treatment variables with public housing authority (PHA) fixed effect (here, we have two PHAs – one for MTW PHA 
(or the treatment group) coded as 1, and non-MTW PHA (or the control group) coded as 0). Low-educated head of 
households include heads with GED, high school diploma, and no formal education degree. Heads with high school 
or GED degree are categorized as a reference group. The BGLW test is performed to test whether the included 
variables are jointly equal to zero. Robust errors are reported in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 
pct., and *** at 1 pct. level. 
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Table 2.12: BGLW Test for 7-item GAD Scale 
 
 All Sampled  
Head of Households 
Non-White Head 
of Households 
Low-Educated  
Head of Households 
Head, Age 0.012 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
0.013 
(0.011) 
Head, White 0.357** 
(0.169) 
– 
( – ) 
0.106 
(0.255) 
Head, Female 0.255 
(0.293) 
0.288 
(0.370) 
-0.171 
(0.453) 
Head, Divorced 0.232 
(0.298) 
0.073 
(0.335) 
0.259 
(0.416) 
Head, Single 0.006 
(0.217) 
-0.142 
(0.235) 
-0.247 
(0.288) 
Head, Criminal history 0.212 
(0.189) 
0.379* 
(0.202) 
-0.054 
(0.236) 
Head, Less than high  
  school degree 
-0.098 
(0.186) 
0.072 
(0.197) 
0.058 
(0.176) 
Head, High school or  
  GED degree 
-0.109 
(0.129) 
-0.028 
(0.142) 
– 
( – ) 
Head, English speaking  
  skill 
-0.030 
(0.195) 
-0.054 
(0.201) 
0.054 
(0.243) 
Head, Second language -0.284 
(0.294) 
-0.078 
(0.331) 
-0.543 
(0.651) 
Head, Computer skill 0.062 
(0.195) 
-0.021 
(0.208) 
0.045 
(0.193) 
Head, Driver’s license -0.055 
(0.145) 
0.006 
(0.154) 
-0.073 
(0.182) 
Head, Employment  
  status 
-0.295** 
(0.121) 
-0.236* 
(0.130) 
-0.200 
(0.169) 
Household, Size 0.012 
(0.047) 
0.012 
(0.047) 
0.045 
(0.062) 
Household, Child 0.072 
(0.172) 
0.093 
(0.184) 
0.077 
(0.261) 
Household, Adult  
  member 
-0.045 
(0.156) 
-0.041 
(0.170) 
0.157 
(0.253) 
Household, Other  
  sources of income 
0.164 
(0.252) 
0.140 
(0.288) 
0.007 
(0.358) 
Household, Recently  
  moved 
-0.113 
(0.217) 
-0.036 
(0.235) 
-0.300 
(0.439) 
PHA Fixed effect 0.107 
(0.122) 
0.141 
(0.131) 
-0.076 
(0.245) 
Cons. 0.104 
(0.578) 
0.361 
(0.645) 
0.331 
(0.803) 
Attrition dummy -0.971 
(0.789) 
-1.125 
(0.905) 
-1.205 
(1.135) 
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Table 2.12 (continued) 
 
 
 All Sampled  
Head of Households 
Non-White Head 
of Households 
Low-Educated  
Head of Households 
Interaction with  Attrition  
  dummy 
   
Head, Age 0.009 
(0.011) 
0.015 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.015) 
Head, White -0.117 
(0.257) 
– 
( – ) 
0.275 
(0.349) 
Head, Female 0.218 
(0.500) 
-0.003 
(0.599) 
0.784 
(0.670) 
Head, Divorced 0.196 
(0.415) 
0.341 
(0.543) 
0.137 
(0.622) 
Head, Single 0.357 
(0.277) 
0.527* 
(0.300) 
0.620 
(0.452) 
Head, Criminal history -0.358 
(0.264) 
-0.579* 
(0.294) 
0.162 
(0.418) 
Head, Less than high  
  school degree 
-0.052 
(0.247) 
-0.098 
(0.265) 
-0.173 
(0.244) 
Head, High school or  
  GED degree 
0.099 
(0.189) 
0.031* 
(0.205) 
– 
( – ) 
Head, English speaking  
  skill 
0.211 
(0.236) 
0.271 
(0.252) 
0.183 
(0.307) 
Head, Second language 0.373 
(0.474) 
0.203 
(0.534) 
1.108 
(0.919) 
Head, Computer skill 0.226 
(0.245) 
0.344 
(0.263) 
0.217 
(0.270) 
Head, Driver’s license -0.122 
(0.200) 
-0.114 
(0.210) 
-0.302 
(0.259) 
Head, Employment  
  status 
0.366 
(0.172) 
0.252** 
(0.187) 
0.205 
(0.245) 
Household, Size -0.006 
(0.065) 
0.012 
(0.047) 
0.029 
(0.088) 
Household, Child -0.192 
(0.293) 
-0.181 
(0.320) 
-0.519 
(0.377) 
Household, Adult  
  member 
-0.076 
(0.275) 
0.089 
(0.310) 
-0.144 
(0.384) 
Household, Other  
  sources of income 
0.013 
(0.364) 
-0.038 
(0.410) 
0.298 
(0.548) 
Household, Recently  
  moved 
0.397 
(0.392) 
0.565 
(0.455) 
0.057 
(0.598) 
PHA Fixed Effect -0.173 
(0.180) 
-0.248 
(0.192) 
-0.076 
(0.245) 
    
Obs. 446 382 243 
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Table 2.12 (continued) 
 
 
 All Sampled  
Head of Households 
Non-White Head 
of Households 
Low-Educated  
Head of  
Households 
R-squared 0.102 0.092 0.154 
    
BGLW (Joint significance test 
for attrition) 
   
  F-test statistics without  
    constant (p-value) 
0.81 
(0.691) 
0.93 
(0.538) 
0.60 
(0.895) 
  F-test statistics with  
    constant (p-value) 
0.77 
(0.744) 
0.88 
(0.603) 
0.57 
(0.924) 
Notes: BGLW test consists of estimates obtained with the OLS regression of 7-item GAD scale score at baseline on 
attrition dummy, baseline pre-treatment variables, and interaction terms between attrition dummy and the pre-
treatment variables with public housing authority (PHA) fixed effect (here, we have two PHAs – one for MTW PHA 
(or the treatment group) coded as 1, and non-MTW PHA (or the control group) coded as 0). Low-educated head of 
households include heads with GED, high school diploma, and no formal education degree. Heads with high school 
or GED degree are categorized as a reference group. The BGLW test is performed to test whether the included 
variables are jointly equal to zero. Robust errors are reported in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 
pct., and *** at 1 pct. level. 
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Table 2.13: Baseline Balance Test 
(Non-Attrition Group Only) 
 
  All Sampled  
Head of Households 
 Non-White Head of Households  Low-Educated  
Head of Households 
 Control 
Group  
(1) 
Treatment 
Dummy  
(2) 
 Control 
Group  
(3) 
Treatment 
Dummy  
(4) 
 Control 
Group  
(5) 
Treatment 
Dummy  
(6) 
20-item CES-D 
 
0.760 
(0.461) 
0.008 
(0.069) 
 0.758 
(0.472) 
-0.020 
(0.075) 
 0.746 
(0.454) 
0.081 
(0.093) 
12-item ATH 
 
2.867 
(0.528) 
0.078 
(0.075) 
 2.902 
(0.543) 
0.080 
(0.083) 
 2.749 
(0.534) 
0.095 
(0.100) 
7-item GAD 
 
0.765 
(0.809) 
0.092 
(0.114) 
 0.698 
(0.786) 
0.106 
(0.121) 
 0.650 
(0.749) 
0.230 
(0.143) 
Head, Age      36.620 
(9.771) 
1.305 
(1.309) 
 36.906 
(9.854) 
0.981 
(1.444) 
 36.962 
(10.177) 
1.756 
(1.767) 
Head, White 0.190 
(0.395) 
-0.089* 
(0.051) 
 – 
( – ) 
– 
( – ) 
 0.170 
(0.379) 
-0.085 
(0.062) 
Head, Female 0.937 
(0.245) 
0.043 
(0.030) 
 0.938 
(0.244) 
0.047 
(0.032) 
 0.943 
(0.233) 
0.028 
(0.038) 
Head, Divorced 0.089 
(0.286) 
0.026 
(0.042) 
 0.094 
(0.294) 
-0.004 
(0.044) 
 0.113 
(0.320) 
-0.043 
(0.054) 
Head, Single 0.848 
(0.361) 
-0.064 
(0.053) 
 0.875 
(0.333) 
-0.078 
(0.054) 
 0.811 
(0.395) 
0.034 
(0.069) 
Head, Criminal history 0.244 
(0.432) 
-0.129** 
(0.055) 
 0.238 
(0.429) 
-0.110* 
(0.061) 
 0.231 
(0.425) 
-0.146** 
(0.068) 
Head, Less than high        
  school degree 
0.203 
(0.405) 
-0.005 
(0.056) 
 0.219 
(0.417) 
-0.014 
(0.063) 
 0.302 
(0.463) 
0.107 
(0.087) 
Head, High school or  
  GED degree 
0.468 
(0.502) 
-0.183*** 
(0.068) 
 0.469 
(0.503) 
-0.181** 
(0.074) 
 – 
( – ) 
– 
( – ) 
Head, English speaking  
  skill 
0.808 
(0.397) 
0.077 
(0.052) 
 0.794 
(0.408) 
0.078 
(0.059) 
 0.849 
(0.361) 
-0.006 
(0.066) 
Head, Second language 0.026 
(0.159) 
0.008 
(0.023) 
 0.032 
(0.177) 
-0.002 
(0.027) 
 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.028 
(0.020) 
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Table 2.13 (continued) 
 
 
 All Sampled  
Head of Households 
 Non-White Head of Households  Low-Educated  
Head of Households 
 Control 
Group  
(1) 
Treatment 
Dummy  
(2) 
 Control Group  
(3) 
Treatment 
Dummy  
(4) 
 Control Group  
(5) 
Treatment 
Dummy  
(6) 
Head, Computer skill 0.785 
(0.414) 
0.067 
(0.055) 
 0.766 
(0.427) 
0.076 
(0.062) 
 0.736 
(0.445) 
-0.018 
(0.081) 
Head, Driver’s license 0.722 
(0.451) 
-0.039 
(0.064) 
 0.672 
(0.473) 
-0.010 
(0.072) 
 0.623 
(0.489) 
-0.059 
(0.090) 
Head, Employment  
  status 
0.557 
(0.500) 
-0.016 
(0.070) 
 0.578 
(0.498) 
-0.037 
(0.076) 
 0.547 
(0.503) 
-0.125 
(0.091) 
Household, Size 3.013 
(1.668) 
0.129 
(0.224) 
 3.000 
(1.764) 
0.173 
(0.256) 
 2.981 
(1.759) 
0.160 
(0.302) 
Household, Child 0.785 
(0.414) 
-0.028 
(0.058) 
 0.766 
(0.427) 
-0.014 
(0.065) 
 0.774 
(0.423) 
-0.055 
(0.079) 
Household, Adult  
  member 
0.139 
(0.348) 
0.131 
(0.054) 
 0.125 
(0.333) 
0.153*** 
(0.057) 
 0.170 
(0.379) 
0.056 
(0.072) 
Household, Other  
  sources of income 
0.065 
(0.248) 
0.024 
(0.037) 
 0.065 
(0.248) 
0.026 
(0.040) 
 0.098 
(0.300) 
-0.028 
(0.052) 
Household, Recently    
  moved 
0.025 
(0.158) 
0.042 
(0.027) 
 0.016 
(0.125) 
0.052* 
(0.027) 
 0.019 
(0.137) 
0.037 
(0.033) 
         
Obs. 79 227  64 197  53 123 
Notes: Difference in psychological well-being index and other covariates (pre-treatment variables) between the treatment and control group at baseline for all 
sampled head of households, and non-white and low-educated heads in the non-attrition group. Low-educated head of households include heads with GED, high 
school diploma, and no formal education degree. Heads with high school or GED degree are categorized as a reference group. Column (1), (3), and (5) present 
baseline mean of psychological well-being index and other covariates (listed on the left) of the control group in non-attrition group. Standard deviations are reported 
in the parenthesis. Column (2), (4), and (6) report the estimates obtained with the OLS regression of each variable on treatment dummy (1 for the treatment group; 
0 for other). Robust errors are reported in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent, and *** at 1 percent level.      
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Table 2.14: Cronbach’s Alpha for Psychological Well-Being Index for  
All Sampled Head of Households (Non-Attrition Group Only) 
 
 12-item CES-D  12-item ATH  7-item GAD 
Item Baseline  
(2012) 
Follow-up  
(2014) 
 Baseline  
(2012) 
Follow-up  
(2014) 
 Baseline  
(2012) 
Follow-up  
(2014) 
1 0.868 0.894  0.838 0.866  0.911 0.921 
2 0.870 0.896  0.818 0.852  0.897 0.914 
3 0.864 0.892     0.899 0.913 
4 0.881 0.907  0.846 0.868  0.900 0.912 
5 0.869 0.895     0.914 0.922 
6 0.860 0.890  0.825 0.842  0.910 0.919 
7 0.890 0.911     0.912 0.919 
8 0.878 0.903  0.832 0.851    
9 0.863 0.893  0.819 0.848    
10 0.868 0.896  0.823 0.844    
11 0.866 0.898       
12 0.870 0.900  0.815 0.852    
13 0.871 0.897       
14 0.865 0.893       
15 0.872 0.899       
16 0.871 0.900       
17 0.862 0.892       
18 0.860 0.892       
19 0.866 0.897       
20 0.865 0.895       
Test Scale 0.875 0.902  0.846 0.869  0.919 0.928 
Notes: A total of 227 head of households (148 heads in the treatment group and 79 heads in the control group) are 
used for calculating alpha coefficients at baseline and follow-up. The alpha coefficient for ATH multi-item scale is 
estimated without 4 distractors. In general, the acceptable alpha values are different from 0.70 to 0.90, and the higher 
alpha coefficient indicates higher reliability. 
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Table 2.15: Cronbach’s Alpha for Psychological Well-Being Index for  
Non-White Head of Households (Non-Attrition Group Only) 
 
 12-item CES-D  12-item ATH  7-item GAD 
Item Baseline  
(2012) 
Follow-up  
(2014) 
 Baseline  
(2012) 
Follow-up  
(2014) 
 Baseline  
(2012) 
Follow-up  
(2014) 
1 0.869 0.901  0.838 0.873  0.908 0.920 
2 0.870 0.903  0.815 0.856  0.893 0.913 
3 0.867 0.901     0.900 0.913 
4 0.879 0.915  0.846 0.875  0.894 0.911 
5 0.872 0.902     0.912 0.920 
6 0.862 0.898  0.829 0.850  0.906 0.917 
7 0.890 0.918     0.911 0.918 
8 0.877 0.910  0.821 0.858    
9 0.866 0.900  0.827 0.855    
10 0.871 0.903  0.823 0.852    
11 0.869 0.905       
12 0.871 0.907  0.818 0.857    
13 0.874 0.905       
14 0.868 0.901       
15 0.873 0.906       
16 0.873 0.908       
17 0.863 0.900       
18 0.862 0.900       
19 0.868 0.905       
20 0.867 0.902       
Test Scale 0.876 0.909  0.847 0.875  0.919 0.927 
Notes: A total of 197 head of households (133 heads in the treatment group and 64 heads in the control group) are 
used for calculating alpha coefficients at baseline and follow-up. The alpha coefficient for ATH multi-item scale is 
estimated without 4 distractors. In general, the acceptable alpha values are different from 0.70 to 0.90, and the higher 
alpha coefficient indicates higher reliability. 
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Table 2.16: Cronbach’s Alpha for Psychological Well-Being Index for  
Low-Educated Head of Households (Non-Attrition Group Only) 
 
 12-item CES-D  12-item ATH  7-item GAD 
Item Baseline  
(2012) 
Follow-up  
(2014) 
 Baseline  
(2012) 
Follow-up  
(2014) 
 Baseline  
(2012) 
Follow-up  
(2014) 
1 0.862 0.877  0.812 0.839  0.910 0.923 
2 0.864 0.878  0.782 0.807  0.899 0.922 
3 0.862 0.877     0.902 0.919 
4 0.879 0.897  0.824 0.840  0.898 0.918 
5 0.864 0.876     0.911 0.925 
6 0.856 0.874  0.793 0.794  0.910 0.920 
7 0.888 0.901     0.908 0.919 
8 0.879 0.894  0.806 0.821    
9 0.859 0.876  0.787 0.817    
10 0.867 0.880  0.795 0.812    
11 0.865 0.881       
12 0.869 0.889  0.778 0.814    
13 0.869 0.882       
14 0.863 0.876       
15 0.871 0.884       
16 0.869 0.891       
17 0.858 0.876       
18 0.858 0.877       
19 0.861 0.880       
20 0.862 0.880       
Test Scale 0.872 0.888  0.819 0.838  0.918 0.931 
Notes: Low-educated head of households include heads with GED, high school diploma, and no formal education 
degree. A total of 123 head of households (70 heads in the treatment group and 53 heads in the control group) are used 
for calculating alpha coefficients at baseline and follow-up. The alpha coefficient for ATH multi-item scale is 
estimated without 4 distractors. In general, the acceptable alpha values are different from 0.70 to 0.90, and the higher 
alpha coefficient indicates higher reliability. 
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Table 2.17:  Summary Statistics for Psychological Well-Being Index 
(Non-Attrition Group Only) 
 
 Baseline (2012)  Follow-up (2014) 
 Treatment Group Control Group  Treatment Group Control Group 
All sampled head of households      
  20-item CES-D 
 
0.768 
(0.551) 
0.760 
(0.461) 
 0.862 
(0.648) 
0.713 
(0.435) 
  12-item ATH 
 
2.953 
(0.558) 
2.874 
(0.527) 
 2.885 
(0.641) 
3.002 
(0.435) 
  7-item GAD 
 
0.856 
(0.836) 
0.765 
(0.809) 
 0.822 
(0.878) 
0.644 
(0.661) 
Non-white head of households      
  20-item CES-D 
 
0.737 
(0.539) 
0.758 
(0.472) 
 0.843 
(0.659) 
0.682 
(0.439) 
  12-item ATH 
 
2.982 
(0.551) 
2.902 
(0.543) 
 2.912 
(0.650) 
3.033 
(0.429) 
  7-item GAD 
 
0.805 
(0.809) 
0.698 
(0.786) 
 0.758 
(0.857) 
0.600 
(0.663) 
Low-educated head of households      
  20-item CES-D 
 
0.827 
(0.582) 
0.746 
(0.454) 
 0.924 
(0.657) 
0.763 
(0.391) 
  12-item ATH 
 
2.844 
(0.566) 
2.749 
(0.534) 
 2.789 
(0.627) 
2.937 
(0.415) 
  7-item GAD 
 
0.879 
(0.837) 
0.650 
(0.749) 
 0.867 
(0.954) 
0.623 
(0.627) 
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis. 
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Table 2.18: Difference-in-Differences Estimates for the MTW Self-Sufficiency Program on  
Psychological Well-Being Index (Non-Attrition Group Only) 
 
  All Sampled  
Head of Households 
 Non-White Head of  
Households 
 Low-Educated  
Head of Households 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
20-item CES-D  0.140** 
(0.064) 
0.115* 
(0.063) 
 0.181*** 
(0.070) 
0.157** 
(0.070) 
 0.080 
(0.091) 
0.030 
(0.092) 
12-item ATH  -0.195*** 
(0.065) 
-0.186*** 
(0.061) 
 -0.202*** 
(0.073) 
-0.190** 
(0.072) 
 -0.243** 
(0.098) 
-0.245** 
(0.96) 
7-item GAD  0.087 
(0.111) 
0.059 
(0.113) 
 0.052 
(0.118) 
0.020 
(0.119) 
 0.014 
(0.157) 
-0.016 
(0.160) 
Controls  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Obs.  454 454  394 394  246 246 
Notes: Difference-in-Differences estimates for the program effects. Outcome variables are listed on the left. The CES-D, ATH, and GAD are constructed by 20 
items, 12 items, and 7 items questionnaire. High values of the ATH scale sore corresponds to positive outcomes. Lower values of the CES-D and GAD scale score 
correspond to positive outcomes. Low-educated head of households include heads with GED, high school diploma, and no formal education degree. Control 
variables include head, age; head, white; head, female; head, divorced; head, single; household, size; household, child; and household, adult member. Robust 
standard errors, clustering at household-level, are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent, and *** at 1 percent level.    
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Table 2.19: Difference-in-Differences Estimates with the Adjustment to  
Group Differences Using the PSM Approach for All Sample Head of Households 
(Non-Attrition Group Only) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
20-item CES-D  0.158** 
(0.071) 
0.150** 
(0.070) 
0.177** 
(0.072) 
0.143** 
(0.069) 
12-item ATH  -0.259** 
(0.132) 
-0.262*** 
(0.083) 
-0.250** 
(0.110) 
-0.236*** 
(0.081) 
7-item GAD  0.166 
(0.110) 
0.188 
(0.120) 
0.165 
(0.131) 
0.149 
(0.137) 
Controls  No Yes No Yes 
      
Obs.  426 426 
Caliper  0.048 0.076 
Pseudo R-squared U 0.130 0.130 
 M 0.019 0.013 
LR chi2  
(p-value) 
U 36.34 (0.006) 36.34 (0.006) 
M 6.85 (0.991) 4.57 (0.999) 
Mean bias U 16.9 16.9 
 M 5.8 4.7 
Median bias U 16.9 16.9 
 M 5.4 4.4 
Notes: PSM specification: 6-NN (oversampling) and two caliper levels – one for 0.25 of standard deviation of the 
calculated propensity scores (Column (1) and (2)), and the other that provides the lowest mean and median biases 
(Column (3) and (4)). Also, we exclude heads whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less the minimum 
of the control group. The CES-D, ATH, and GAD are constructed by 20 items, 12 items, and 7 items questionnaire. 
High values of the ATH scale sore corresponds to positive outcomes. Lower values of the CES-D and GAD scale 
score correspond to positive outcomes. Control variables include head, age; head, white; head, female; head, divorced; 
head, single; household, size; household, child; and household, adult member. Robust standard errors, clustering at 
household-level, are reported in parentheses. ‘U’ indicates unmatched, and ‘M’ means matched with the PSM. * 
denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent, and *** at 1 percent level.          
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Table 2.20: Difference-in-Differences Estimates with the Adjustment to  
Group Differences Using the PSM Approach for Non-White Head of Households 
(Non-Attrition Group Only) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
20-item CES-D  0.191** 
(0.074) 
0.181** 
(0.075) 
0.181** 
(0.073) 
0.172** 
(0.070) 
12-item ATH  -0.296*** 
(0.104) 
-0.291*** 
(0.092) 
-0.280** 
(0.119) 
-0.275** 
(0.095) 
7-item GAD  0.098 
(0.120) 
0.137 
(0.119) 
0.057 
(0.115) 
0.078 
(0.117) 
Controls  No Yes No Yes 
      
Obs.  366 366 
Caliper  0.045 0.090 
Pseudo R-squared U 0.126 0.126 
 M 0.018 0.008 
LR chi2  
(p-value) 
U 29.52 (0.030) 29.52 (0.030) 
M 5.78 (0.995) 2.72 (1.000) 
Mean bias U 16.3 16.3 
 M 6.0 3.8 
Median bias U 16.7 16.7 
 M 4.9 2.6 
Notes: PSM specification: 6-NN (oversampling) and two caliper levels – one for 0.25 of standard deviation of the 
calculated propensity scores (Column (1) and (2)), and the other that provides the lowest mean and median biases 
(Column (3) and (4)). Also, we exclude heads whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less the minimum 
of the control group. The CES-D, ATH, and GAD are constructed by 20 items, 12 items, and 7 items questionnaire. 
High values of the ATH scale sore corresponds to positive outcomes. Lower values of the CES-D and GAD scale 
score correspond to positive outcomes. Control variables include head, age; head, white; head, female; head, divorced; 
head, single; household, size; household, child; and household, adult member. Robust standard errors, clustering at 
household-level, are reported in parentheses. ‘U’ indicates unmatched, and ‘M’ means matched with the PSM. * 
denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent, and *** at 1 percent level.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
99 
 
Table 2.21: Difference-in-Differences Estimates with the Adjustment to  
Group Differences Using the PSM Approach for Low-Educated Head of Households 
(Non-Attrition Group Only) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
20-item CES-D  0.183* 
(0.108) 
0.164* 
(0.109) 
0.206* 
(0.112) 
0.198* 
(0.105) 
12-item ATH  -0.328** 
(0.156) 
-0.374** 
(0.149) 
-0.329** 
(0.144) 
-0.296** 
(0.126) 
7-item GAD  0.077 
(0.160) 
0.099 
(0.152) 
0.113 
(0.153) 
0.112 
(0.151) 
Controls  No Yes No Yes 
      
Obs.  244 244 
Caliper  0.051 0.085 
Pseudo R-squared U 0.134 0.134 
 M 0.028 0.021 
LR chi2  
(p-value) 
U 21.30 (0.167) 21.30 (0.167) 
M 5.16 (0.995) 3.90 (0.999) 
Mean bias U 16.0 16.0 
 M 8.9 6.9 
Median bias U 14.8 14.8 
 M 8.2 5.4 
Notes: PSM specification: 6-NN (oversampling) and two caliper levels – one for 0.25 of standard deviation of the 
calculated propensity scores (Column (1) and (2)), and the other that provides the lowest mean and median biases 
(Column (3) and (4)). Also, we exclude heads whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less the minimum 
of the control group. Low-educated head of households include heads with GED, high school diploma, and no formal 
education degree.The CES-D, ATH, and GAD are constructed by 20 items, 12 items, and 7 items questionnaire. High 
values of the ATH scale sore corresponds to positive outcomes. Lower values of the CES-D and GAD scale score 
correspond to positive outcomes. Control variables include head, age; head, white; head, female; head, divorced; head, 
single; household, size; household, child; and household, adult member. Robust standard errors, clustering at 
household-level, are reported in parentheses. ‘U’ indicates unmatched, and ‘M’ means matched with the PSM. * 
denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent, and *** at 1 percent level.    
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2.8. Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Implementation Timetable of the MTW Self-Sufficiency Program 
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Figure 2.2: Factors in MTW Self-Sufficiency Program that  
Affect Psychological Well-Being 
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Figure 2.3: Timeline of Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
103 
 
Figure 2.4: Kernel Density Estimates for the Distribution of Psychological Well-Being Index 
 
                    (a) All Sampled Head of Households       (b) Non-White Head of Households        (c) Low-Educated Head of Households 
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Figure 2.5: Density Distribution of Propensity Score 
 
A. All Sampled Head of Households 
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Figure 2.5 (continued) 
 
 
B. Non-White Head of Households 
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Figure 2.5 (continued) 
 
 
C. Low-Educated Head of Households 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE EFFECT OF MOVING TO WORK 
DEMONSTRATION ON RECIPIENTS’  
SELF-SUFFICIENCY 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Over the past several decades, we have witnessed a growing social debate about the work 
disincentives inherent in public housing programs. Proponents of the programs argue that housing 
assistance may improve recipients’ economic self-sufficiency by providing additional resources to 
stabilize families and invest in education or job training programs. On the other hand, the standard 
static economic theory predicts a reduction in labor supply through both income and substitution 
effects (Olsen, Tyler, King, & Carrillo, 2005; Jacob & Ludwig, 2012; Shroder, 2002). Specifically, 
housing assistance allows a recipient to consume goods and services independent of work, and the 
benefits are reduced by a proportional increment of earnings and eventually end if the recipient no 
longer needs financial aid under the program’s rule. These would require less effort to achieve 
economic self-sufficiency.  
Although there exists future discussions about ambiguous assumptions and limitations of 
the static model 1 , recent studies provide supportive evidence of disincentives to work. For 
example, Olsen, Tyler, King, and Carillo (2005) and Susin (2005) assert that, overall, housing 
                                                          
1 See Gahvari (1994), Jacob and Ludwig (2012), Leonesio, 1988; Moffitt (2002), Murray (1980), Olsen et al., 
(2005), and Schone (1992) for more detail.   
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assistance had a substantial negative earning effect which was relatively smaller for housing 
vouchers than for public housing and project-based subsidies.  Jacob and Ludwig (2012) examine 
the effects of an expansion of housing vouchers for working-age, able-bodied families in the late 
1990s in Chicago on labor market outcomes. They find that receipt of the voucher reduced 
recipients’ labor force participation, quarterly earnings, and increased TANF program 
participation. Similarly, Carlson, Haveman, Kaplan, and Wolfe (2012) find that receipt of the 
voucher had a large negative effect on earnings, especially in the initial year of receipt, and the 
effect faded out over time.  
Such concerns about work disincentives partly result in drawing attention to the 
effectiveness and optimal design of the public housing programs, and the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has started the Moving to Work (MTW) demonstration, 
authorized by Congress in 1996, which provides flexibilities and waivers to local Public Housing 
Authorities (PHAs) to design and test different strategies to improve participants’ economic self-
sufficiency, as well as other national goals of enhancing cost-effectiveness in federal expenditure 
and expanding affordable housing options (Abravanel et al., 2004).  
In this study, we focus on the MTW self-sufficiency program which incorporates activities 
and policies initiated under the MTW demonstration, and examine its early impact on participants’ 
labor market outcomes compared to those of recipients in conventional public housing programs.2 
As of 2010, the Housing Authority of Champaign County (HACC) has joined the MTW 
demonstration, and the MTW self-sufficiency program has taken effect in Champaign County, 
Illinois, since January 2013. HACC, unlike other conventional public housing programs, is 
allowed to impose work requirements and time-limits on the receipt of subsidy under the self-
                                                          
2 In this study, a participant indicates a head of household that participates in the MTW self-sufficiency program. 
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sufficiency statutory objective. Also, the HACC enforces participation in mandatory Local Self-
Sufficiency (LSS) programs for non-compliant households, and if a household maintains a 
continuous state of non-compliance until the next re-certification, then a penalty or sanction will 
be imposed to the household to compel compliance or to limit its welfare benefits, often resulting 
in loss of subsidy.3 Moreover, the HACC requires working-age (18-54) and able-bodied (non-
disabled and non-handicapped) family members to work a certain number of hours or attend 
educational programs that assist in achieving economic independence within the certain years.  
Since the MTW self-sufficiency program possibly works through multiple channels to 
affect participants’ labor market outcomes, and not all of the participants in the treatment group 
make the same choices from the given options, we calculate the average program effects using the 
Differences-in-Differences models. However, since the MTW demonstration, by its design, may 
not be an ideal random assignment experiment, potential source of bias can be derived from 
correlation between the agency selection process and particular recipients’ characteristics, or 
PHA’s or regional specifics. Therefore, we calculate program effect estimates adopting the 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) approach to test whether the difference in characteristics bias 
our main results. 
Our findings suggest that, in the short-run, the MTW self-sufficiency program leads to a 
significant increase in participants’ probability of working in the labor force (7.8-10.3 percentage-
points) and number of weekly hours worked (3.0-3.7 hours). We also hypothesize that the MTW 
self-sufficiency program may have larger effect sizes in head of households with relatively less 
barriers to employment (such as heads with no criminal history, and having at least a high-school 
                                                          
3 Each MTW PHA develops its unique activities and policies at the same time, based on local housing authority 
and community circumstances. For example, not all MTW PHAs necessarily impose a sanction or implement reward 
systems (i.e. escrow account). Such heterogeneity may result in different program effect estimates along the PHAs, 
and it makes difficult to establish external validity of findings. 
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diploma or GED). On the other hand, we expect that the program may have relatively lower effect 
sizes in single mother households since they are often thought to be the most disadvantaged group 
which may experience further barriers to economic self-sufficiency (Blank, 2002; Danziger et al., 
1999; Ellwood, 2000). Our results lend support to the first hypothesis that the program has a larger 
impact on labor market outcomes of the participants with less barriers to employment; however, 
we do not find the statistical short-run impact for single mother households.4  
Indeed, the MTW demonstration has been criticized because the evaluation has been 
limited to (i) unstandardized data collection – each PHA develops unique policies at the same time 
– and (ii) absence of adequate control groups (non-MTW PHAs) which may bias program effect 
estimates (Abravanel et al., 2004; Cadik & Nogic, 2010). These limitations make a nationwide 
evaluation extremely difficult to compare outcomes of interests across PHAs and establish external 
validity of findings. Fischer (2015) states “requiring more rigorous evaluation of certain MTW 
activities.” GAO (2012) noted that “in most cases, the practices chosen were based on the opinions 
of HUD or contracted staff and largely involved anecdotal (or qualitative) rather than quantitative 
data” (p. 21). Our study contributes to quantitative evidence of the effects of the MTW self-
sufficiency program on participants’ economic activities, which enables comparison of program 
effects to other MTW PHAs; however, our findings would be limited to PHAs that share similar 
activities and characteristics with the HACC. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follow: Section 3.2 discusses background 
information about the MTW self-sufficiency program, and Section 3.3 discusses the empirical 
strategy. Section 3.4 describe data that detail survey design and an analysis of attrition bias and 
                                                          
4 It is difficult to conclude whether the MTW self-sufficiency program doesn’t really affect labor market outcomes 
of single mother households since our sample size limits our ability to make the definite conclusion. Therefore, this 
finding should be viewed with caution.  
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balance tests. Section 3.5 presents the results, and Section 3.6 discusses limitations of the study 
and closes with concluding comments. 
 
3.2. Moving to Work 
The MTW demonstration was legislated by Section 204 of the Omnibus Consolidated Recessions 
and Appropriations Act of 1996 to assess innovative, locally designed initiatives in pursuit of the 
more efficient use of housing assistance. MTW PHAs are selected based on their “performance, 
capability, quality, and feasibility of the MTW Plan, the extent to which the Plan was likely to 
promote residents’ self-sufficiency, community support and involvement, and local and national 
impact” (Cadik & Nogic, 2010, p.13).  
The MTW demonstration is designed to allow flexibilities and waivers (deregulation) to 
participating PHAs to avoid excessive regulatory burden that may impede the effectiveness of 
policies and programs in provisions of the 1937 Housing Act (Abravanel et al., 2004). MTW PHAs 
are also permitted to combine various operating subsidies into a single, flexible fund, referred to 
as a Block Grant, and use these funds interchangeably to better fit the needs of its community. The 
39 current MTW PHAs manage over nearly 12% of the nation’s public housing units and 14% of 
housing vouchers (Table 3.1). In general, the MTW demonstration has three statutory objectives: 
encouraging participating households to achieve economic self-sufficiency, enhancing cost-
effectiveness in federal expenditures, and expanding affordable housing options for low-income 
families. Because of its regulatory flexibility, MTW PHAs are allowed to have their own activities 
and support services, as well as different definitions of program eligibility and fulfillment of the 
self-sufficiency criteria. 
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As of 2010, the HACC joined the MTW demonstration. The HACC serves the County of 
Champaign, Illinois, which is a largely rural county with twin cities of Champaign and Urbana. In 
early 2011, the HACC determined program eligibility, work requirements and time-limits, and 
developed administrative procedures for sanctions and connections to community support 
programs; however, the actual program has taken effect since January 2013 (Figure 3.1). The 
HACC requires all working-age (18-54), able-bodied (non-disabled) family members to work a 
certain number of hours or attend job training, educational institutions, or programs that assist 
participants to obtain employment and achieve economic independence within the certain years. 
Specifically, under the self-sufficiency statutory objective, head of households are required to 
develop a self-sufficiency plan that identifies goals and objectives for each household member in 
the first certification. Re-certification is repeated annually. Households with no income were first 
invited to set up the plan because they are one of the main targets of the program for a transition 
to work.  
The HACC also requires that at least one adult member in the MTW household is expected 
to work a minimum of 20 hours per week or be enrolled in an educational institution that provides 
a certificate or degree by the next re-certification. In the fourth re-certification, one adult member 
must be employed a minimum of 20 hours per week; and all other adult members must be 
employed a minimum of 20 hours per week, or attend an institutional program. In the sixth re-
certification, all adult members have to be self-sufficient. Also, family members, aged 5 through 
18, are required to be enrolled and attend school.  
Moreover, along with the work requirement, the HACC enforces participation in its 
mandatory Local Self-Sufficiency (LSS) program. Each MTW household is assigned a case 
manager who assists in advising on their career planning and assessing its employment barriers. 
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The case managers also provide referrals to services offered by local social service partners 
including: the public health district, child care resource centers; education and job training 
services; financial budgeting; and transportation services. Compliant households – all adult 
members, aged 18 through 54, have been employed 20 hours per week for a minimum of 12 months 
and members, aged 5 through 18, are enrolled in school – are exempt from the mandatory LSS 
program; however, they must participate in the program if they fail to satisfy the self-sufficiency 
requirements. 
Non-compliant households face a loss of housing assistance which may give a strong 
motivation to offset work disincentives. Specifically, the HACC terminates housing assistance if 
a household does not meet self-sufficiency requirements. Specifically, if a household is not 
compliant, the HACC sends a letter to the household for an appointment with a case manager to 
help meet the requirements. If the household does not respond a second time, the HACC and case 
manager review the household’s current status. After the review, a termination of housing 
assistance letter would be mailed to the household. There are, however, hardship exemptions for 
households with extenuating circumstances such as illness or loss of employment through no fault 
of the family member. The households in such circumstances have 16 days from the date of the 
letter to respond in writing to request an exemption. 
 
3.3. Empirical Strategy 
3.3.1. Conceptual Model 
A goal of this study is to provide the early impact of the MTW self-sufficiency program on 
participants’ labor market outcomes. Our data consist of the two time-period household-level 
observations in 2012 (baseline) and 2014 (follow-up). We calculate the effects using the ordinary 
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least squares (OLS) regression in which an outcome variable is regressed on treatment dummy, 
time dummy, and the interaction of treatment and time dummy. Our model specification to 
estimate the impact of the MTW self-sufficiency program is: 
(1) 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑀𝑇𝑊𝑗 𝛽1 + 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 𝛽2 + 𝑀𝑇𝑊𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  𝛽3 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡, 
where i, j, and t index head of household, PHA, and time respectively. 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡  are labor market 
outcomes: the binary employment status (1 if the head is employed; 0 if unemployed) and the 
number of weekly hours worked (labor supply). 𝑀𝑇𝑊𝑗 is a treatment dummy (1 for MTW PHA; 
0 for non-MTW PHA). 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a time dummy (1 for follow-up year; 0 for baseline year). 𝛽0 is 
designed to capture unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  is an idiosyncratic error 
term.  𝛽3 identifies the program effect, estimated by, 
(2) 𝐷𝐷 = 𝐸(𝑦1
𝑇 − 𝑦0
𝑇|𝑇1 = 1) −  𝐸(𝑦1
𝐶 − 𝑦0
𝐶|𝑇1 = 0) = 𝛽3 
Since not all of the head of participating households make the same choices, the DD 
estimate represents the average program effects for all working-age, able-bodied head of 
households regardless of whether the treatment actually received. Also, inclusion of the control 
variables (i.e. age, gender, race, etc.) would increase the precision of the causal effect estimates of 
interest. 
 
3.3.2. Agency Selection 
In a program evaluation context, if the MTW self-sufficiency program was randomly assigned, 
one can estimate the program effect by comparing the outcomes between the treatment and control 
groups. By its design, the selection of MTW PHAs is not an ideal random assignment experiment. 
Specifically, it is a PHA’s own decision to apply for the demonstration, and Congress may 
authorize specific PHAs to become part of MTW, and in others, it may authorize HUD to select 
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the PHAs through its own criteria. However, Cadik and Nogic (2010) argue that “the scoring and 
selection process was not straightforward” (p.13). They report that several highest scored PHAs 
failed to join the MTW demonstration due to limited program scope, and inadequate or lack of 
innovative activity proposals. On the other hand, some PHAs which did not belong to the highest 
scoring group were recommended for participation in the demonstration. Additionally, some 
selected PHAs withdrew from the demonstration since the originally requested deregulation was 
not secured in negotiated agreements. These factors would raise endogeneity concerns: the 
particular unobserved characteristics (recipients’ characteristics, and PHA’s or regional specifics), 
correlated with the agency selection processes, can bias the program effect estimates. 
On the other hand, implementation timing of the self-sufficiency program is plausibly 
uncorrelated with participants’ unobserved characteristics. Actually, the effective date of the 
program depends on the local housing authority’s circumstances. Specifically, as shown in Figure 
3.1, the HACC’s implementation plan of the MTW self-sufficiency program was approved in early 
2011; however, the actual effective date of the program was postponed to January 2013. For 
example, the effective date may vary by the size of the local housing authority, cost burden (or 
financial capability) of program implementation, time for program preparation, or priority changes 
among activities and programs. Also, since the self-sufficiency program is mandatory for all 
program eligible households, endogeneity issues in the participation decision at the household-
level would not bias the program effect estimates.  
In order to reduce potential source of bias from correlation between agency selection 
processes and recipients’ characteristics – in case recipients’ particular characteristics may 
increase the likelihood of being selected as an MTW agency –, we capture various dimensions of 
recipients’ lives by collecting criminal history, educational attainment, marriage status, presence 
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of driver’s license, computer skills, residential mobility, English speaking skills, and household 
composition information, in addition to conventional utilized variables such as head age, race, 
gender, household size, and income. This rich set of variables allow us to create a more convincing 
statistical sample of control group households using the PSM approach.5 
Moreover, in order to reduce bias from correlation between agency selection processes and 
PHA’s and regional specifics, we considerably chose a control group PHA based on the following 
criteria: (i) a PHA has not been a member of the MTW demonstration; (ii) a PHA is located in the 
same state since recipients may be influenced by different state rules and policies which were 
likely to affect unobserved household and neighborhood characteristics; (iii) a PHA does not serve 
a large city or its suburban areas due to heterogeneity inherent in different regional characteristics; 
and (iv) a PHA is in close proximity and shares similar observed neighborhood characteristics. 
According to the criteria, we chose a PHA which serves a small metropolitan statistical area (MSA) 
and its suburban areas, located southwest of Champaign County. Under the consent of the non-
MTW PHA, we surveyed control group households that satisfied eligibility in the MTW self-
sufficiency program. 
Table 3.2 compares descriptive statistics for the selected economic, demographic, and 
housing characteristics of each Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) including the treatment PHA 
(HACC) and control PHA. We observe that total population and households in MSA with 
treatment PHA were about twice larger than the one with control PHA, while population density 
was similar in both areas. MSA with control PHA had a higher proportion of white and black 
(alone) head of households. Also, the average unemployment rates in 2012 were high in MSA with 
control PHA (2.6%), but the change in unemployment rates between 2012 and 2014 was quite 
                                                          
5 Details about the model and specifications are discussed in Section 3.4.3. 
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close. Similarly, annual median income was close between MSAs for all households and for black 
head of households. MSA with treatment PHA had about twice many housing units, while 
household-unit ratio was similar in both areas. Lastly, household-level poverty rates in MSA with 
treatment PHA was reported to be higher, but the family-level poverty rates, and families below 
severe poverty level were close.   
 
3.4. Data 
3.4.1. Survey Design and Response Rates 
We conducted our own survey, which we refer to as the “Housing and Self-Sufficiency Social 
Survey”, providing socioeconomic characteristics for the treatment and control group households. 
Also, an additional source of information came from restricted-use administrative data (HUD-
50058 Family Report records). 
The timeline of the study is summarized in Figure 3.2. Each head of household completed 
a baseline survey prior to the MTW self-sufficiency program in order to provide a benchmark for 
the evaluation. Baseline survey took place throughout the year of 2012, and a head of household 
that completed the baseline survey was asked to complete a follow-up survey 12-months from the 
baseline survey. Heads were randomly selected from the all MTW eligible households once every 
quarter year, and we sent invitation letters to them to complete the survey. The heads who did not 
wish to complete the survey were excluded from the study, but we re-sent invitation letters or made 
calls to heads that did not respond to the survey invite. The heads who completed the survey 
received $25 Wal-Mart gift cards as a remuneration of participation. For our analysis, we followed 
head of households that completed the survey in both 2012 and 2014.  
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Table 3.3 reports survey design and response rates at baseline and follow-up year. The 
main sampling frame for the data used in this study consisted of working-age (18-54), able-bodied 
(non-disabled) head of households. In 2012, 1,224 heads in the treatment group and 761 heads in 
the control group met eligibility for program participation, and about 94.2 percent and 82.1 percent 
of those heads in the treatment and control groups were invited, respectively.6 By the end of 
baseline year, in the treatment group, 301 heads (approximately 27 percent) completed the social 
survey and162 heads (approximately 26 percent) in the control group. Specifically, we excluded 
13 observations due to missing labor market outcomes at baseline. This led to the total observation 
from 463 to 450.  
 
3.4.2. Attrition and Baseline Balance Test 
We find levels of attrition due to various reasons – portability out, dropouts, no response, or 
refusals to complete in a subsequent survey. Specifically, the main reason for attrition was ‘no 
response’. For example, recipients who were not motivated might not respond to the invitation. 
Also, for some cases, we could not reach households if their addresses changed, but were not 
updated in administrative data. In these cases, invitation letters were returned and we considered 
them as ‘no response’. With other reasons of portability out, dropouts, and refusals to complete 
the survey, it leads to small level of sample attrition. In 2014, a total of 234 head of households 
completed the survey, including 155 heads in the treatment group, and 79 heads in the control 
group. Attrition rates were similar in both groups (approximately 47.1 percent and 49.7 percent 
for the treatment and control group, respectively).7  
                                                          
6 We could not send our invitation letters to the rest of households (71 households or 6%) because of temporarily 
unavailable address.  
7 8 observations that had missing labor market outcomes in the follow-up survey were considered in the attrition 
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We compare statistical difference in labor market outcomes (employment status and 
number of weekly hours worked) and pre-treatment variables at baseline between the attrition and 
non-attrition group for all sampled head of households. The description of variables are listed in 
Table 3.4. The results, presented in Table 3.5, show that the attrition group of all sampled had of 
households tended to have younger head of households (at the 5-percent level of significance) and 
more white head of households (at the 10-percent level); and the head of households with less 
barriers to employment tended to have younger head of households and less divorced head of 
households (at the 10-percent level).  
In order to test whether attrition was random in our data set, we conducted two tests: the 
attrition probit test (Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, & Moffitt, 1998) and BGLW test (Becketti, Gould, 
Lillard, & Welch, 1988). Attrition probit regressions consist of the estimates obtained with the 
probit model of attrition dummy on baseline pre-treatment variables. The results in Table 3.6 show 
that overall the attrition status is not affected by our labor market outcomes; however, we find that 
head’s age and English speaking skill are significant predictors of attrition at least 10 percent level 
for all sampled head of households, and head’s age for the two subgroup households. Then, we 
perform Wald test which indicates whether the included variables are jointly equal to zero, and all 
test statistics lead us to accept the null hypothesis.8 
The BGLW test consists of estimates obtained with the OLS regression of each outcome 
variable at the baseline on the attrition dummy, pre-treatment variables, and interaction terms 
between the attrition dummy and pre-treatment variables. Then, we calculate Chi-test (goodness-
of-fit test for probit model) and F-test (goodness-of-fit test for OLS model) statistics for the joint 
significance of the interaction terms. Table 3.7 and 3.8 report the regression results and BGLW 
                                                          
group. 
8 We use Stata ‘test’ command after running attrition probit regression. 
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tests for participants’ employment status and number of weekly hours worked variable, 
respectively. The results show that all test-statistics fail to reject the null hypothesis, concluding 
that attrition in the sample was random and less likely to bias on program effect estimates for the 
sample of remaining head of households. 
Table 3.9 details the results for baseline balancing test which compares the difference in 
our labor market outcomes and pre-treatment variables between the treatment and control group. 
If the control group is well established, we would expect that none of the coefficients would differ 
from zero. The results show that the treatment group tended to have more female and non-white 
heads, and fewer heads with criminal history and a high school or GED degree for all sampled 
head of households. Similarly, the head of households with less barriers to employment in the 
treatment group tended to have higher educated (college or higher) head of households; and fewer 
heads with criminal history for single mother households. 
 
3.4.3. Propensity Score Matching Analysis 
In Table 3.9, we observed the statistical difference in some socioeconomic characteristics 
especially in level of education and criminal history between the treatment and control group – 
treatment group households tend to have higher educational background and less criminal history 
– may induce an upward bias in the program effect estimates which lead to larger magnitude of 
the estimates than the actual. In order to test whether the group differences bias our estimates, we 
adopt the PSM approach to create a statistical sample of control group households that share 
approximately similar likelihoods of being assigned to the treatment condition based on pre-
treatment characteristics.  
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More precisely, we use Nearest Neighbor (NN) matching approach allowing the replacement due 
to small sample size. Specifically, more than one NN (oversampling) is applied to reduce variance 
in prediction, resulting from using more information to construct the counterfactual for each 
sample household. Also, we impose a tolerance level on the maximum propensity score distance, 
referred to as caliper, since the NN approach may result in poor matches if the closest neighbor is 
far away.9 Following recommendation from previous studies, we choose 6-NN and a caliper of 
0.25 of the standard deviation of the propensity scores. Table 3.10 presents a probit regression 
used to estimate the propensity score. Also, since it is possible that no match can be found for a 
particular head of household in the treatment group based on the common support, we exclude 
those whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum of the control 
group households (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997). 
Table 3.11 present the results for balance test after the match. We also report several test-
statistics to compare the level of bias before and after the match. Specifically, the pseudo R-
squared is very low, indicating that the estimated model only explains less than 1 percent variation 
of the treatment condition, and the likelihood ratio (LR) test leads us to accept the hypothesis of 
joint significance of the pre-treatment variables after the match. Additionally, the mean and median 
standardized bias decrease significantly after the match. We perform the same analyses, reported 
in Table 3.12, for head of households with less barriers to employment and single mother 
households. The matching results are consistent across the subgroups.  
Lastly, Figure 3.3 shows the density distribution of the calculated propensity scores for the 
treatment and control groups (including subgroups) before and after the match. The more the two 
distributions are similar (overlap), the larger common supports they have. We observe that the 
                                                          
9 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) generally suggests a caliper of 0.25 standard deviation of the propensity score. 
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distributions tend to have a larger common support after the match, indicating that the matching 
procedure is successful in balancing the treatment and control group based on the pre-treatment 
variables. 
 
3.5. Results 
Table 3.13 presents estimates for the early impact of the MTW self-sufficiency program on 
working-age, able-bodied participants’ labor market outcomes that consist of a change in 
employment status and the number of weekly hours worked. Since the program works through 
multiple channels to affect participants’ labor market outcomes, we calculate the average program 
effects estimated by the Difference-in-Differences models (column 2-3). Our findings suggest that, 
on average, the MTW self-sufficiency program increases approximately 11.1-12.9 percentage-
points the probability of working in the labor force and 4.3-4.7 working hours per week in the 
short-run. We also test two hypotheses that (i) the MTW self-sufficiency program may have larger 
effect sizes in head of households with relatively less barriers to employment (no criminal history, 
and having at least a high-school diploma or GED); and (ii) the program may have relatively lower 
effect sizes in a single mother households. Overall, the program indeed leads to a greater and 
significant increase in employment (18.6-19.7 percentage-points) and weekly hours worked (6.1-
6.2 hours), at the 5 percent level, for head of household with less barriers to employment; however, 
we cannot find any statistical significant program effects on labor market outcomes of single 
mother households.   
However, the difference in socioeconomic characteristics, especially in educational 
attainment and criminal history, between the treatment and control group may induce an upward-
bias in the program effect estimates. In order to test whether the group differences bias our 
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estimates, we report estimates of the parameters obtained with Difference-in-Difference with the 
PSM approach (column 5-6) following model specifications, discussed in the previous section 
3.4.3.  According to the results, we find smaller program effects after the match. Specifically, the 
results show that, on average, the MTW self-sufficiency program increases about 7.8-10.3 
percentage-points the probability of working in the labor force which is 2.6-3.3 percentage points 
smaller than the estimates without the adjustment of group differences.  
Also, we find that the program increases about 3.0-3.7 hours of work per week which is a 
decrease in estimates of 1.0-1.3 hours after the match.10 Similarly, the results show that overall the 
program increases the employment by approximately 15.4-17.3 percentage-points (a decrease in 
estimates of 2.4-3.2 percentage-points) and increases 5.7-6.0 hours of work per week (a slight 
decrease in estimates of 0.2-0.4 hours) for head of households with less barriers to employment. 
These results indicate that the difference in socioeconomic characteristics between the treatment 
and control group induce an upward bias in the program effect estimates. However, we still find 
no statistical significant effect for single mother households.11  
 
3.6. Limitations and Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we examine the early impact of the MTW self-sufficiency program on participants’ 
labor market outcomes. This study focuses on how a change in self-sufficiency activities and 
policies would affect participants’ economic activities compared to those of recipients in 
conventional public housing programs. Our results provide empirical evidence that, overall, in the 
                                                          
10 Number in parenthesis represents the difference between the estimates with and without the adjustment to group 
differences.  
11 Indeed, it is difficult to conclude whether the MTW self-sufficiency program doesn’t really affect labor market 
outcomes of single mother households since our sample size limits our ability to make the definite conclusion. 
Therefore, the finding should be viewed with caution. 
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short-run, the MTW self-sufficiency program leads to a significant increase in participants’ 
employment status and weekly hours worked.  
Our study has some limitations. In a program evaluation context, particularly in analysis 
of randomized control trials (RCT), previous studies have recommended estimating robust 
standard errors, clustering at the randomization level (Moulton, 1990; Bertrand, Duflo, & 
Mullainathan, 2004). Also, serial correlation in errors may cause another source of bias with longer 
time spans (Cameron and Miller, 2011). In our study, since the program is implemented at the 
PHA level, we would estimate standard errors clustered at the PHA level; however, since we only 
have two groups – one for MTW (treatment) and the other for non-MTW (control) groups, we 
cannot calculate inference due to insufficient degree of freedom. Also, less than 10 clusters creates 
more bias than the regression without clustering standard errors (Kezdi, 2004; Peterson, 2009; 
Rogers, 1993). The next largest regional boundary we consider is zip-code level; however, since 
assisted households are free to move across the regions within the local PHA jurisdiction, the 
underlying assumption that each zip-code region is independent is not realistic. Therefore, we 
estimate robust standard errors, clustered at household level. This allows for correlation within 
household over time (or time correlation), but assumes independence over household (or no spatial 
correlation). Also, estimating standard errors, clustered at household level, leads to another 
assumption – equicorrelation within the cluster (household level), indicating equal correlation for 
a given individual over time. Equicorrelation is often a less reasonable assumption with longer 
time spans. This would not be substantial in our study since we analyze the short-run MTW 
impacts following only two-subsequent years. Lastly, clustering at household level (234 
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households) meets restriction in number of clusters for accurate inferences (more than 50 
clusters).12  
Additionally, our findings may be limited to PHAs that share similar activities and 
characteristics with the HACC. Since each MTW PHA develops its unique activities and policies 
at the same time based on the PHA and community circumstances, it is difficult to establish 
external validity of the findings. For example, the HACC does not implement the escrow account 
which may further incentivize participants’ employment. Also, if MTW PHAs serve large cities 
and metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), the living environments and the level of local 
community support would be different from Champaign County which would lead to different 
program effects. Although our study has several limitations, as a pioneer study of evaluating the 
MTW demonstration, our study provides a suggestive conclusion that PHAs or regions close to 
HACC would be predicted to have such significant improvement in labor market outcomes which 
provide valuable findings for politicians, public administrators and scholars.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Robust-standard errors with no clustering option do not make noticeable change in statistical significance of 
the estimates. 
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3.7. Tables 
 
 
Table 3.1: Moving to Work (MTW) Participating Sites 
 
Site Public Housing  
Units 
Housing Choice  
Vouchers 
Alaska Housing Finance Corporation 1,300 4,300 
Atlanta Housing Authority 8,200 18,800 
Housing Authority of Baltimore City 12,600 17,500 
Boulder Housing Partners 337 857 
Cambridge Housing Authority 3,125 2,500 
Housing Authority of Champaign County 447 1,706 
Charlotte Housing Authority 4,900 4,500 
Chicago Housing Authority 26,300 49,800 
Housing Authority of Columbus, GA 2,300 2,333 
Delaware State Housing Authority 500 600 
District of Columbia Housing Authority 8,700 12,900 
Fairfax County Redevelopment and Housing   
  Authority 
1,100 3,910 
Holyoke Housing Authority 921 1,380 
Keene Housing 200 600 
King County Housing Authority 3,499 7,773 
Lawrence-Douglas County Housing Authority 400 600 
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Housing  
  Authority 
1,303 2,512 
Lincoln Housing Authority 300 2,900 
Louisville Metropolitan Housing Authority 5,300 9,500 
Massachusetts Dept. of Housing and Community  
  and Development 
0 20,000 
Minneapolis Public Housing Authority 7,000 5,000 
Housing Authority of the City of New Haven 2,800 4,400 
Oakland Housing Authority 3,700 12,900 
Orlando Housing Authority 1,600 2,900 
Philadelphia Housing Authority 18,600 16,800 
Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh 5,846 6,237 
Portage Metropolitan Housing Authority 300 1,800 
Housing Authority of Portland 3,100 7,900 
Housing Authority of the City of Reno 764 2,728 
San Antonio Housing Authority 7,000 12,400 
Housing Authority of the County of San Bernardino 1,700 8,400 
San Diego Housing Commission 35 13,900 
Housing Authority of the County of San Mateo 200 4,200 
Housing Authority of the County of Santa Clara 
  / Housing Authority of the City of San Jose 
350 16,700 
Seattle Housing Authority 6,000 8,400 
Tacoma Housing Authority 900 3,500 
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
 
 
Site Public Housing 
Units 
Housing Choice  
Vouchers 
Tulare County Housing Authority 700 2,800 
Vancouver Housing Authority 550 2,100 
   
U.S. Total 1,150,867 2,112,817 
MTW Total 142,877 298,036 
% MTW Total 12.41% 14.11% 
Source: Authors’ calculation using U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) data. 
 
Notes: Public housing, managed by the State, are added to public housing stocks in Cambridge Housing Authority. 
Total number of public housing units and issued housing vouchers are collected from the 2013 Picture of Subsidized 
Households data set from the HUD.   
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Table 3.2: Comparison of Descriptive Statistics of Selected Economic, Demographic, and Housing 
Characteristics between Metropolitan Statistical Areas of the Treatment and Control PHAs 
 
 MSA 
(MTW-HACC) 
MSA 
(Non-MTW) 
Demographic Characteristics   
  Population 231655 110558 
  Population Density 201.8 190.8 
  Household 91327 45074 
Race   
  White alone household 80.86% 83.55% 
  Black alone household 10.27% 14.36% 
Economic status   
  Median Household income $46,830 $46,165 
  Median household income (black only) $26,194 $25,321 
  Unemployed rate in 2012 7.40% 10.00% 
  Unemployed rate 2012-2014 -1.40% -1.30% 
  Business establishment 2012 4808 2445 
Housing   
  Median rent $777 $656 
  Housing unit 101010 50505 
  Household-unit ratio 1.106 1.120 
Poverty rate   
  Household level 18.91% 13.89% 
  Family level 9.67% 10.94% 
  Family level-severe poverty (<.5) 4.29% 4.89% 
Source: Five-year (2008-2012) American Community Survey data from United States 
Census Bureau   
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Table 3.3: Sample Design, Response Rates, and Attrition 
 
  
Total 
MTW  
Households 
Non-MTW  
Households 
Baseline (2012):    
  Number of MTW eligible households 1,985 1,224 761 
  Number invited 
  Percent invited (%) 
1,778 
89.6 
1,153 
94.2 
625 
82.1 
  Number responded 463 301 162 
  Response rate (%) 26.4 26.7 25.9 
  Missing labor market outcome variables 13 8 5 
  Sub-total 450 293 157 
    
Follow-up (2014):    
  Number of portability out, dropouts, no  
    response or refusals 
208 132 76 
  Missing labor market outcome variables  8 6 2 
  Percent decreased (%) 48.0 47.1 49.7 
  Final sample size (households) 234 155 79 
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Table 3.4: Description of Variables 
 
 Description 
Dependent variable  
  Head, Employment status = 1 for having at least a job; 0 for other 
  Head, Weekly hours worked = Number of hours worked per week 
  
Program variable  
  MTW = 1 for MTW PHA; 0 for other 
  Post = 1 for follow-up year; 0 for baseline year 
  
Control variable  
  Head, Age = Age 
  Head, White = 1 for white; 0 for other 
  Head, Female = 1 for female; 0 for other 
  Head, Divorced = 1 for head was divorced; 0 for other 
  Head, Single = 1 for single; 0 for other 
  Head, Criminal history = 1 for ever serving time in jail; 0 for other 
  Head, Less than high school  
    diploma 
= 1 for less than high school diploma;   
  0 for other 
  Head, High school diploma or  
    GED 
= 1 for high school diploma or GED;  
  0 for other 
  Head, English speaking skill = 1 for speaking good or excellent;  
  0 for speaking fair or poor 
  Head, Second language = 1 for speaking second language;  
  0 for other 
  Head, Computer skill = 1 for ever using computer; 0 for other 
  Head, Driver’s license = 1 for having a driver’s license; 0 for other 
  Household, Size = Household size 
  Household, Children = 1 for having at least a child; 0 for other 
  Household, Adult member = 1 for living with an adult member over  
  the age of 18; 0 for other 
  Household, Other sources of income = 1 for receiving income from other adult  
members (excluding head) over the age of  
18; 0 for other  
  Household, Recently moved = 1 for a household that moved in less  
  than three months 
Notes: Head, English speaking skill was originally asked in a four-point scale: “Poor” (1); “Fair” (2); “Good” (3); 
and “Excellent” (4). We re-code the variable – 1 if a respondent chose ‘excellent’ or ‘good’, and 0 if a respondent 
chose ‘fair’ or ‘poor’.  
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Table 3.5: Comparison of Labor Market Outcomes and Pre-Treatment Variables between  
Attrition and Non-Attrition Group 
 
 All sampled head of  
households 
 Head of households with less  
barriers to employment 
 Single mother households 
 Non-attrition 
households 
(1) 
Attrition  
dummy 
(2) 
 Non-attrition 
households 
(3) 
Attrition  
dummy  
(4) 
 Non-attrition 
households 
(5) 
Attrition  
dummy  
(6) 
Head, Employment status 0.521 
(0.501) 
-0.032 
(0.047) 
 0.590 
(0.493) 
-0.055 
(0.056) 
 0.532 
(0.501) 
0.008 
(0.059) 
Head, Weekly hours worked 15.277 
(16.433) 
-2.446 
(1.499) 
 17.700 
(16.928) 
-3.189 
(1.866) 
 15.466 
(16.473) 
-0.983 
(1.918) 
Head, Age 37.162 
(9.053) 
-1.883** 
(0.856) 
 36.422 
(8.669) 
-1.913* 
(0.972) 
 32.791 
(7.405) 
-1.285 
(0.810) 
Head, White 0.115 
(0.320) 
0.055* 
(0.037) 
 0.130 
(0.338) 
0.035 
(0.040) 
 0.122 
(0.329) 
0.038 
(0.041) 
Head, Female 0.962 
(0.193) 
-0.023 
(0.020) 
 0.969 
(0.174) 
-0.020 
(0.022) 
 – 
(–) 
– 
(–) 
Head, Divorced 0.098 
(0.298) 
-0.007 
(0.027) 
 0.118 
(0.324) 
-0.054* 
(0.032) 
 0.079 
(0.271) 
-0.012 
(0.031) 
Head, Single 0.812 
(0.392) 
0.022 
(0.036) 
 0.814 
(0.391) 
0.046 
(0.041) 
 – 
(–) 
– 
(–) 
Head, Criminal history 0.150 
(0.358) 
-0.038 
(0.032) 
 – 
(–) 
– 
(–) 
 0.123 
(0.330) 
-0.028 
(0.037) 
Head, Less than high school  
  diploma 
0.197 
(0.399) 
0.004 
(0.037) 
 – 
(–) 
– 
(–) 
 0.158 
(0.366) 
0.016 
(0.044) 
Head, High school diploma or  
  GED 
0.331 
(0.471) 
0.020 
(0.044) 
 0.429 
(0.496) 
0.036 
(0.056) 
 0.367 
(0.484) 
0.002 
(0.057) 
Head, English speaking skill 0.849 
(0.359) 
-0.047 
(0.035) 
 0.875 
(0.332) 
-0.022 
(0.039) 
 0.884 
(0.321) 
-0.032 
(0.040) 
Head, Second language 0.030 
(0.171) 
0.009 
(0.017) 
 0.031 
(0.174) 
0.026 
(0.023) 
 0.022 
(0.146) 
0.018 
(0.020) 
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Table 3.5 (continued) 
 
 
 All sampled head of  
households 
 Head of households with less  
barriers to employment 
 Single mother households 
 Non-attrition 
households 
(1) 
Attrition  
dummy 
(2) 
 Non-attrition 
households 
(3) 
Attrition  
dummy  
(4) 
 Non-attrition 
households 
(5) 
Attrition  
dummy  
(6) 
Head, Computer skill 0.816 
(0.388) 
-0.009 
(0.037) 
 0.876 
(0.331) 
-0.036 
(0.039) 
 0.842 
(0.366) 
0.037 
(0.041) 
Head, Driver’s license 0.671 
(0.471) 
-0.021 
(0.044) 
 0.739 
(0.440) 
-0.021 
(0.050) 
 0.691 
(0.464) 
0.032 
(0.054) 
Household, Size 
 
3.120 
(1.540) 
-0.089 
(0.144) 
 3.073 
(1.631) 
-0.076 
(0.203) 
 3.055 
(1.569) 
-0.041 
(0.161) 
Household, Children 0.769 
(0.422) 
0.021 
(0.039) 
 0.832 
(0.375) 
-0.004 
(0.042) 
 – 
(–) 
– 
(–) 
Household, Adult member 0.235 
(0.425) 
-0.052 
(0.038) 
 0.242 
(0.430) 
-0.051 
(0.046) 
 – 
(–) 
– 
(–) 
Household, Other sources of  
  income 
0.086 
(0.281) 
-0.011 
(0.026) 
 0.082 
(0.275) 
-0.004 
(0.031) 
 – 
(–) 
– 
(–) 
Household, Recently moved 0.043 
(0.203) 
0.005 
(0.019) 
 0.050 
(0.218) 
-0.011 
(0.023) 
 0.058 
(0.234) 
0.002 
(0.028) 
Obs. 234 450  164 321  135 285 
Notes: Difference in labor market outcomes and other covariates (pre-treatment variables) between attrition and non-attrition group for all sampled head of 
households, head of households with less barriers to employment, and single mother households. Head of households with less barriers to employment include 
heads with no criminal history, and high school diploma, GED, or higher educational attainment. Single mother households include single parent, female-headed 
households. Column (1), (3), and (5) present baseline mean of labor market outcomes and other covariates (listed on the left) of non-attrition group. Standard 
deviations are reported in the parenthesis. Column (2), (4), and (6) report the estimates obtained with the OLS regression of each variable on attrition dummy (1 
for attrition group; 0 for other) with public housing authority (PHA) fixed effect (here, we have two PHAs – one for MTW PHA (or the treatment group) coded as 
1, and non-MTW PHA (or the control group) coded as 0). Robust errors are reported in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent, and *** 
at 1 percent level.      
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Table 3.6: Attrition Probit Regression 
(Dependent variable: Attrition dummy) 
 
 All sampled head of  
households 
 Head of households with less  
barrios to employment 
 Single mother households 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Head, Employment status 0.067 
(0.262) 
0.077 
(0.282) 
 0.041 
(0.312) 
0.114 
(0.339) 
 0.135 
(0.326) 
0.264 
(0.339) 
Head, Weekly hours worked -0.008 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
 -0.009 
(0.009) 
-0.008 
(0.010) 
 -0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.008 
(0.011) 
Head, Age  -0.023** 
(0.009) 
  -0.027** 
(0.011) 
  -0.022* 
(0.013) 
Head, White  0.222 
(0.183) 
  0.155 
(0.219) 
  0.099 
(0.237) 
Head, Female  -0.294 
(0.332) 
  -0.250 
(0.442) 
  – 
(–) 
Head, Divorced  -0.065 
(0.307) 
  -0.394 
(0.386) 
  0.204 
(0.489) 
Head, Single  -0.042 
(0.232) 
  -0.125 
(0.289) 
  – 
(–) 
Head, Criminal history  -0.184 
(0.187) 
  – 
(–) 
  -0.165 
(0.258) 
Head, Less than high school  
  diploma 
 0.089 
(0.181) 
  – 
(–) 
  0.282 
(0.246) 
Head, High school diploma or  
  GED 
 0.056 
(0.149) 
  0.083 
(0.160) 
  0.134 
(0.189) 
Head, English speaking skill  -0.326* 
(0.179) 
  -0.192 
(0.233) 
  -0.345 
(0.246) 
Head, Second language  0.269 
(0.334) 
  0.511 
(0.361) 
  0.481 
(0.453) 
Head, Computer skill  -0.027 
(0.184) 
  -0.148 
(0.239) 
  0.202 
(0.242) 
Head, Driver’s license  0.019 
(0.147) 
  0.011 
(0.183) 
  0.131 
(0.195) 
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Table 3.6 (continued) 
 
 
 All sampled head of  
households 
 Head of households with less  
barrios to employment 
 Single mother households 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Household, Size  -0.033 
(0.052) 
  -0.014 
(0.055) 
  0.027 
(0.058) 
Household, Children  0.091 
(0.217) 
  -0.119 
(0.251) 
  – 
(–) 
Household, Adult member  -0.067 
(0.199) 
  -0.106 
(0.236) 
  – 
(–) 
Household, Other sources of income  0.213 
(0.271) 
  0.282 
(0.334) 
  – 
(–) 
Household, Recently moved  -0.147 
(0.315) 
  -0.349 
(0.380) 
  -0.045 
(0.352) 
PHA Fixed effect 
 
-0.062 
(0.125) 
0.067 
(0.137) 
 -0.160 
(0.154) 
-0.104 
(0.167) 
 -0.099 
(0.155) 
-0.134 
(0.170) 
Cons. 0.0286 
(0.083) 
1.400** 
(0.628) 
 0.168 
(0.152) 
1.703** 
(0.776) 
 0.094 
(0.147) 
0.774 
(0.716) 
Obs. 450 450  321 321  285 285 
Log-likelihood -310.196 -287.768  -211.160 -198.165  -194.873 -180.021 
Pseudo R-squared 0.004 0.032  0.009 0.042  0.003 0.027 
Wald test         
  Chi-squared test statistics without  
     constant (p-value) 
2.71 
(0.258) 
18.69 
(0.477) 
 2.93 
(0.231) 
13.10 
(0.519) 
 0.44 
(0.803) 
8.04 
(0.782) 
  Chi-squared test statistics with  
     constant (p-value) 
3.42 
(0.332) 
19.98 
(0.460) 
 3.09 
(0.377) 
15.05 
(0.522) 
 0.90 
(0.825) 
8.72 
(0.794) 
Notes: Attrition probit regressions consist of the estimates, obtained with a probit model of attrition dummy on labor market outcomes and other covariates (pre-
treatment variables) with public housing authority (PHA) fixed effect (here, we have two PHAs – one for MTW PHA (or the treatment group) coded as 1, and non-
MTW PHA (or the control group) coded as 0. Head of households with less barriers to employment include heads no criminal history, and high school diploma, 
GED, or higher educational attainment. Single mother households include single parent, female-headed households. A Wald test is performed to test whether 
the included variables are jointly equal to zero. Robust errors are reported in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent, and *** at 1 percent 
level. 
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Table 3.7: BGLW Test for Employment Status 
 
  
All sampled head of  
households 
Head of households 
with less barriers to 
employment 
 
Single mother 
households 
Head, Age 0.006 
(0.013) 
0.027* 
(0.016) 
0.020 
(0.019) 
Head, White -0.517* 
(0.282) 
-0.620* 
(0.327) 
0.042 
(0.376) 
Head, Female 0.459 
(0.576) 
0.573 
(0.784) 
– 
(–) 
Head, Divorced -0.229 
(0.434) 
-0.175 
(0.531) 
0.013 
(0.787) 
Head, Single 0.074 
(0.328) 
0.266 
(0.423) 
– 
(–) 
Head, Criminal history -0.119 
(0.261) 
– 
(–) 
0.048 
(0.382) 
Head, Less than high school  
  diploma 
-0.784*** 
(0.269) 
– 
(–) 
-1.321*** 
(0.396) 
Head, High school diploma or  
  GED 
-0.298 
(0.212) 
-0.296 
(0.231) 
-0.764*** 
(0.286) 
Head, English speaking skill 0.265 
(0.278) 
0.460 
(0.354) 
0.293 
(0.399) 
Head, Second language -0.126 
(0.527) 
-0.685 
(0.626) 
-1.318 
(0.796) 
Head, Computer skill -0.362 
(0.278) 
-0.537 
(0.383) 
-0.386 
(0.392) 
Head, Driver’s license 0.793*** 
(0.211) 
0.738*** 
(0.263) 
0.637** 
(0.301) 
Household, Size -0.028 
(0.077) 
-0.026 
(0.079) 
-0.020 
(0.88) 
Household, Child 0.218 
(0.301) 
0.146 
(0.339) 
– 
(–) 
Household, Adult member 0.395 
(0.266) 
0.182 
(0.304) 
– 
(–) 
Household, Other sources of  
  income 
-0.070 
(0.381) 
-0.187 
(0.459) 
– 
(–) 
Household, Recently moved -0.034 
(0.441) 
-0.141 
(0.498) 
-0.169 
(0.515) 
PHA Fixed effect 
 
-0.180 
(0.204) 
-0.045 
(0.175) 
-0.303 
(0.279) 
Attrition 0.367 
(1.311) 
1.798 
(1.644) 
-0.465 
(1.525) 
Interaction with Attrition  
  dummy 
   
Head, Age 0.002 
(0.019) 
-0.021 
(0.023) 
0.006 
(0.027) 
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Table 3.7 (continued) 
 
 
  
All sampled head of  
households 
Head of households 
with less barriers to 
employment 
 
Single mother 
households 
Head, White 0.921** 
(0.395) 
0.946** 
(0.457) 
0.698 
(0.506) 
Head, Female -0.430 
(0.764) 
-0.166 
(1.006) 
– 
(–) 
Head, Divorced 0.133 
(0.650) 
0.021 
(0.835) 
-0.493 
(0.997) 
Head, Single -0.475 
(0.489) 
-0.562 
(0.608) 
– 
(–) 
Head, Criminal history -0.279 
(0.399) 
– 
(–) 
-0.373 
(0.556) 
Head, Less than high school  
  diploma 
0.536 
(0.379) 
– 
(–) 
1.207** 
(0.528) 
Head, High school diploma or  
  GED 
0.352 
(0.308) 
0.267 
(0.330) 
0.747* 
(0.394) 
Head, English speaking skill -0.339 
(0.375) 
-0.811* 
(0.475) 
0.788 
(0.527) 
Head, Second language -0.585 
(0.719) 
0.068 
(0.808) 
0.562 
(1.025) 
Head, Computer skill 0.878** 
(0.381) 
0.916* 
(0.498) 
0.787 
(0.527) 
Head, Driver’s license -0.244 
(0.302) 
-0.416 
(0.375) 
0.219 
(0.414) 
Household, Size -0.082 
(0.106) 
-0.035 
(0.109) 
0.011 
(0.120) 
Household, Children 0.064 
(0.451) 
-0.490 
(0.522) 
– 
(–) 
Household, Adult member -0.541 
(0.419) 
-0.598 
(0.498) 
– 
(–) 
Household, Other sources of  
  income 
-0.194 
(0.575) 
-0.187 
(0.687) 
– 
(–) 
Household, Recently moved 0.114 
(0.106) 
0.553 
(0.808) 
0.393 
(0.724) 
Attrition x PHA Fixed Effect 0.168 
(0.289) 
0.686* 
(0.357) 
0.460 
(0.369) 
Cons. -0.848 
(0.991) 
-1.889 
(1.266) 
-0.845 
(1.549) 
    
Obs. 450 321 285 
Log-likelihood -272.673 -191.264 -163.674 
R-squared 0.112 0.098 0.145 
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Table 3.7 (continued) 
 
 
  
All sampled head of  
households 
Head of households 
with less barriers to 
employment 
 
Single mother 
households 
    
BGLW (Joint significance test  
  for attrition) 
   
Chi-squared test statistics   
  without constant (p-value) 
21.31 
(0.213) 
20.55 
(0.242) 
14.03 
(0.372) 
  Chi-squared test statistics with  
    constant (p-value) 
22.38 
(0.216) 
21.72 
(0.257) 
14.84 
(0.390) 
Notes: BGLW test consists of estimates obtained with the OLS regression of employment status variable at 
baseline on attrition dummy, baseline covariates, interaction terms between attrition dummy and the 
covariates and public housing authority (PHA) fixed effect (here, we have two PHAs – one for MTW PHA 
(or the treatment group) coded as 1, and non-MTW PHA (or the control group) coded as 0). Head of 
households with less barriers to employment include heads with no criminal history, and high school diploma, GED, 
or higher educational attainment. Single mother households include single parent, female-headed households. 
The BGLW test is performed to test whether the included variables are jointly equal to zero. Robust errors 
are reported in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level. 
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Table 3.8: BGLW Test for Weekly Hours Worked 
 
  
All sampled head of  
households 
Head of households 
with less barriers to 
employment 
 
Single mother 
households 
Head, Age 0.057 
(0.153) 
0.245 
(0.194) 
0.117 
(0.212) 
Head, White -2.946 
(3.296) 
-6.080 
(4.034) 
3.991 
(4.344) 
Head, Female 0.726 
(5.867) 
2.056 
(8.364) 
-1.954 
(11.711) 
Head, Divorced 1.731 
(5.010) 
1.825 
(6.702) 
2.701 
(9.013) 
Head, Single 4.408 
(3.815) 
5.418 
(5.423) 
– 
(–) 
Head, Criminal history -3.339 
(3.024) 
– 
(–) 
-2.315 
(4.347) 
Head, Less than high school  
  diploma 
-8.788*** 
(3.066) 
– 
(–) 
-12.505*** 
(3.515) 
Head, High school diploma or  
  GED 
-3.428 
(2.463) 
-4.630 
(2.889) 
-8.731*** 
(3.267) 
Head, English speaking skill 1.485 
(3.230) 
4.237 
(4.530) 
0.697 
(4.640) 
Head, Second language -2.066 
(6.073) 
-7.743 
(7.736) 
-8.282 
(9.611) 
Head, Computer skill -5.021 
(3.177) 
-7.282 
(4.672) 
-5.228 
(4.438) 
Head, Driver’s license 9.170*** 
(2.453) 
8.336** 
(3.268) 
5.754* 
(3.431) 
Household, Size 0.041 
(0.893) 
0.019 
(0.833) 
0.031 
(0.768) 
Household, Child 3.823 
(3.492) 
4.226 
(4.106) 
– 
(–) 
Household, Adult member 5.870* 
(3.086) 
4.834 
(3.738) 
– 
(–) 
Household, Other sources of  
  income 
1.079 
(4.386) 
-0.501 
(5.752) 
– 
(–) 
Household, Recently Moved -3.339 
(5.090) 
-4.145 
(6.104) 
-6.809 
(5.841) 
PHA Fixed Effect 
 
-0.539 
(2.348) 
-2.542 
(3.051) 
-3.243 
(3.147) 
Attrition -2.394 
(7.291) 
3.317 
(9.234) 
-3.477 
(8.313) 
Interaction with Attrition  
  dummy 
   
Head, Age -0.038 
(0.219) 
-0.150 
(0.296) 
0.121 
(0.311) 
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Table 3.8 (continued) 
 
 
  
All sampled head of  
households 
Head of households 
with less barriers to 
employment 
 
Single mother 
households 
Head, White 7.813* 
(4.691) 
12.246** 
(5.843) 
3.239 
(5.864) 
Head, Female -0.086 
(8.452) 
6.505 
(11.782) 
– 
(–) 
Head, Divorced -7.153 
(7.713) 
-7.940 
(10.618) 
-6.906 
(12.351) 
Head, Single -10.793* 
(5.728) 
-11.244 
(7.767) 
– 
(–) 
Head, Criminal history 0.568 
(4.635) 
– 
(–) 
0.479 
(6.361) 
Head, Less than high school    
  degree 
6.914 
(4.446) 
– 
(–) 
13.194** 
(6.295) 
Head, High school or GED    
  degree 
5.269 
(3.692) 
5.928 
(4.218) 
11.060* 
(5.870) 
Head, English speaking skill 1.079 
(4.388) 
-4.304 
(6.100) 
3.078 
(6.010) 
Head, Second language -1.026 
(8.281) 
4.059 
(9.931) 
6.842 
(11.017) 
Head, Computer skill 9.606** 
(4.462) 
10.540* 
(6.260) 
9.763 
(6.082) 
Head, Driver’s license -1.196 
(3.566) 
-2.485 
(4.732) 
6.122 
(4.733) 
Household, Size -1.607 
(1.282) 
-2.378 
(1.911) 
1.882 
(2.573) 
Household, Child -0.302 
(5.322) 
-8.445 
(6.654) 
– 
(–) 
Household, Adult member -4.258 
(6.834) 
-9.005 
(6.316) 
– 
(–) 
Household, Other sources of  
  income 
-4.258 
(6.834) 
-5.762 
(8.758) 
– 
(–) 
Household, Recently Moved 1.488 
(7.723) 
5.281 
(9.973) 
8.250 
(8.628) 
PHA Fixed Effect 2.338 
(3.404) 
6.652 
(4.349) 
5.697 
(4.244) 
Cons. 4.951 
(10.975) 
-1.121 
(14.535) 
2.808 
(16.665) 
    
Obs. 450 321 285 
R-squared 0.164 0.128 0.201 
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Table 3.8 (continued) 
 
 
  
All sampled head of  
households 
Head of households 
with less barriers to 
employment 
 
Single mother 
households 
    
BGLW (Joint significance test  
  for attrition) 
   
  F-test statistics without  
    constant (p-value) 
1.04 
(0.408) 
1.31 
0.198 
1.33 
0.195 
  F-test statistics with  
    constant (p-value) 
1.07 
(0.383) 
1.23 
0.248 
1.25 
0.243 
Notes: BGLW test consists of estimates obtained with the OLS regression of weekly hours worked variable 
at baseline on attrition dummy, baseline covariates, interaction terms between attrition dummy and the 
covariates, and public housing authority (PHA) fixed effect (here, we have two PHAs – one for MTW PHA 
(or the treatment group) coded as 1, and non-MTW PHA (or the control group) coded as 0). Head of 
households with less barriers to employment include heads with no criminal history, and high school diploma, GED, 
or higher educational attainment. Single mother households include single parent, female-headed households. 
The BGLW test is performed to test whether the included variables are jointly equal to zero. Robust errors 
are reported in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level. 
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Table 3.9: Baseline Balance Test 
(Non-Attrition Group Only) 
 
 All sampled head of  
households 
 Head of households with less 
barriers to employment 
 Single mother households 
 Control  
group  
(1) 
Treatment  
dummy  
(2) 
 Control  
group  
(3) 
Treatment  
dummy  
(4) 
 Control  
group  
(5) 
Treatment  
dummy  
(6) 
Head, Employment status 0.5443 
(0.5012) 
-0.0346 
(0.0692) 
 0.660 
(0.048) 
-0.098 
(0.084) 
 0.571 
(0.500) 
-0.060 
(0.089) 
Head, Weekly hours worked 15.3038 
(15.8837) 
-0.0409 
(2.2351) 
 19.223 
(15.956) 
-2.151 
(2.831) 
 16.663 
(16.520) 
-1.849 
(2.928) 
Head, Age 36.9494 
(9.9716) 
0.3216 
(1.3150) 
 35.915 
(9.769) 
0.717 
(1.614) 
 31.653 
(6.744) 
2.036 
(1.257) 
Head, White 0.1772 
(0.3843) 
-0.0933* 
(0.0486) 
 0.191 
(0.398) 
-0.086 
(0.065) 
 0.163 
(0.373) 
-0.063 
(0.062) 
Head, Female 0.9114 
(0.2860) 
0.0757** 
(0.0334) 
 0.936 
(0.247) 
0.046 
(0.038) 
 – 
(–) 
– 
(–) 
Head, Divorced 0.0759 
(0.2666) 
0.0337 
(0.0391) 
 0.085 
(0.282) 
0.046 
(0.052) 
 0.082 
(0.277) 
-0.004 
(0.049) 
Head, Single 0.8481 
(0.3612) 
-0.0546 
(0.0521) 
 0.872 
(0.337) 
-0.083 
(0.062) 
 – 
(–) 
– 
(–) 
Head, Criminal history 0.2308 
(0.4241) 
-0.1211** 
(0.0541) 
 – 
(–) 
– 
(–) 
 0.229 
(0.425) 
-0.163** 
(0.067) 
Head, Less than high school diploma 0.2278 
(0.4221) 
-0.0460 
(0.0568) 
 – 
(–) 
– 
(–) 
 0.204 
(0.407) 
-0.071 
(0.068) 
Head, High school diploma or GED 0.4304 
(0.4983) 
-0.1512** 
(0.0667) 
 0.574 
(0.500) 
-0.206** 
(0.086) 
 0.429 
(0.500) 
-0.095 
(0.087) 
Head, English speaking skill 0.7949 
(0.4064) 
0.0818 
(0.0531) 
 0.826 
(0.383) 
0.069 
(0.063) 
 0.854 
(0.357) 
0.046 
(0.060) 
Head, Second language 0.0256 
(0.1591) 
0.0066 
(0.0229) 
 0.043 
(0.204) 
-0.016 
(0.033) 
 0.041 
(0.200) 
-0.030 
(0.031) 
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Table 3.9 (continued) 
 
 
 All sampled head of  
households 
 Head of households with less  
barriers to employment 
 Single mother households 
 Control  
group  
(1) 
Treatment  
dummy  
(2) 
 Control  
group  
(3) 
Treatment  
dummy  
(4) 
 Control  
group  
(5) 
Treatment  
dummy  
(6) 
Head, Computer skill 0.7595 
(0.4301) 
0.0857 
(0.0564) 
 0.830 
(0.380) 
0.065 
(0.062) 
 0.857 
(0.354) 
-0.024 
(0.064) 
Head, Driver’s license 0.6835 
(0.4681) 
-0.0190 
(0.0649) 
 0.766 
(0.428) 
-0.038 
(0.075) 
 0.735 
(0.446) 
-0.068 
(0.081) 
Household, Size 
 
3.076 
(1.708) 
0.066 
(0.225) 
 3.011 
(1.672) 
0.082 
(0.273) 
 2.972 
(1.759) 
0.160 
(0.302) 
Household, Child 0.7722 
(0.4221) 
-0.0044 
(0.0584) 
 0.851 
(0.360) 
-0.027 
(0.063) 
 – 
(–) 
– 
(–) 
Household, Adult member 0.1646 
(0.3731) 
0.1064 
(0.0651) 
 0.213 
(0.414) 
0.042 
(0.073) 
 – 
(–) 
– 
(–) 
Household, Other sources of income 0.0649 
(0.2480) 
0.0318 
(0.0369) 
 0.067 
(0.252) 
0.021 
(0.046) 
 – 
(–) 
– 
(–) 
Household, Recently Moved 0.0253 
(0.1581) 
0.0263 
(0.0252) 
 0.022 
(0.146) 
0.040 
(0.031) 
 0.020 
(0.143) 
0.057 
(0.035) 
Obs. 79 234  47 164  49 135 
Notes: Difference in labor market outcomes (employment status and weekly hours worked) and other covariates (pre-treatment variables) between 
the treatment and control group at baseline for all sampled head of households, head of households with less barriers to employment, and single 
mother households in the non-attrition group. Head of households with less barriers to employment include heads with no criminal history, and high school 
diploma, GED, or higher educational attainment. Single mother households include single parent, female-headed households. Column (1), (3), and (5) 
present baseline mean of the given variables (listed on the left). Standard deviations are reported in the parenthesis. Column (2), (4), and (6) report 
the estimates obtained with the OLS regression of each variable on treatment dummy (1 for the treatment group; 0 for other). Robust errors are 
reported in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent, and *** at 1 percent level.   
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Table 3.10: Propensity Score Matching Analysis:  
Logit Regression for All Sample Head of Households at Baseline 
 
 Dependent Variable:  
Treatment Dummy 
Head, Age 0.010 
(0.014) 
Head, White -0.514* 
(0.289) 
Head, Female 1.331** 
(0.557) 
Head, Divorced 0.337 
(0.515) 
Head, Single -0.156 
(0.359) 
Head, Criminal history -0.698*** 
(0.266) 
Head, Less than high school diploma -0.474* 
(0.274) 
Head, High school diploma or GED -0.544** 
(0.219) 
Head, English speaking skill 0.227 
(0.279) 
Head, Second language -0.008 
(0.528) 
Head, Computer skill 0.259 
(0.283) 
Head, Driver’s license -0.336 
(0.229) 
Household, Size 
 
0.007 
(0.079) 
Household, Child -0.180 
(0.327) 
Household, Adult member 0.221 
(0.285) 
Household, Other sources of income -0.308 
(0.409) 
Household, Recently moved 0.351 
(0.493) 
Cons. -0.721 
(1.049) 
  
Obs. 234 
Log-likelihood -125.860 
Pseudo R-squared 0.122 
                                  Notes: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. * denotes significance    
                                  at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level. 
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Table 3.11: Propensity Score Matching Analysis: Balance Test Results  
Using Nearest Neighbor (NN) PSM Approach for All Sample Head of Households 
 
  Mean t-test 
  Treatment Control p-value 
Head, Age  36.566 36.978 0.738 
Head, White  0.082 0.100 0.603 
Head, Female  0.985 0.978 0.653 
Head, Divorced  0.060 0.053 0.818 
Head, Single  0.851 0.870 0.659 
Head, Criminal history  0.119 0.109 0.794 
Head, Less than high school diploma  0.201 0.231 0.557 
Head, High school diploma or GED  0.299 0.320 0.706 
Head, English speaking skill  0.866 0.856 0.827 
Head, Second language  0.037 0.043 0.798 
Head, Computer skill  0.836 0.806 0.526 
Head, Driver’s license  0.679 0.617 0.582 
Household, Size  3.067 3.088 0.912 
Household, Child  0.769 0.765 0.948 
Household, Adult member  0.246 0.229 0.747 
Household, Other sources of income  0.090 0.062 0.405 
Household, Recently moved  0.052 0.050 0.927 
     
Obs.  141 79  
Pseudo R-squared U 0.128  
 M 0.008  
LR chi2 (p-value) U 36.04 (0.003)  
 M 3.11 (1.000)  
Mean bias U 18.6  
 M 4.3  
Median bias U 20.8  
 M 3.9  
Notes: PSM specification: 6-NN (oversampling) and a caliper of 0.25 of standard deviation of the calculated propensity 
scores. Also, we exclude heads whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less the minimum of the control 
group (14 heads). ‘U’ indicates unmatched, and ‘M’ means matched with the PSM. * denotes significance at 10 percent, 
** at 5 percent, and *** at 1 percent level.          
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Table 3.12: Propensity Score Matching Analysis: Balance Test Results  
Using Nearest Neighbor (NN) PSM Approach for the Two Subgroup Households 
 
  Head of households with less  
barriers to employment 
Single mother households 
Obs.  147 125 
Pseudo R-squared U 0.093 0.156 
 M 0.012 0.007 
LR chi2 (p-value) U 17.43 (0.234) 25.83 (0.011) 
 M 2.94 (0.999) 1.72 (1.00) 
Mean bias U 17.0 21.6 
 M 5.7 4.0 
Median bias U 15.8 21.4 
 M 5.8 2.8 
Notes: PSM specification: 6-NN (oversampling) and a caliper of 0.25 of standard deviation of the calculated propensity 
scores. Also, we exclude heads whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less the minimum of the control 
group. Observations include the treatment and control households. Head of households with less barriers to 
employment include heads with no criminal history, and high school diploma, GED, or higher educational attainment. 
Single mother households include single parent, female-headed households. ‘U’ indicates unmatched, and ‘M’ 
means matched with the PSM. * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent, and *** at 1 percent level.          
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Table 3.13: Difference-in-Differences Estimates:  
Effects of the MTW Self-Sufficiency Program on Labor Market Outcomes 
(Non-Attrition Group Only) 
 
  
CM 
 Difference-in-Differences 
Estimates 
 Difference-in-Differences 
Estimates with PSM  
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
All sampled head of households          
  Head, Employment status 0.570  0.111* 
(0.064) 
0.129** 
(0.062) 
468  0.078** 
(0.037) 
0.103* 
(0.058) 
440 
  Head, Weekly hours worked 16.079  4.264** 
(2.158) 
4.694** 
(2.171) 
468  2.980** 
(1.374) 
3.679* 
(2.045) 
440 
Head of households with less barriers to employment          
  Head, Employment status 0.649 
 
 0.186** 
(0.086) 
0.197** 
(0.082) 
328  0.154* 
(0.086) 
0.173** 
(0.076) 
294 
  Head, Weekly hours worked 18.906  6.108** 
(3.021) 
6.245** 
(3.021) 
328  5.706* 
(3.252) 
6.007* 
(3.264) 
294 
Single mother households          
  Head, Employment status 0.646  0.118 
(0.092) 
0.120 
(0.094) 
270  0.052 
(0.144) 
0.063 
(0.150) 
250 
Head, Weekly hours worked 18.643  4.869 
(3.082) 
4.734 
(3.141) 
270  2.922 
(4.584) 
2.233 
(4.850) 
250 
Controls   N Y   N Y  
Notes: Difference-in-Differences estimates for the program effects. Head of households with less barriers to employment include heads with no criminal 
history, and high school diploma, GED, or higher educational attainment. Single mother households include single parent, female-headed households. CM 
represents for the control mean. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) specification: 6-NN (oversampling) and a caliper of 0.25 of standard deviation 
of the calculated propensity scores. Also, we exclude heads whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less the minimum of the control 
group. Control variables include head, age; head, female; head, divorced; head, single; household, size; household, children; and household, adult 
member. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent, and *** at 1 percent level. 
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3.8. Figures 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Implementation Timetable of the MTW Self-Sufficiency Program 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Timeline of Study 
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Figure 3.3: Density Distribution of Propensity Score: 
 
A. All Sampled Head of Households 
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Figure 3.3 (continued) 
 
 
B. Head of Household with Less Barriers to Employment 
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Figure 3.3 (continued) 
 
 
C. Head of Household with Less Barriers to Employment 
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APPENDIX A 
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION 
A.1 Family Share of Rents 
Annual consumption of non-housing goods (𝑁𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑗) is defined by subtracting annual family share 
of rent (𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑗) from annual gross income (𝑦𝑖).  
(1)     𝑁𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑗 =  𝑦𝑖 − 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑛 
Also, 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑗 is determined by subtracting Housing Authority Payment (𝐻𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗) from gross rent (𝐺𝑅𝑗) 
which is defined by the sum of contract rent and expected utility payment.  
(2)     𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑗 = 𝐺𝑅𝑗 − 𝐻𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗 
The 𝐻𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗 is calculated by subtracting the Tenant Total Payments (𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑖) from Payment Standard 
(𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗) if 𝐺𝑗 is less than the 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗, otherwise and subtracting the 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑖 from the gross rent (𝐺𝑅𝑛).  
(3)     𝐻𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗 = {
𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗 − 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑖 if 𝐺𝑅𝑗 ≥ 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗
𝐺𝑅𝑗 − 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑖  if 𝐺𝑅𝑗 < 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗
  
By substituting eq. (3) to eq. (2), 
(4)     𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑗 = {
𝐺𝑅𝑗 − 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗 + 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑖  if 𝐺𝑅𝑗 ≥ 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗
𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑖                             if 𝐺𝑅𝑗 < 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗
 
By substituting eq. (4) to eq. (1),  
(5)     𝑁𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑗 = {
𝑦𝑖 − 12 ∗ (𝐺𝑅𝑗 − 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗 + 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑖) if 𝐺𝑅𝑗 ≥ 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗
𝑦𝑖 − 12 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑖  if 𝐺𝑅𝑗 < 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗
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A.2 Study Area 
The entire areas in Figure A.1 presents Champaign County, and colored areas represent the study 
areas for Chapter 1. Low-poverty region is defined by the neighborhoods with less than 10 percent 
of population below poverty threshold. Mid-poverty neighborhood has between 10 and 30 percent 
of population below poverty threshold, and high-poverty neighborhood has more than 30 percent 
of population below poverty threshold. 
 
Figure A.1: Champaign-Urbana Cities 
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